Thirteen college students participated individually in a multistage decision making task. The tas... more Thirteen college students participated individually in a multistage decision making task. The task consisted of eight different computer-controlled problems. The duration of each problem was not known to the decision maker. A dynamic programming model employing Bayesian notions was constructed for the adaptive decision making task, tested and confirmed. An alternative explanation is discussed briefly.
Abstract: In this book, we set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coali... more Abstract: In this book, we set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects:(1) there are three or more players,(2) players may openly ...
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2013
ABSTRACT Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what cond... more ABSTRACT Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what conditions, selfish decisions by autonomous individuals jointly result in socially inefficient outcomes. By contrast, considerably less emphasis has been placed on the extent of the inefficiency in those outcomes relative to the social optimum, and how the extent of inefficiency in theory compares with what is observed in experiments or practice. In this expository article, we introduce and subsequently extend the price of anarchy (PoA), an index that originated in studies on communication in computer science, and illustrate how it can be used to characterize the extent of inefficiency in social dilemmas. A second purpose of our article is to introduce a class of social dilemmas that occur when individuals selfishly choose routes in networks, and illustrate how the concept of PoA can be helpful in studying them.
Coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games f... more Coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games featuring symmetric players, complete information, zero entry costs, and several randomly presented values of the market capacity. Once the market capacity becomes publicly known, each ...
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989
Studied single-stage intergroup competition for public goods in small groups with total resources... more Studied single-stage intergroup competition for public goods in small groups with total resources of equal size and binary contributions. In Experiment 1, the two competing groups were of equal size, but the individual resources (endowments) within each group differed from one ...
ABSTRACT In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W.,... more ABSTRACT In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483-521] evaluate the behavior of subjects in a two-person investment game with symmetric players using the symmetric (completely) mixed-strategy equilibrium solution as the normative benchmark. Dechenaux et al. [Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Lugovskyy, V., 2006. Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 276-283] claim additional support for an alternating (asymmetric) equilibria solution. However, both aggregate and individual level analyses of our data soundly reject the asymmetric alternating equilibria solution.
Thirteen college students participated individually in a multistage decision making task. The tas... more Thirteen college students participated individually in a multistage decision making task. The task consisted of eight different computer-controlled problems. The duration of each problem was not known to the decision maker. A dynamic programming model employing Bayesian notions was constructed for the adaptive decision making task, tested and confirmed. An alternative explanation is discussed briefly.
Abstract: In this book, we set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coali... more Abstract: In this book, we set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects:(1) there are three or more players,(2) players may openly ...
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2013
ABSTRACT Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what cond... more ABSTRACT Research on social dilemmas has largely been concerned with whether, and under what conditions, selfish decisions by autonomous individuals jointly result in socially inefficient outcomes. By contrast, considerably less emphasis has been placed on the extent of the inefficiency in those outcomes relative to the social optimum, and how the extent of inefficiency in theory compares with what is observed in experiments or practice. In this expository article, we introduce and subsequently extend the price of anarchy (PoA), an index that originated in studies on communication in computer science, and illustrate how it can be used to characterize the extent of inefficiency in social dilemmas. A second purpose of our article is to introduce a class of social dilemmas that occur when individuals selfishly choose routes in networks, and illustrate how the concept of PoA can be helpful in studying them.
Coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games f... more Coordination behavior is studied experimentally in a class of noncooperative market entry games featuring symmetric players, complete information, zero entry costs, and several randomly presented values of the market capacity. Once the market capacity becomes publicly known, each ...
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989
Studied single-stage intergroup competition for public goods in small groups with total resources... more Studied single-stage intergroup competition for public goods in small groups with total resources of equal size and binary contributions. In Experiment 1, the two competing groups were of equal size, but the individual resources (endowments) within each group differed from one ...
ABSTRACT In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W.,... more ABSTRACT In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483-521] evaluate the behavior of subjects in a two-person investment game with symmetric players using the symmetric (completely) mixed-strategy equilibrium solution as the normative benchmark. Dechenaux et al. [Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Lugovskyy, V., 2006. Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 276-283] claim additional support for an alternating (asymmetric) equilibria solution. However, both aggregate and individual level analyses of our data soundly reject the asymmetric alternating equilibria solution.
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Papers by A. Rapoport