Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model

Francisco Rodríguez and Eduardo Zambrano

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2022, vol. 10, issue 1, No 8, 105-116

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.

Keywords: Credibility and commitment; Political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model (2021)
Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00220-8

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