An empirical model of the multi‐unit, sequential, clock auction

Stephen G. Donald, Harry Paarsch and Jacques Robert

Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, vol. 21, issue 8, 1221-1247

Abstract: We construct a model of participation and bidding at multi‐unit, sequential, clock auctions when bidders have multi‐unit demand. We describe conditions sufficient to characterize a symmetric, perfect‐Bayesian equilibrium and then demonstrate that this equilibrium induces an efficient allocation. We propose an algorithm, based on the generalized Vickrey auction, to calculate the expected winning bid for each unit sold. This algorithm allows us to construct a simulation‐based estimator of the parameters for both the participation process and the distribution of latent valuations. We apply our method to data from 37 multi‐lot, sequential, English auctions of export permits for timber held in Russia. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.854

Related works:
Journal Article: An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:japmet:v:21:y:2006:i:8:p:1221-1247

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www3.intersci ... e.jsp?issn=0883-7252

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Applied Econometrics is currently edited by M. Hashem Pesaran

More articles in Journal of Applied Econometrics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().