

# Construction of Large Families of Pseudorandom Subsets of the Set $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ Using Elliptic Curves

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## Abstract

Pseudo-random subsets of the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  have many applications in the fields of network security, cryptography and other security issues. Recently, Dartyge and Sárközy investigated the measures—the well distribution measure and the correlation measure of order  $k$ —of pseudorandomness of subsets of the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ , and they presented several constructive examples for subsets with strong pseudorandom properties when  $N$  is a prime number. In this article, we present a construction of pseudo-random subsets by using elliptic curves over finite fields and estimate their pseudorandom measures. Exponential sums play an important role in the proofs.

*Keywords:* Cryptography, pseudo-random subsets, elliptic curves

## 1 Introduction

Random subsets of the positive integers not exceeding a certain fixed integer  $N$  have many applications in the fields of network security, cryptography and other security issues. Many researchers find out that using random subsets can improve the efficiency and security performance in the key pre-distribution procedure, then propose key management and broadcasting authentication protocol in P2P, ad hoc network and wireless sensor network [1, 19]. Anonymous communication is one of important security methods to defense passive attacks in network. Random subsets can play an efficient role in constructing an anonymous path and avoid routing information being intercepted [21]. As we know random subsets can also be used to construct key exchange and private matching [20]. In particular, in stream ciphers random subsets of a finite field are applied to construct binary sequences with strong pseudorandom properties, see, e.g. [12, 17]. As indicated in [7], it suffices to study subsets of  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ ,

the study of subsets of other finite ordered sets can be reduced to this case, which leads to use the number theoretic tools intensively.

A challenging problem is how to efficiently construct random subsets of the positive integers not exceeding a certain fixed integer  $N$ . However, in most cases we replace the random subset by a pseudorandom subset, which “looks random”, and which is constructed by a suitable algorithm. But when is a subset a “good” pseudorandom subset? Recently, Dartyge, Mosaki and Sárközy introduced and studied the pseudo-random measures of subsets of the set of the positive integers not exceeding  $N$  [7, 8, 9]. These measures are closely related to the measures of pseudorandomness of binary sequences introduced by Mauduit and Sárközy [17] and of the  $p$ -pseudorandom binary sequences defined by Hubert and Sárközy [13].

For a subset  $\mathcal{R}$  of  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ , define the associated sequence  $E_N$  by

$$E_N = E_N(\mathcal{R}) = \{e_1, \dots, e_N\} \in \left\{ 1 - \frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N}, -\frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N} \right\}^N$$

with

$$e_m = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N} & \text{for } m \in \mathcal{R} \\ -\frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (m = 1, \dots, N). \quad (1)$$

Then the *well-distribution measure* of the subset  $\mathcal{R}$  of  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  is defined by

$$W(\mathcal{R}, E_N) = \max_{a,b,t} \left| \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} e_{a+jb} \right|$$

where the maximum is taken over all  $a, b, t$  such that  $a, b, t \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $1 \leq a \leq a + (t-1)b \leq N$ , while the *correlation measure of order  $k$*  of  $\mathcal{R}$  is defined as

$$C_k(\mathcal{R}, E_N) = \max_{M,D} \left| \sum_{m=1}^M e_{m+d_1} e_{m+d_2} \cdots e_{m+d_k} \right|$$

where the maximum is taken over all  $D = (d_1, \dots, d_k)$  with non-negative integers  $0 \leq d_1 < \dots < d_k$  and  $M$  such that  $M + d_k \leq N$ . One would expect that these measures are “small”. Thus we may consider a subset  $\mathcal{R}$  of  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  as a “good” pseudo-random subset if  $W(\mathcal{R}, E_N)$  and  $C_k(\mathcal{R}, E_N)$  (at least for small  $k$ ) are small; they must be  $O(N)$  and ideally, they are  $O(N^{1/2+\varepsilon})$  [10].

Dartyge, Mosaki and Sárközy presented some good constructions of pseudo-random subsets when  $N$  is a prime number in [7, 8, 9, 10]. In [5] we present a construction of pseudo-random subsets for  $N = pq$  with  $2 < p < q < 2p$  by using generalized cyclotomic classes modulo  $N$ . However in applications one usually needs large families of pseudo-random subsets. It is interesting to design “good” pseudo-random subsets for different  $N$  using different algebraic systems. It is a natural way to choose elliptic curves over finite fields, partially for the elliptic curve cryptography for extensive use. We will apply elliptic curves to constructing some families of pseudo-random subsets and analyze their pseudorandom measures in the present paper.

We first introduce some notions and basic facts of elliptic curves over finite fields. Let  $p > 3$  be a (large) prime,  $\mathbb{F}_p$  the finite field of  $p$  elements which we identify with the set  $\{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$ ,  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  the set of non-zero elements of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , given by an affine Weierstrass equation of the standard form

$$y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$$

with coefficients  $A, B \in \mathbb{F}_p$  and nonzero discriminant, see [11]. It is known that the set, denoted by  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ , of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ -rational points of  $\mathcal{E}$  forms an Abelian group under an appropriate composition rule denoted by  $\oplus$  and with the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$  as the neutral element. We recall that

$$|\#\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p) - p - 1| \leq 2p^{1/2},$$

where  $\#\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is the number of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ -rational points, including the point at infinity  $\mathcal{O}$ . The translation map by  $W \in \mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  on  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is defined as

$$\tau_W : P \mapsto P \oplus W.$$

It is obvious that  $(f \circ \tau_W)(P) = f(\tau_W(P)) = f(P \oplus W)$ .

In this article, for convenience, we always suppose that  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is a cyclic group of order  $N$  and  $G \in \mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is a generator, i.e.,  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p) = \langle G \rangle$ . In particular,  $N \sim p$  in this case. A multiple of  $G$  is taken by  $nG = \oplus_{i=1}^n G$ . We write  $nG = (x_n, y_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p$  on  $\mathcal{E}$  for all  $1 \leq n \leq N-1$  and set  $X(nG) = x_n$  and  $Y(nG) = y_n$ .

**Construction of subsets.** We would like to study the pseudorandom properties of the subset  $\mathcal{R}$  of  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  defined by

$$\mathcal{R} := \{n \mid 1 \leq n \leq N, X(nG) \equiv h \pmod{p} \text{ for any } h \in H\} \quad (2)$$

where  $r \in \mathbb{Z}, s \in \mathbb{N}, s < p/2$  and  $H = \{r, r+1, \dots, r+s-1\}$ .

We remark that  $\mathcal{R}$  can be defined in several different ways using elliptic curves, we refer to a preprint version of [12], which is available at <http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/editions/preprint2002/preprint2002.html>, and [2, 3, 4] for related issues.

We also note that one can use some rational functions  $f(X, Y)$ , a more general case, instead of  $X$  in Equation (2).

## 2 The Cardinality of $\mathcal{R}$

Exponential sums play an important role in the proofs to estimate the cardinality of  $\mathcal{R}$  and its pseudo-random measures.

For any positive integer  $m$ , we identify  $\mathbb{Z}_m$  with the residue ring modulo  $m$ . Put

$$e_m(z) = \exp(2\pi iz/m).$$

The exponential sums enter into our problem by means of the following well known basic identity.

**Lemma 1 ([15]).** For any element  $c \in \mathbb{Z}_m$ , we have

$$\sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}_m} e_m(cz) = \begin{cases} m, & \text{if } c = 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We also need the following statement.

**Lemma 2 ([15]).** The bound

$$\sum_{c=0}^{m-1} \left| \sum_{z=u+1}^{u+v} e_m(cz) \right| \leq m(1 + \log m)$$

holds for any integers  $u$  and  $1 \leq v \leq m$ .

Let  $\psi(z) = \exp(2\pi iz/p)$  be a classical additive character of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . We also need the following upper bound which is a special case of [14, Corollary 1].

**Lemma 3.** Let  $f$  be a nonconstant rational function and  $G \in \mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  be a rational point of order  $N$ . Then the bound

$$\left| \sum_{\substack{z=0 \\ f(zG) \neq \infty}}^{N-1} \psi(\lambda f(zG)) e_N(\eta z) \right| \leq 2\deg(f)p^{1/2}$$

holds for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $\eta \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ . Hence the bound on incomplete sums

$$\left| \sum_{\substack{z=u \\ f(zG) \neq \infty}}^v \psi(\lambda f(zG)) \right| \leq 2\deg(f)p^{1/2}(1 + \log N)$$

holds for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and integers  $0 \leq u < v \leq N-1$ .

We now present a bound on the cardinality of  $\mathcal{R}$ .

**Theorem 1.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be defined as in Equation (2). Then *Proof.* For  $1 \leq n \leq N - 1$ , it is easy to see that the cardinality of  $\mathcal{R}$  satisfies

$$\left| |\mathcal{R}| - \frac{sN}{p} \right| \leq 4p^{1/2}(1 + \log p).$$

*Proof.* From the definition of  $\mathcal{R}$  in Equation (2) and Lemma 1, we have

$$\sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p} \psi(\lambda(X(nG) - h)) = \begin{cases} p, & \text{if } n \in \mathcal{R} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Hence by Lemmas 2 and 3 we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{R}| &= \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{1}{p} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p} \psi(\lambda(X(nG) - h)) \\ &= \frac{s(N-1)}{p} + \\ &\quad \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \sum_{n=1}^N \psi(\lambda X(nG)) \\ &\leq \frac{s(N-1)}{p} + \\ &\quad \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \left| \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \right| \cdot \left| \sum_{n=1}^N \psi(\lambda X(nG)) \right| \\ &\leq \frac{sN}{p} + 4p^{1/2}(1 + \log p). \end{aligned}$$

We complete the proof of Theorem 1.  $\square$

### 3 Pseudo-random Measures of $\mathcal{R}$

Now we present upper bounds on the well-distribution measure and the correlation measure of order  $k$  of  $\mathcal{R}$  defined in Equation (2). The associated sequence  $E_N$  defined by Equation (1) is

$$e_m = \begin{cases} 1 - \alpha & \text{for } m \in \mathcal{R} \\ -\alpha & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where

$$\alpha = \frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N} = \frac{s}{p} + 8\theta p^{-1/2}(1 + \log p)$$

with some  $\theta$  satisfying  $|\theta| < 1$ , since  $N \sim p$ . Let  $\beta = \frac{s}{p} - \alpha$ .

Throughout this paper, the implied constant in the symbol “ $\ll$ ” is absolute.

**Theorem 2.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a subset of  $\{1, \dots, N\}$  defined as in Equation (2), we have

$$W(\mathcal{R}, E_N) \ll p^{1/2}(1 + \log p)(1 + \log N).$$

$$\begin{aligned} e_n &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{1}{p} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p} \psi(\lambda(X(nG) - h)) \\ &\quad - \alpha \left( 1 - \frac{1}{p} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p} \psi(\lambda(X(nG) - h)) \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{p} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p} \psi(\lambda(X(nG) - h)) - \alpha \\ &= \frac{s}{p} - \alpha + \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X(nG)) \\ &= \beta + \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X(nG)). \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

However  $e_N = -\alpha$ , since  $NG = \mathcal{O}$ .

Assume that  $a, b, t \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $1 \leq a \leq a + b(t - 1) \leq N$ . According to Equation (3), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} &\left| \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} e_{a+ib} \right| \\ &\leq \left| \frac{1}{p} \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X((a + ib)G)) \right| \\ &\quad + \left| \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \beta \right| + 1 \\ &\leq \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \left| \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \right| \cdot \left| \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \psi(\lambda X((a + ib)G)) \right| \\ &\quad + |t\beta| + 1 \\ &\leq 4p^{1/2}(1 + \log p)(1 + \log N) + |t\beta| + 1 \end{aligned}$$

by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 or [3, Lemma 5], which is derived from Lemma 3. And

$$|t\beta| = 8t\theta p^{-1/2}(1 + \log p) \leq 16p^{1/2}(1 + \log p)$$

since  $t \leq N \sim p$ . So we have

$$\left| \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} e_{a+ib} \right| \ll p^{1/2}(1 + \log p)(1 + \log N).$$

We complete the proof of Theorem 2.  $\square$

**Theorem 3.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a subset of  $\{1, \dots, N\}$  defined as in Equation (2), for  $k < p$ , we have

$$C_k(\mathcal{R}, E_N) \ll kp^{1/2}(2 + \log p)^k(1 + \log N).$$

*Proof.* Assume that integers  $d_1, \dots, d_k$  and  $M \in \mathbb{N}$  with

$$0 \leq d_1 < \dots < d_k, M + d_k \leq N.$$

Now using Equation (3), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left| \sum_{m=1}^M e_{m+d_1} e_{m+d_2} \cdots e_{m+d_k} \right| \\
 \leq & \left| \sum_{m=1}^M \prod_{i=1}^k \left( \beta + \frac{1}{p} \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X((m+d_i)G)) \right) \right| + 1 \\
 = & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} \left| \sum_{m=1}^M \prod_{i=1}^k \left( p\beta + \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X((m+d_i)G)) \right) \right| \\
 = & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} \left| \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{u=0}^k \sum_{1 \leq j_1 < \dots < j_u \leq k} (p\beta)^{k-u} \right. \\
 & \left. \prod_{i=1}^u \left( \sum_{\lambda \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-\lambda h) \psi(\lambda X((m+d_{j_i})G)) \right) \right| \\
 = & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} \left| \sum_{u=0}^k (p\beta)^{k-u} \sum_{1 \leq j_1 < \dots < j_u \leq k} \right. \\
 & \sum_{\lambda_1 \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \cdots \sum_{\lambda_u \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-h(\lambda_1 + \dots + \lambda_u)) \\
 & \left. \sum_{m=1}^M \psi \left( \sum_{v=1}^u \lambda_v X((m+d_{j_v})G) \right) \right| \\
 = & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} \left| \sum_{u=0}^k (p\beta)^{k-u} \sum_{1 \leq j_1 < \dots < j_u \leq k} \right. \\
 & \sum_{\lambda_1 \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-h\lambda_1) \cdots \sum_{\lambda_u \in \mathbb{F}_p^*} \sum_{h=r}^{r+s-1} \psi(-h\lambda_u) \\
 & \left. \sum_{m=1}^M \psi((\lambda_1 X \circ \tau_{d_{j_1}G} + \dots + \lambda_u X \circ \tau_{d_{j_u}G})(mG)) \right| \\
 \leq & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} \sum_{u=0}^k \binom{k}{u} (p\beta)^{k-u} p^u (1 + \log p)^u Z \\
 = & 1 + \frac{1}{p^k} (p\beta + p(1 + \log p))^k Z \\
 = & 1 + (\beta + 1 + \log p)^k Z \leq (2 + \log p)^k Z
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\left| \sum_{m=1}^M \psi((\lambda_1 X \circ \tau_{d_{j_1}G} + \dots + \lambda_u X \circ \tau_{d_{j_u}G})(mG)) \right| \leq Z.$$

It suffices to estimate the value of  $Z$ , i.e., the upper bound

of

$$\sum_{m=1}^M \psi((\lambda_1 X \circ \tau_{d_{j_1}G} + \dots + \lambda_u X \circ \tau_{d_{j_u}G})(mG))$$

for any  $\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_u \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $1 \leq u \leq k$ . By [3, Lemma 1],

$$\lambda_1 X \circ \tau_{d_{j_1}G} + \dots + \lambda_u X \circ \tau_{d_{j_u}G}$$

is a nonconstant rational function of degree at most  $2u$ . So by Lemma 3 again, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left| \sum_{m=1}^M \psi((\lambda_1 X \circ \tau_{d_{j_1}G} + \dots + \lambda_u X \circ \tau_{d_{j_u}G})(mG)) \right| \\
 \leq & 4up^{1/2}(1 + \log N) \leq 4kp^{1/2}(1 + \log N).
 \end{aligned}$$

We complete the proof of Theorem 3 by setting

$$Z = 4kp^{1/2}(1 + \log N).$$

□

## 4 Conclusion

Elliptic curves are widely used in cryptography for designing public key cryptosystems [11] and pseudorandom number generators [18]. It is a natural way to use elliptic curves to construct pseudorandom subsets, which is an important security primitive in network security and cryptography. In this article, we present an efficient method for constructing pseudorandom subsets of the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  using elliptic curves over finite fields and show that such pseudorandom subsets possess strong pseudorandom properties using the number theoretic tools of exponential sums.

Very recently, Liu and Gao studied a *quasi-random subset* of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , which consists of the  $x$ -axis of all rational points on elliptic curves over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  in [16]. The study of quasi-random subsets of  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  is partially related to random graphs [6]. A relationship between quasi-randomness and pseudo-randomness is discussed in [10].

It is noted again that the pseudorandom subsets are constructed using modulo  $N$  residue rings in [7, 8, 9, 10] when  $N$  is a prime and in [5] when  $N$  is a product of two distinct primes. But in this article  $N$  can achieve other values depending on the elliptic curves. Our method can offer large families of pseudorandom subsets of the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  for different  $N$  by using different elliptic curves. Although we only restrict that  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  is a cyclic group of order  $N$ , it is easy to extend to any elliptic curves, which is defined over finite fields  $\mathbb{F}_q$  for a prime power  $q$ , with a cyclic subgroup of order  $N$  of  $\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ .

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