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Ports Distribution Management for Privacy Protection inside Local Domain Name System

Published: 28 October 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Domain Name System (DNS) had been recognized as an indispensable and fundamental infrastructure of current Internet. However, due to the original design philosophy and easy access principle, one can conveniently wiretap the DNS requests and responses. Such phenomenon is a serious threat for user privacy protection especially when an inside hacking takes place. Motivated by such circumstances, we proposed a ports distribution management solution to relieve the potential information leakage inside local DNS. Users will be able to utilize pre-assigned port numbers instead of default port 53. Selection method of port numbers at the server side and interactive process with corresponding end host are investigated. The necessary implementation steps, including modifications of destination port field, extension option usage, etc., are also discussed. A mathematical model is presented to further evaluate the performance. Both the possible blocking probability and port utilization are illustrated. We expect that this solution will be beneficial not only for the users in security enhancement, but also for the DNS servers in resources optimization.

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  • (2018)Performance evaluation of secure multipath retransmission mechanism in next generation heterogeneous communication systemsIET Networks10.1049/iet-net.2017.01167:2(61-67)Online publication date: Mar-2018

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  1. Ports Distribution Management for Privacy Protection inside Local Domain Name System

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    MIST '16: Proceedings of the 8th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats
    October 2016
    126 pages
    ISBN:9781450345712
    DOI:10.1145/2995959
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Publication History

    Published: 28 October 2016

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    Author Tags

    1. domain name system
    2. ports distribution
    3. privacy protection
    4. resource management

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    • Research-article

    Funding Sources

    • The Natural Science Foundation of China
    • The Institute for Information and communications Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP)
    • The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
    • The Project of State Grid Corporation of China

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    MIST '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 8 of 22 submissions, 36%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 21 of 54 submissions, 39%

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    • (2018)Performance evaluation of secure multipath retransmission mechanism in next generation heterogeneous communication systemsIET Networks10.1049/iet-net.2017.01167:2(61-67)Online publication date: Mar-2018

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