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Complex-demand knapsack problems and incentives in AC power systems

Authors:

Lan Yu,

Chi-Kin ChauAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '13: Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

Pages 973 - 980

Published: 06 May 2013 Publication History

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Abstract

We consider AC electrical systems where each electrical device has a power demand expressed as a complex number, and there is a limit on the magnitude of total power supply. Motivated by this scenario, we introduce the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP), a new variation of the traditional knapsack problem, where each item is associated with a demand as a complex number, rather than a real number often interpreted as weight or size of the item. While keeping the same goal as to maximize the sum of values of the selected items, we put the capacity limit on the magnitude of the sum of satisfied demands.

For C-KP, we prove its inapproximability by FPTAS (unless P = NP), as well as presenting a (1/2-e)-approximation algorithm. Furthermore, we investigate the selfish multi-agent setting where each agent is in charge of one item, and an agent may misreport the demand and value of his item for his own interest. We show a simple way to adapt our approximation algorithm to be monotone, which is sufficient for the existence of incentive compatible payments such that no agent has an incentive to misreport. Our results shed insight on the design of multi-agent systems for smart grid.

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Cited By

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Khonji MChau SElbassioni K(2018)Approximation Scheduling Algorithms for Electric Vehicle Charging with Discrete Charging OptionsProceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Future Energy Systems10.1145/3208903.3213895(579-585)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3208903.3213895
Elbassioni KNguyen T(2017)Approximation algorithms for binary packing problems with quadratic constraints of low cp-rank decompositionsDiscrete Applied Mathematics10.1016/j.dam.2017.06.020230:C(56-70)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.dam.2017.06.020
Chau CElbassioni KKhonji M(2016)Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart GridACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/29550895:1(1-29)Online publication date: 10-Oct-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2955089
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Complex-demand knapsack problems and incentives in AC power systems
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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Published In

AAMAS '13: Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

May 2013

1500 pages

ISBN:9781450319935

General Chairs:
Maria Gini
University of Minnesota, USA
,
Onn Shehory
IBM Haifa Research Lab, Israel
,
Program Chairs:
Takayuki Ito
Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan
,
Catholijn Jonker
Delft Institute of Technology, The Netherlands

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SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

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Published: 06 May 2013

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AAMAS '13: International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

May 6 - 10, 2013

MN, St. Paul, USA

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AAMAS '13 Paper Acceptance Rate 140 of 599 submissions, 23%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Khonji MChau SElbassioni K(2018)Approximation Scheduling Algorithms for Electric Vehicle Charging with Discrete Charging OptionsProceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Future Energy Systems10.1145/3208903.3213895(579-585)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3208903.3213895
Elbassioni KNguyen T(2017)Approximation algorithms for binary packing problems with quadratic constraints of low cp-rank decompositionsDiscrete Applied Mathematics10.1016/j.dam.2017.06.020230:C(56-70)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.dam.2017.06.020
Chau CElbassioni KKhonji M(2016)Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart GridACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/29550895:1(1-29)Online publication date: 10-Oct-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2955089
Elbassioni KNguyen T(2015)Approximation Schemes for Multi-objective Optimization with Quadratic Constraints of Fixed CP-RankProceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory - Volume 934610.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_17(273-287)Online publication date: 27-Sep-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_17
Chau CElbassioni KKhonji MBazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)Truthful mechanisms for combinatorial AC electric power allocationProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617406(1005-1012)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2615731.2617406

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On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods

A robust combinatorial auction mechanism against shill bidders

Mechanisms for complement-free procurement

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