Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

Francesc Dilme

No 148, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the approach by providing novel comparative statics results in different applications.

Keywords: Strategic Communication; Small Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_148_2022.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest (2022)
Working Paper: Strategic Communication With a Small Conflict of Interest (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:148

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