Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell ()

No 12776, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess -- since such information has value to consumers -- voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent.

JEL-codes: D18 D62 D82 H23 K13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-reg
Note: LE CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 360-379.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks (2012)
Working Paper: Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks (2006)
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