research-article

Complexity and Algorithms of K-implementation

Authors:

Pingzhong Tang,

Shuran ZhengAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

Pages 5 - 13

Published: 09 May 2016 Publication History

Abstract

This paper settles the complexity of K-implementation, a ten-year open problem in AI. The problem is for a designer to modify an existing normal-form game, in a cost-optimal way, so as to ensure the solutions of the modified game fall into a given set of outcomes. We first prove that the problem is NP-COMPLETE for general games with respect to dominance by pure strategies, and then provide an alternative proof showing that the problem is NP-COMPLETE even for two-player games with respect to dominance by mixed strategies. We then consider a related but different objective, show its hardness and develop computationally efficient algorithms for a class of well-known games called supermodular games. For this objective, we are able to provide an optimal algorithm based on mixed-integer linear program. Interestingly, this algorithm also provides a lower-bound approximation guarantee for the original K-implementation problem and approximates the optimal solution well in experiments.

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Cited By

Sauerberg NOesterheld CDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility TransfersProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663026(1654-1663)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663026
Deng YConitzer VSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Disarmament gamesProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298310(473-479)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298310

Index Terms

Complexity and Algorithms of K-implementation
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
      1. Multi-agent systems

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

May 2016

1580 pages

ISBN:9781450342391

General Chairs:
Catholijn M. Jonker
TU Delft, Netherlands
,
Stacy Marsella
University of Southern California, USA
,
Program Chairs:
John Thangarajah
RMIT University. Australia
,
Karl Tuyls
University of Liverpool, UK

Sponsors

IFAAMAS

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 09 May 2016

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Research-article

Funding Sources

Tsinghua Initiative Scientific Research Grant
National Basic Research Program of China Grant
Natural Science Foundation of China

Conference

AAMAS '16

Sponsor:

AAMAS '16: International Conference on Agents and Multiagent Systems

May 9 - 13, 2016

Singapore, Singapore

Acceptance Rates

AAMAS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 137 of 550 submissions, 25%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Citations

Cited By

Sauerberg NOesterheld CDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility TransfersProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663026(1654-1663)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663026
Deng YConitzer VSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Disarmament gamesProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298310(473-479)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298310

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