Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?

Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Delroy M. Hunter and Yun Zhu

No 16/2017, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland

Abstract: There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.

JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure? (2017)
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