Incorporating rigidity and commitment in the timing structure of macroeconomic games

Jan Libich and Petr Stehlík

Economic Modelling, 2010, vol. 27, issue 3, 767-781

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel framework that generalizes the timing structure of games. Building on alternating move games and models of rational inattention, the players' actions may be rigid, i.e., infrequent. This rigidity in the timing of moves makes the game more dynamic and asynchronous, acting as a commitment mechanism. Therefore, it can enhance cooperation and often eliminate inefficient equilibrium outcomes present in the static (normal form) game. Interestingly, (i) this can happen even in a finite game (possibly as short as two periods) and (ii) without reputation building. Furthermore, (iii) the required degree of commitment may be under some circumstances arbitrarily low and under others infinitely high. Our main example comes from macroeconomics in which various rigidities have played a central role. Investigating the Kydland-Prescott-Barro-Gordon monetary policy game, we derive the necessary and sufficient degree of long-term policy commitment to low inflation under which the influential time-inconsistency problem is eliminated.

Keywords: Asynchronous; moves; Dynamic; games; Commitment; Rigidity; Time-inconsistency; Inflation; targeting; Central; Bank; independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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