Bolt-on Differential Privacy for Scalable Stochastic Gradient Descent-based Analytics

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Joint work with Fengan Li, Arun Kumar, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Somesh Jha and Jeffrey Naughton

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### Theme of the Talk

- Better differentially private Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
	- SGD is a popular optimization algorithm for machine learning.
	- Differential privacy is the de facto standard in formalizing privacy.
- Improve private SGD on the following aspects simultaneously:
	- Easier to implement: "Bolt on" with an existing implementation.
	- Run faster,
	- Better convergence/accuracy and
	- Support a stronger privacy model.
- Essence behind the "all-win" improvements: A novel analysis of the *L*2-sensitivity of SGD.

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## Background: Differential Privacy

- [Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith, TCC 2006]
	- A formal notion on how to anonymize participation.
	- Gödel Prize 2017.

- Intuition for differential privacy:
	- Participation is anonymized if it causes little change to the output.
- Has become the de-facto standard of protecting data privacy.
	- Differential privacy will be in your pocket (iOS 10)!
	- Google's RAPPOR.



# Background: More Differential Privacy (1/2)

#### • *ε*-differentially privacy

- A stability property of a randomized algorithm *M*.
- For any neighboring *S ∼ S ′* , and any event *E*,

$$
S' = \{z_1, \dots, z_{i-1}, z'_i, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_m\}
$$
  
\n
$$
S = \{z_1, \dots, z_{i-1}, z_i, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_m\}
$$
  
\n
$$
Pr[\mathcal{M}(S) \in E] \le e^{\varepsilon} \cdot Pr[\mathcal{M}(S') \in E]
$$

- (*ε, δ*)-differential privacy: A relaxation.
	- $\cdot$  Pr $[\mathcal{M}(S) \in E]$  ≤  $e^{\varepsilon}$  Pr $[\mathcal{M}(S') \in E]$ +δ
	- Qualitatively weaker privacy model.

# Background: More Differential Privacy (2/2)

- *ε* is a ratio bound that measures the strength of privacy. • Smaller *ε*, stronger privacy.
- We inject random noise to ensure privacy.
	- Typically: Smaller *ε ↔* More noise *↔* Less accurate statistics.
- The "game" of finding better differentially private algorithms:
	- For the same  $\varepsilon$  we want less noise and better accuracy.
	- The key challenge: How to inject noise?

# Background: Optimization and Machine Learning

- Setup:
	- $Z$  =  $X \times Y$ : a sample space.
	- Let  $S = \{(x_i, y_i) : i \in [m]\}$ , a training set.
	- $\boldsymbol{\cdot} \ \ \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ , a hypothesis space.
	- $\ell : \mathcal{W} \times Z \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ , a loss function.
- Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM): Find *w ∈ W* that minimizes:

$$
\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^m \ell(w,(x_i,y_i))
$$

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*m*: training set size.

## Stochastic Gradient Descent

- A fundamental algorithm for ERM,
- An iterative procedure: At iteration *t*, sample *i<sup>t</sup> ∼* [*m*], and

$$
w_{t+1} = w_t - \eta_t \nabla \ell_{i_t}(w_t).
$$

- Problem Statement: How to inject noise for SGD to get both private and accurate models?
	- Focus on convex optimization (*ℓ<sup>i</sup>* is convex).
	- Some remarks on non-convex optimization in the backup slides.

## A Remark: Why Differentially Private SGD?

- SGD is fundamental for training machine learning models.
	- In particular on large scale datasets.
	- Private SGD implies automatic privacy for all these models.
- More robust privacy guarantees
	- Many previous work on private ERM requires assumptions in finding the exact minimizer, which is too idealistic.
	- Making SGD private avoids any such assumption.

## Previous Private SGD

A common paradigm: Inject noise at each iteration.

• Each step locally private, global privacy follows from composition.

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### [+]: Pros, [-]: Cons.

- [Song, Chaudhuri and Sarwate (GlobalSIP 2013)]
	- [-] A lot of noise for each iteration, very "inaccurate" model.
- [Bassily, Smith and Thakurta (STOC 2014)]
	- [+] Reduces noise for each iteration, and improves composition.
	- [-] The composition only works for  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy.
	- $\bm{\cdot}$  [-] (Their proof) needs  $\Theta(m^2)$  iterations to converge.

#### • Both approaches

- [-] Relatively hard to implement.
- [-] Large runtime overhead.

## Our Proposal

- Use the classic "output perturbation" method.
	- Inject noise only at the end to the result of non-private SGD.
- Analyze "global stability" of SGD:

 $L_2$ -sensitivity :  $\Delta_2$  =  $\max_{S,S',r,r'}$  $||SGD(r, S) - SGD(r', S')||_2$ 

[Challenge] Upper bound  $\Delta_2$  by a small quantity.

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[Challenge] Upper bound  $\Delta_2$  by a small quantity.

- [Our Contribution] Address the challenge by a novel analysis of  $\Delta_2$ .
- Automatic benefits
	- [+] Easier to implement: "Bolt on" with an existing implementation.
	- [+] Low runtime overhead.

# Our Algorithms: The New Part is How to Set  $\Delta_2$

**Algorithm 1 Private Convex Permutation-based SGD** 

**Require:**  $\ell(\cdot, z)$  is convex for every  $z, \eta \leq 2/\beta$ . **Input:** Data S, parameters  $k, \eta, \varepsilon$ 1: **function** PrivateConvexPSGD( $S, k, \epsilon, \eta$ )<br>2:  $w \leftarrow PSGD(S)$  with k passes and  $\eta_t = \eta$  $\frac{2!}{3!}$ <br> $\frac{3!}{4!}$ <br>5:  $\frac{\Delta_2 \leftarrow 2kL\eta}{\Delta_2 \leftarrow 2kL\eta}$  Sample noise vector  $\kappa$  according to (3). return  $w + \kappa$ 

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1: function PrivateConvexPSGD(S,  $k, \varepsilon, \eta$ )  $w \leftarrow \text{PSGD}(S)$  with k passes and  $\eta_t = \eta$  $\overline{2}$ 

 $\sqrt{3}$  $\Delta_2 \leftarrow 2kL\eta$ 

 $\overline{4:}$ Sample noise vector  $\kappa$  according to (3).

 $5:$ return  $w + \kappa$ 

Algorithm 2 Private Strongly Convex Permutation-based SGD

**Require:**  $\ell(\cdot, z)$  is  $\gamma$ -strongly convex for every z **Input:** Data  $S$ , parameters  $k, \varepsilon$ 1: function PrivateStronglyConvexPSGD( $S, k, \varepsilon$ )  $2:$  $w \leftarrow \text{PSGD}(S)$  with k passes and  $\eta_t = \min(\frac{1}{\beta}, \frac{1}{\gamma t})$  $\overline{\Delta_2 \leftarrow \frac{2L}{\gamma m}}$ <br>Sample noise vector  $\kappa$  according to (3).  $\sqrt{3:}$  $\overline{4:}$ 5: return  $w + \kappa$ 

# Theoretical Guarantees of Our Algorithms

With output perturbation…

Theorem (Informal)

There is a private SGD algorithm based on output perturbation that gives both *ε*-differential privacy and convergence, even for 1 epoch over the data.

Intuition: Convergence with stronger privacy model (*ε*-DP).

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### Theorem (Informal)

For  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy and constant epochs, there is a private SGD algorithm based on output perturbation that gives  $(\log m)^{O(1)}$ -factor improvement in excess empirical risk over BST14.

Intuition: Better convergence for  $O(1)$  passes and  $(ε, δ)$ -DP.

# Empirical Study

- Datasets: MNIST (for this talk).
	- Recognize digits in images.
	- More datasets in the paper: KDDCup-2004 Protein, Forest Covertype.
- Model: Build logistic regression models (using SGD).
- Key Experimental Results:
	- Much faster running time.
	- Substantially better model accuracy.

## Implementation

### • Implemented using Bismarck

• An in-RDBMS analytics system.



• [Feng, Kumar, Recht and Re (SIGMOD 2012)]. • Using Permutation-based SGD to unify in-RDBMS analytics.

#### • Integration effort.

- Our algorithms: Trivial to integrate.
- SCS13, BST14: Needs to re-implement sampling functions inside Bismarck core.

# Experimental Results: Running Time

Much faster when CPU cost dominates the runtime:

• Negligible overhead compared to the noiseless version.



# Experimental Results: *ε*-Differential Privacy

More accurate for the same privacy guarantee (*ε*):



Figure : Convex case. Mini-batch size is 50, 10 epochs

# Experimental Results: (*ε, δ*)-Differential Privacy

Up to 4X better test accuracy:



Figure : Convex case.  $\delta = 1/m^2$ . Mini-batch size is 50, 10 epochs

# Very Roughly: How the Theory Works

- Sharpen and combine two recent theory advancements:
	- Stability of SGD in expectation: [Hardt, Recht and Singer, ICML 2016].
	- Convergence of Permutation-based SGD (PSGD): [Shamir, NIPS 2016].

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- Part 1: From "stability in expectation" to *ε*-differential privacy.
	- Have to use PSGD.
	- Key: If the randomness does not depend on *S*, then it suffices to bound

 $\max_{S,S',r}$   $\|SGD(r, S) - SGD(r, S')\|$ .

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 $\max_{S,S',r}$   $\|SGD(r, S) - SGD(r, S')\|$ .

- Differential privacy is really a notion of worst-case stability.
- Part 2: Convergence of private PSGD.
	- Convergence of PSGD is poorly understood in theory.
	- We mitigate this issue using Shamir's results.

### Important Details that We Do Not Cover

- Please refer to the paper for the following important details:
	- Proofs.
	- How batch sizes improve accuracy under the same privacy guarantee.
	- How to set hyperparameters.
	- How to do private parameter tuning.
	- Reduce dimensionality via random projection.
	- More lessons we learned (e.g. Our algorithms are easier to tune).
	- More implementation details (differential privacy can be very subtle).
	- More experimental results.
	- …

### Summary and Future Directions

- Better differentially private stochastic gradient descent
	- Bolt-on implementation, more efficient, produces more accurate models and supports a stronger privacy model.
- Many interesting things to do:
	- Better understanding of convergence of constant-epoch private SGD.
	- Principled ways to set batch size for private SGD?
	- Systematic comparison of different approaches to private ERM.
	- How does our work fit into the larger context of implementing a differential privacy system?
	- …

# Thanks!

**?**

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**Backup Slides**

## Better Analysis of  $L_2$ -Sensitivity of SGD

- Denote *A* the non-private SGD algorithm.
	- $\mathcal{A}(r,S): r$  the randomness part,  $S$  the input training set.
	- $\cal R$  : random variable where  $r$  is sampled from.
- Step 1: Reduce to the "same randomness" case.
	- In general, we need to bound

$$
\max_{S,S',r,r'} \|A(r,S) - A(r',S')\|.
$$

- Key: If the random variable  $R$  does not depend on  $S$ , then we can bound

$$
\max_{S, S', r} \|A(r, S) - A(r, S')\|.
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# "Same Randomness" *⇒* "Almost Identical Gradient Updates"

- Step 2: Analyze the "same randomness" case:
	- Permutation-based SGD (PSGD): We sample a random permutation *r* of [*m*], and cycle through *S* according to *r*.

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	- We have the following diagram  $(G_i)$  are functions)

$$
S: w_0 \xrightarrow{G_1} w_1 \xrightarrow{G_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{G_t} w_t \xrightarrow{G_{t+1}} \cdots \xrightarrow{G_T} w_T
$$
  

$$
\uparrow
$$
  

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\uparrow
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\uparrow
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\downarrow
$$
  

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\uparrow
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\downarrow
$$
  

$$
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$$

• Key: Due to "same randomness," in each pass we only encounter once the differing gradient update function  $G_{t^*} \neq G'_{t^*}.$ 

# Expansion Properties of Gradient Operators

 $\left[\text{Key Quantity}\right] \delta_t = \|w_t - w'_t\|$ 

Definition (Expansiveness)

An operator  $G: \mathcal{W} \mapsto \mathcal{W}$  is  $\rho$ -expansive if  $\sup_{w,w'} \frac{\|G(w)-G(w')\|}{\|w-w'\|} \leq \rho$ .

**Intuition:** Measure how  $\delta_t$  gets stretched/contracted.

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Intuition: Measure how *δ<sup>t</sup>* gets stretched/contracted.

#### Lemma (Nesterov, Polyak)

Assume that *ℓ* is *β*-smooth. Then, the following hold.

- 1. If  $\ell$  is convex, then for any  $\eta \leq 2/\beta$ ,  $G_{\ell,\eta}$  is 1-expansive.
- 2. If  $\ell$  is  $\gamma$ -strongly convex, then for  $\eta \leq \frac{2}{\beta+\gamma}$ ,  $G_{\ell,\eta}$  is  $(1-\frac{2\eta\beta\gamma}{\beta+\gamma})$ -expansive.

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# Our Results on Bounding *δ<sup>T</sup>*

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### Theorem (Convex)

Consider *k*-passes PSGD for *L*-Lipschitz, convex and *β*-smooth optimization. Let  $\eta_1 = \eta_2 = \cdots = \eta_T = \eta \leq \frac{2}{\beta}$ . Then  $\sup_{S \sim S'} \sup_r \delta_T \leq 2kL\eta$ .

Intuition:  $\delta_T = O(k\eta)$ .

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### Theorem (Strongly Convex)

Consider *k*-passes PSGD for *L*-Lipschitz, *γ*-strongly convex and *β*-smooth *optimization.* Let  $\eta_t$  = min $(\frac{1}{\gamma t}, \frac{1}{\beta})$ *. Then* sup<sub>*S*∼*S'*</sub> sup<sub>*r*</sub>  $\delta_T \leq \frac{2L}{\gamma m}$ *.* 

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Intuition:  $\delta_T = O(\frac{1}{m})$ .

## More Remarks on Implications of Our Results

- A recent paper [Zhang, Zheng, Mou and Wang, ArXiv 2017]
- Batch size *m* can lead to optimal excess empirical risk:
	- Note that this is nothing but Gradient Descent.
	- No need of Shamir's results as no randomness in gradient steps.
- Non-convex Optimization:
	- Basically, by choosing a "random" starting point and then SGD, one can get  $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy with convergence to a stationary point.