From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibil... more From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibility of artificially producing human beings. What is at stake in biotechnology, Heidegger claims, is the imminent possibility of the destruction of the human essence. It is unclear, however, how Heidegger can substantiate such a claim given that he consistently denounced attempts to define human Dasein as a living being to which a higher capacity such as reason or language is added. This paper will argue that, in this sense, Heidegger took the radical challenge of biotechnology both too seriously and not seriously enough. Too seriously, because it is unclear why he would fear the annihilation of Dasein's essence if he is convinced that this essence is not related to man's biological equipment in the first place. Not seriously enough, because Heidegger at the same time remained convinced that even the most intrusive interventions in the human body will not be able to disrupt Dasein's ontological essence.
This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politico-philosophical debate about th... more This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politico-philosophical debate about the ethical permissibility of a so-called ‘liberal eugenics ’ and argues that neither the liberal argument for nor the liberal argument against human genetic enhancement is internally consistent as, ultimately, each ends up violating the very liberal principles it nonetheless pretends to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to a “wrongful life ” or a life not worth living. It will therefore be concluded that the specific stakes of this contentious issue cannot be grasped within a liberal conceptual framework.
This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politicophilosophical debate about the... more This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politicophilosophical debate about the ethical permissibility of a so-called ‘liberal eugenics’ and argues that neither the liberal argument for nor the liberal argument against human genetic enhancement is internally consistent as, ultimately, each ends up violating the very liberal principles it nonetheless pretends to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to a “wrongful life” or a life not worth living. It will therefore be concluded that the specific stakes of this contentious issue cannot be grasped within a liberal conceptual framework.
Hannah Arendt calls “natality,” the fact that human beings enter the world through birth, the cen... more Hannah Arendt calls “natality,” the fact that human beings enter the world through birth, the central category of political thought. But how can she assert that being born conditions one to act freely if she also seems to maintain that is through labor, not action, that human beings deal with biologically conditioned processes? Expanding on Arendt’s largely neglected footnote to Arnold Gehlen in The Human Condition, this paper will argue that the concept of natality precisely undoes any strict division between freedom and necessity because it names the radical co-implication of biological and politicolinguistic births, the conditioned and the spontaneous.
Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 2011
Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical and religious turns in the ... more Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical and religious turns in the thinking of Jacques Derrida, few have noticed that his late writings were marked by what we could tentatively call a "zoological turn." This is surprising given that in The Animal That Therefore I Am Derrida clearly stated that the question as to what distinguishes the human from the animal has for him always been the most important question of philosophy. This essay will attempt to offer a preliminary exploration of this still largely uncharted aspect of Derrida's thought. Starting from a brief overview of Derrida's most important writings on the question of the animal, it will be argued that his decision to write an entire book on this issue was largely motivated by his eagerness to settle a discussion with one of his pupils, the French theorist of technology Bernard Stiegler.
From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibil... more From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibility of artificially producing human beings. What is at stake in biotechnology, Heidegger claims, is the imminent possibility of the destruction of the human essence. It is unclear, however, how Heidegger can substantiate such a claim given that he consistently denounced attempts to define human Dasein as a living being to which a higher capacity such as reason or language is added. This paper will argue that, in this sense, Heidegger took the radical challenge of biotechnology both too seriously and not seriously enough. Too seriously, because it is unclear why he would fear the annihilation of Dasein's essence if he is convinced that this essence is not related to man's biological equipment in the first place. Not seriously enough, because Heidegger at the same time remained convinced that even the most intrusive interventions in the human body will not be able to disrupt Dasein's ontological essence.
This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politico-philosophical debate about th... more This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politico-philosophical debate about the ethical permissibility of a so-called ‘liberal eugenics ’ and argues that neither the liberal argument for nor the liberal argument against human genetic enhancement is internally consistent as, ultimately, each ends up violating the very liberal principles it nonetheless pretends to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to a “wrongful life ” or a life not worth living. It will therefore be concluded that the specific stakes of this contentious issue cannot be grasped within a liberal conceptual framework.
This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politicophilosophical debate about the... more This article critically surveys the current bioethical and politicophilosophical debate about the ethical permissibility of a so-called ‘liberal eugenics’ and argues that neither the liberal argument for nor the liberal argument against human genetic enhancement is internally consistent as, ultimately, each ends up violating the very liberal principles it nonetheless pretends to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to a “wrongful life” or a life not worth living. It will therefore be concluded that the specific stakes of this contentious issue cannot be grasped within a liberal conceptual framework.
Hannah Arendt calls “natality,” the fact that human beings enter the world through birth, the cen... more Hannah Arendt calls “natality,” the fact that human beings enter the world through birth, the central category of political thought. But how can she assert that being born conditions one to act freely if she also seems to maintain that is through labor, not action, that human beings deal with biologically conditioned processes? Expanding on Arendt’s largely neglected footnote to Arnold Gehlen in The Human Condition, this paper will argue that the concept of natality precisely undoes any strict division between freedom and necessity because it names the radical co-implication of biological and politicolinguistic births, the conditioned and the spontaneous.
Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 2011
Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical and religious turns in the ... more Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical and religious turns in the thinking of Jacques Derrida, few have noticed that his late writings were marked by what we could tentatively call a "zoological turn." This is surprising given that in The Animal That Therefore I Am Derrida clearly stated that the question as to what distinguishes the human from the animal has for him always been the most important question of philosophy. This essay will attempt to offer a preliminary exploration of this still largely uncharted aspect of Derrida's thought. Starting from a brief overview of Derrida's most important writings on the question of the animal, it will be argued that his decision to write an entire book on this issue was largely motivated by his eagerness to settle a discussion with one of his pupils, the French theorist of technology Bernard Stiegler.
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