Heterogeneous norms: Social image and social pressure when people disagree
Vera L. te Velde
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 194, issue C, 319-340
Abstract:
Social pressure has been successfully used to encourage prosocial behavior in a diverse range of settings. Some backfiring results, however, have prompted a closer look at the necessary conditions for success. I propose that disagreement about what the right thing is to do is one key underexplored factor that can explain these findings. Existing models of social image break down when personal norms are heterogeneous because it’s unclear which choice provides the best image. Some models have addressed this by assuming individuals seek the approval of a relevant reference network, but this approval seeking is qualitatively different from the signaling role of normative behavior that has been shown to be very important in homogeneous norm settings. I distinguish “respect” as the type of social image attained when one’s actions are inferred to be motivated by strong personal beliefs, from “approval”, which is obtained when one’s actions are judged to be normatively correct. Using a psychological game theoretic model, I show how these distinct motives lead to different outcomes in terms of consensus, hypocrisy, compromise, polarization, and destructive posturing. Results demonstrate how using social incentives to change behavior may easily backfire if heterogeneous norms, or approval and respect, are conflated.
Keywords: Norms; Social pressure; Social image; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D71 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:194:y:2022:i:c:p:319-340
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.013
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