Paper 2010/590
Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks
Andrey Bogdanov and Ilya Kizhvatov
Abstract
The fundamental problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is central to side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework enhancing side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of collision detection efficiency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel traces are developed based on a statistical model of Euclidean distance. The theoretical and experimental results of this work confirm that DPA-combined collision attacks are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of dimension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a wide-spread 8-bit RISC microcontroller whose architecture is similar to that of many smart cards.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- side-channel attackscombined collision attackslinear collision attacksDPAAES
- Contact author(s)
- andrey bogdanov @ esat kuleuven be
- History
- 2011-05-11: last of 2 revisions
- 2010-11-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/590
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/590,
author = {Andrey Bogdanov and Ilya Kizhvatov},
title = {Beyond the Limits of {DPA}: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/590},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/590}
}
