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Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination

Published: 04 May 2015 Publication History

Abstract

This paper proposes an alternative automated mechanism design approach called parametric mechanism design via quantifier elimination (PMD-QE), which utilizes QE, a symbolic formula manipulation technique. In PMD-QE, we start from a skeleton of mechanisms, which is characterized by a set of parameters, e.g., critical values. The range of parameters where the given constraints are satisfied is automatically identified by QE. To demonstrate the potential of this idea, we are able to identify a non-trivial dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanism for a setting where a bidder has a publicly known budget limit.

References

[1]
B. Caviness and J. Johnson, editors. Quantifier Elimination and Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
[2]
S. Dobzinski, R. Lavi, and N. Nisan. Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2):486--503, 2012.
[3]
J.-J. Laffont and J. Robert. Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers. Economics Letters, 52(2):181--186, 1996.
[4]
E. S. Maskin. Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers. European Economic Review, 44(4--6):667--681, 2000.
[5]
T. Sandholm. Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP), pages 19--36, 2003.

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences
AAMAS '15: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 2015
2072 pages
ISBN:9781450334136

Sponsors

  • IFAAMAS

In-Cooperation

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 04 May 2015

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Author Tags

  1. budget limit
  2. mechanism design
  3. quantifier elimination
  4. vcg

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  • Poster

Funding Sources

  • JSPS KAKENHI

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AAMAS'15
Sponsor:

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AAMAS '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 108 of 670 submissions, 16%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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