The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States

Manuela Krause and Niklas Potrafke
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuela Kauder

No 302, ifo Working Paper Series from ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Abstract: Since 2007 the German state governments have been allowed by a constitutional reform to set real estate transfer tax rates. We exploit this reform and investigate whether government ideology predicts the levels and increases in the real estate transfer tax rates. The results show that leftwing and center governments were more active in increasing the real estate transfer tax rates than rightwing governments. Many voters were disenchanted with the policies and platforms of the established German parties. Disenchantment notwithstanding, real estate transfer tax policies show that the established political parties are still prepared to offer polarized policies.

Keywords: Real estate transfer tax; partisan politics; reform; government ideology; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H20 H71 P16 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States (2020)
Working Paper: The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ifowps:_302

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