Identification in Matching Games

Jeremy Fox

No 15092, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are nonparametrically identified. In particular, the ratios of complementarities from multiple pairs of inputs are identified. Also, the ordering of production levels is identified.

JEL-codes: C14 C3 C35 C71 D4 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: IO LS TWP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.

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Journal Article: Identification in matching games (2010)
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