Paper 2016/720
A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption
Seung Geol Choi, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tal Malkin, and Hoeteck Wee
Abstract
We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryption. Instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message; the encoding is based on an error-correcting code with certain properties of reconstruction and secrecy from partial views, satisfied, e.g., by a Reed-Solomon code.
Note: An extended abstract [CDMW08] appeared in TCC 2008 under the title “Black-Box Construction of a Non- malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One”
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in JOC 2017
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z
- Contact author(s)
- choi @ usna edu
- History
- 2017-03-16: revised
- 2016-07-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/720
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/720,
author = {Seung Geol Choi and Dana Dachman-Soled and Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee},
title = {A Black-Box Construction of Non-Malleable Encryption from Semantically Secure Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/720},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.1007/s00145-017-9254-z},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/720}
}
