Attacking Power Indices by Manipulating Player Reliability
Pages 538 - 546
Abstract
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game.
We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable, even though computing power indices is feasible.
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Published In
May 2019
2518 pages
ISBN:9781450363099
- General Chairs:
- Edith Elkind,
- Manuela Veloso,
- Program Chairs:
- Noa Agmon,
- Matthew E. Taylor
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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
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Published: 08 May 2019
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May 13 - 17, 2019
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AAMAS '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 193 of 793 submissions, 24%;
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