Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality

David G. Pearce
Additional contact information
David G. Pearce: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://cowles.yale.edu/

No 983, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The paper is a survey written for the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society. It is devoted largely to a discussion of the progress made in the last decade in understanding the structure of self-enforcing agreements in discounted supergames of complete information. Perfect and imperfect monitoring models are considered in turn, with attention given to the case of substantial impatience as well as to the various "folk theorems." The emphasis is on the features of constrained-optimal perfect equilibria, causes of inefficiency, and some relationships among different strands of the literature. The remainder of the paper is a critical and comparative consideration of recent work on renegotiation in repeated games.

Keywords: Repeated game; self-enforcing contracts; supergames; folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 1991-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 132-174

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d09/d0983.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:983

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().