Reinforcing Adversarial Robustness using Model Confidence Induced by Adversarial Training

> Xi Wu xiwu@cs.wisc.edu

Joint work with Uyeong Jang, Jiefeng Chen, Lingjiao Chen, and Somesh Jha

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## Entirely wrong behavior of confidence

- Small perturbations can cause highly confident but wrong predictions.
- An example from (Goodfellows, Shlens, and Szegedy, ICLR 2015), on a naturally trained neural network:



 $\boldsymbol{x}$ "panda"<br>57.7% confidence



 $\text{sign}(\nabla_{\bm{x}} J(\bm{\theta}, \bm{x}, y))$ "nematode" 8.2% confidence



 $\begin{array}{c}\n x + \\
\epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y)) \\
 \text{``gibbon''} \\
 99.3 % confidence\n\end{array}$ 



### A better behavior

- Low confidence if the model "does not learn/know it."
- An intuitively good model for classifying pandas and gibbons (disks give natural data manifolds)



## Main contributions of this work

- In a precise formal sense, adversarial training by (Madry et al., ICLR 2017) gives better behavior of model confidence for points near the data distribution.
- The better behavior of model confidence induced by adversarial training can be used to improve adversarial robustness.

## Defining good behaviors of confidence (1/2)

**Intuition**: Confident predictions of different classes should be well separated. A bad  $(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}$  with poor confidence separation:



# Defining good behaviors of confidence (2/2)

- ${\mathcal D} \colon$  Data generating distribution;  $d(\cdot, \cdot) \colon$  A distance metric;  $p, q \in [0, 1], \delta \ge 0.$
- Bad event (Neighborhood has *p*-confident wrong predictions):

$$
\mathcal{B} = \{ \exists y' \neq y, \mathbf{x}' \in N(\mathbf{x}, \delta), F_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}')_{y'} \ge p \}
$$

-  $F$  is said to have  $(p,q,\delta)$  -separation if

$$
\Pr_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\,\mathcal{B}\,\right]\leq q.
$$

## Adversarial Training by Madry et al.

Adversarial training formulation of Madry et al.:

minimize 
$$
\rho(\theta)
$$
,  
where  $\rho(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[ \max_{\Delta \in \mathcal{S}} L(\theta, \mathbf{x} + \Delta, y) \right]$ ,

#### Theorem (Informal, this work)

For a large family of loss functions *L*, models trained as above achieve good  $(p, q, \delta)$ -separation, where as  $p \to 1$ ,  $q \to 0$ .

#### Empirical results (summary)

- We generate high-confidence attacks in order to bypass confidence-based defenses (as well as gradient-masking effect).
- Finding 1: Confidence of models trained using Madry et al.'s objective behave much better than their natural counterparts.
- Finding 2: A simple "nearest neighbor search" based on confidence corrects 20% *∼* 25% targeted adversarial examples that fool the baseline model of Madry et al.
- Finding 3: For *>* 98% of test instances, correct label can be found in two neighbors with highest confidences.

# Questions?

Please come to our poster session if you want to know more details!