Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence
Lorenzo Sacconi and
Marco Faillo ()
Constitutional Political Economy, 2010, vol. 21, issue 2, 201 pages
Keywords: Conformist preferences; Reciprocity; Veil of ignorance; Psychological games; Fairness; Experiments; C7; C9; D63; D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-009-9080-x
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