Outside Versus Inside Bonds

Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher Waller

No 372, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist � borrow or sell assets. We compare the welfare properties of these options in two economies: in one, agents can borrow (issue inside bonds) and in the other they can sell government bonds (outside bonds). All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds and that the converse is not true. Moreover, under best policies, the allocation with outside bonds strictly Pareto dominates the allocation with inside bonds.

Keywords: Liquidity; Financial markets; Monetary policy; Search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:372

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