This chapter explains how the electoral system in South Korea has formed into a two-party-dominat... more This chapter explains how the electoral system in South Korea has formed into a two-party-dominated system and identifies the elements that prevent a third party from winning seat shares proportional to its vote share. The chapter discusses the features that characterize political parties’ campaign strategies and the voting behaviour of South Korean citizens. Candidates pursue personal votes by focusing on negative campaigning and advertising their valences. This chapter also identifies two major position issues over which political parties compete and citizens make voting decisions. Although redistributive issues have recently become more salient, electoral competition has long revolved around inter-Korean issues. Citizens’ socio-economic statuses only have a meagre effect on their partisan support. Instead, citizens’ political attitudes have been formed differently across generations, as they have been exposed to different levels of anti-communism. Finally, the chapter explains the variation in regional voting in terms of party system polarization. As the ideological difference between parties has decreased, regional voting has intensified.
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different ... more In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies.
This paper analyzes the causal mechanism for the effect of citizens' partisan attachments on ... more This paper analyzes the causal mechanism for the effect of citizens' partisan attachments on candidate position-taking by offering a spatial model that treats the partisan attachments as voter-specific valence. An analysis of the model reveals that it is rational for candidates enjoying partisan favors to deviate from their partisans toward the center of their constituencies. The model also shows that the candidates with partisan favors could have a centrifugal incentive if the partisan favors translate into political activism. Empirical tests in the context of the U.S. House of Representatives elections in 2006 support the expectation that candidates with larger partisan bases are ideologically closer to their district preferences. The tests also show that partisans' ideological campaign contribution has a centrifugal force; however, it is not strong enough to offset the centripetal force of partisan attachments.
This chapter explains how the electoral system in South Korea has formed into a two-party-dominat... more This chapter explains how the electoral system in South Korea has formed into a two-party-dominated system and identifies the elements that prevent a third party from winning seat shares proportional to its vote share. The chapter discusses the features that characterize political parties’ campaign strategies and the voting behaviour of South Korean citizens. Candidates pursue personal votes by focusing on negative campaigning and advertising their valences. This chapter also identifies two major position issues over which political parties compete and citizens make voting decisions. Although redistributive issues have recently become more salient, electoral competition has long revolved around inter-Korean issues. Citizens’ socio-economic statuses only have a meagre effect on their partisan support. Instead, citizens’ political attitudes have been formed differently across generations, as they have been exposed to different levels of anti-communism. Finally, the chapter explains the variation in regional voting in terms of party system polarization. As the ideological difference between parties has decreased, regional voting has intensified.
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different ... more In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies.
This paper analyzes the causal mechanism for the effect of citizens' partisan attachments on ... more This paper analyzes the causal mechanism for the effect of citizens' partisan attachments on candidate position-taking by offering a spatial model that treats the partisan attachments as voter-specific valence. An analysis of the model reveals that it is rational for candidates enjoying partisan favors to deviate from their partisans toward the center of their constituencies. The model also shows that the candidates with partisan favors could have a centrifugal incentive if the partisan favors translate into political activism. Empirical tests in the context of the U.S. House of Representatives elections in 2006 support the expectation that candidates with larger partisan bases are ideologically closer to their district preferences. The tests also show that partisans' ideological campaign contribution has a centrifugal force; however, it is not strong enough to offset the centripetal force of partisan attachments.
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Papers by Woojin Moon