Scott Scheall is Associate Professor of Philosophy & Economics in the Center for Economics, Politics & History. Prior to joining the University of Austin, he taught for fourteen years at Arizona State University. Scott’s research considers the significance of human ignorance for decision-making, particularly in the political realm. He is the author of two books, F. A. Hayek and the Epistemology of Politics: The Curious Task of Economics and Dialogues concerning Natural Politics: A Modern Philosophical Dialogue about Policymaker Ignorance, a unique textbook freely available for use in courses in political philosophy, political science, economics, and political economy. His work has appeared in journals in philosophy, political economy, history of economics, bioethics, and cognitive psychology. Scott is co-editor of Review of the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, and founder, producer, and former co-host of the long-running podcast Smith and Marx Walk into a Bar: A History of Economics Podcast. He occasionally posts and podcasts at his Substack page, The Problem of Policymaker Ignorance.
The paper argues for three points. The first purpose of the paper is to show that Carl Menger wou... more The paper argues for three points. The first purpose of the paper is to show that Carl Menger would have rejected Ludwig von Mises’ methodological apriorism. Second, I argue that Carl Menger was a pluralist about the methods of theoretical economics and that Mises was rather less of a pluralist, if not altogether a monist, about the legitimate method(s) of economic theorizing. Finally, I try to establish the broad consistency of Menger’s pluralism with the tolerant methodological attitude of his son, the mathematician, logician, and philosopher of science, Karl Menger.
Political questions are typically framed in normative terms, in terms of the political actions th... more Political questions are typically framed in normative terms, in terms of the political actions that we (or our political representatives) “ought” to take or, alternatively, in terms of the political philosophies that “should” inform our political actions. “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?”
Such questions are typically posed and debates around such questions emerge with little, if any, prior consideration of a question that is, logically speaking, more fundamental: “What can we effectively achieve through political action? What goals are within and without the scope of political action?”
Because we pose and argue about normative political questions without first getting the descriptive facts straight, we often embark on political projects that have little hope of success.
Anyone who accepts a principle like ought implies can is committed to rejecting “ought” claims that assert obligations to do things that cannot be done. Given that most, if not all, people accept some such principle, most, if not all, people are implicitly committed to rejecting the traditional – purely normative – form of political discussion. That they nevertheless engage in such discussion reveals a significant inconsistency in how many people think about and assign obligations to policymakers.
If the question “Liberalism and / or Socialism?” is the normative question “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” then it is the wrong – or, more exactly, a premature – question to ask.
F. A. Hayek essentially quit the study of industrial uctuations as an explicit object of theoreti... more F. A. Hayek essentially quit the study of industrial uctuations as an explicit object of theoretical investigation following the publication of 1941’s The Pure Theory of Cap- ital. Nonetheless, several of Hayek’s subsequent methodologically oriented writings bear important implications for economic phenomena, especially those of industrial uctuations. Decisions (usually, for Hayek, of a political nature) taken on the basis of a ‘pretence’ of knowledge impede the operation of the price system’s belief-coordi- nating function and thereby contribute to episodes of economic disequilibrium. Moreover, this later account – which I call Hayek’s epistemic theory of industrial uctu- ations – implies certain aspects of his earlier theory. The two accounts are connected in virtue of the role that the limits of human knowledge play in each. Indeed, it turns out that – in a sense de ned in the paper – Hayek’s early theory of the cycle is a special case of his more general epistemic account. The concluding section addresses the im- plications of the main arguments of the paper for certain themes in the secondary literature on Hayek.
Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology
Features articles on classical and modern economic thought. This title includes review essays on ... more Features articles on classical and modern economic thought. This title includes review essays on books about historical figures in economics
The paper argues for three points. The first purpose of the paper is to show that Carl Menger wou... more The paper argues for three points. The first purpose of the paper is to show that Carl Menger would have rejected Ludwig von Mises’ methodological apriorism. Second, I argue that Carl Menger was a pluralist about the methods of theoretical economics and that Mises was rather less of a pluralist, if not altogether a monist, about the legitimate method(s) of economic theorizing. Finally, I try to establish the broad consistency of Menger’s pluralism with the tolerant methodological attitude of his son, the mathematician, logician, and philosopher of science, Karl Menger.
Political questions are typically framed in normative terms, in terms of the political actions th... more Political questions are typically framed in normative terms, in terms of the political actions that we (or our political representatives) “ought” to take or, alternatively, in terms of the political philosophies that “should” inform our political actions. “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?”
Such questions are typically posed and debates around such questions emerge with little, if any, prior consideration of a question that is, logically speaking, more fundamental: “What can we effectively achieve through political action? What goals are within and without the scope of political action?”
Because we pose and argue about normative political questions without first getting the descriptive facts straight, we often embark on political projects that have little hope of success.
Anyone who accepts a principle like ought implies can is committed to rejecting “ought” claims that assert obligations to do things that cannot be done. Given that most, if not all, people accept some such principle, most, if not all, people are implicitly committed to rejecting the traditional – purely normative – form of political discussion. That they nevertheless engage in such discussion reveals a significant inconsistency in how many people think about and assign obligations to policymakers.
If the question “Liberalism and / or Socialism?” is the normative question “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” then it is the wrong – or, more exactly, a premature – question to ask.
F. A. Hayek essentially quit the study of industrial uctuations as an explicit object of theoreti... more F. A. Hayek essentially quit the study of industrial uctuations as an explicit object of theoretical investigation following the publication of 1941’s The Pure Theory of Cap- ital. Nonetheless, several of Hayek’s subsequent methodologically oriented writings bear important implications for economic phenomena, especially those of industrial uctuations. Decisions (usually, for Hayek, of a political nature) taken on the basis of a ‘pretence’ of knowledge impede the operation of the price system’s belief-coordi- nating function and thereby contribute to episodes of economic disequilibrium. Moreover, this later account – which I call Hayek’s epistemic theory of industrial uctu- ations – implies certain aspects of his earlier theory. The two accounts are connected in virtue of the role that the limits of human knowledge play in each. Indeed, it turns out that – in a sense de ned in the paper – Hayek’s early theory of the cycle is a special case of his more general epistemic account. The concluding section addresses the im- plications of the main arguments of the paper for certain themes in the secondary literature on Hayek.
Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology
Features articles on classical and modern economic thought. This title includes review essays on ... more Features articles on classical and modern economic thought. This title includes review essays on books about historical figures in economics
There is something extreme about Mises' apriorism, namely, his epistemological justification of t... more There is something extreme about Mises' apriorism, namely, his epistemological justification of the a priori element(s) of economic theory. His critics have long recognized and attacked the extremeness of Mises' epistemology of a priori knowledge. However, several of his defenders have glossed or ignored what is (and what has long been recognized by his critics to be) extreme about Mises' apriorism. Thus, the argument is directed less against Mises than those contributions to the secondary literature that assert his methodological moderation while glossing or plainly ignoring what the most prominent critics have found extreme about Mises' apriorism. Defending Mises as a merely moderate apriorist because he held only a narrow part of the foundation of economics to be a priori is a straw-man defense against criticisms of his apriorism as epistemologically extreme.
The present paper considers the implications of the postulate that the professional activities of... more The present paper considers the implications of the postulate that the professional activities of scientists constitute complex phenomena in the sense associated with the Nobel Prize-winning economist, methodologist, and political philosopher, F.A. Hayek. If the professional activities of scientists are complex in Hayek's sense, then there is more than one kind of rationality at work in science. It is argued that a failure to recognize science's possible complexity contributes to an error theory of various unsuccessful philosophies of science. It is further argued that, where ecological rationality is operative, various scientific results cannot be realized without an element of methodological liberty. It is shown that acceptance of the possibility that ecological rationality operates in science – a view here dubbed methodological liberalism – is closely related to Hayek's denial of the possibility of a successful scientism, a denial crucial to his arguments against socialism and Keynesian macroeconomics.
How should we conceive of policymakers for the purposes of political analysis? In particular, if ... more How should we conceive of policymakers for the purposes of political analysis? In particular, if we wish to explain and predict political decisions and their consequences, if we wish to ensure that political action is as effective as it can be, how should we think of policymakers? Should we think of them as they are commonly conceived in traditional political analysis, i.e., as uniquely knowledgeable and as either altruistic (i.e., as motivated to realize goals associated with their constituents’ interests) or knavish (i.e., as motivated to realize goals associated with their own personal interests), or should we treat them as possibly ignorant with respect to their political tasks?
It is always an open question whether policymakers possess the knowledge required to realize some policy objective. It should never be assumed a priori that policymaker knowledge is adequate to the policy tasks with which policymakers are charged. Politicians need knowledge concerning the causes of social phenomena adequate to control events sufficiently well to ensure the success of their policies. No argument has ever been offered for the standard, if only implicit, assumption that policymakers, somehow automatically, possess this knowledge. In many contexts, there is no reason to believe that policymakers possess or can acquire this knowledge. Indeed, a bit of reflection reveals how unlikely it is that and how rare the circumstances must be in which policymakers meet this condition, which political philosophers, theorists, economists, and other political thinkers have traditionally assumed as a matter of course.
The main purpose of the book is to encourage a conversation among scholars and students of political inquiry (in philosophy and political theory, political science, economics and political economy) concerning the best way to conceive of policymakers for the purposes of such inquiry.
The book defends an alternative, more realistic, method of political analysis. The book argues against the false assumption that policymakers are epistemically privileged. The book presents and defends the alternative assumption that, with respect to the knowledge required to discharge their political tasks effectively, policymakers are at least as ignorant as constituents.
The book further argues that whether policymakers are altruistic or knavish is, in the first instance, a function of the nature and extent of their ignorance with regard to constituent-minded policy goals. Policymakers who possess the knowledge required to be effectively altruistic are more likely to be altruistic, other things the same, than policymakers who are ignorant of the knowledge that successful altruism requires.
This being said, my goal is more to leave readers thinking about and inclined to debate these profound issues than to prescribe a particular methodological conclusion (even less to advocate a particular political conclusion). The book is a heuristic for spurring further conversation. It makes of readers fellow interlocutors partnered with the characters (and the author!) of the dialogue.
The vehicle for this analysis is a conversation between four friends, philosophy graduate students, with different interests, different levels and kinds of experience, and different political preferences. The four friends consider how politicians should be conceived for the purposes of analyzing political decision-making and its consequences.
In his famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume concluded that the assumption of an all-knowing and all-powerful God was neither necessary nor sufficient to explain natural phenomena. Dialogues concerning Natural Politics does for social science what Hume did for natural science. Both books undermine the assumption that some epistemically privileged being – God in the case of natural phenomena and God-like politicians in the case of social phenomena – must be invoked to explain relevant phenomena.
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Papers by Scott Scheall
Such questions are typically posed and debates around such questions emerge with little, if any, prior consideration of a question that is, logically speaking, more fundamental: “What can we effectively achieve through political action? What goals are within and without the scope of political action?”
Because we pose and argue about normative political questions without first getting the descriptive facts straight, we often embark on political projects that have little hope of success.
Anyone who accepts a principle like ought implies can is committed to rejecting “ought” claims that assert obligations to do things that cannot be done. Given that most, if not all, people accept some such principle, most, if not all, people are implicitly committed to rejecting the traditional – purely normative – form of political discussion. That they nevertheless engage in such discussion reveals a significant inconsistency in how many people think about and assign obligations to policymakers.
If the question “Liberalism and / or Socialism?” is the normative question “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” then it is the wrong – or, more exactly, a premature – question to ask.
Such questions are typically posed and debates around such questions emerge with little, if any, prior consideration of a question that is, logically speaking, more fundamental: “What can we effectively achieve through political action? What goals are within and without the scope of political action?”
Because we pose and argue about normative political questions without first getting the descriptive facts straight, we often embark on political projects that have little hope of success.
Anyone who accepts a principle like ought implies can is committed to rejecting “ought” claims that assert obligations to do things that cannot be done. Given that most, if not all, people accept some such principle, most, if not all, people are implicitly committed to rejecting the traditional – purely normative – form of political discussion. That they nevertheless engage in such discussion reveals a significant inconsistency in how many people think about and assign obligations to policymakers.
If the question “Liberalism and / or Socialism?” is the normative question “Should we be liberals or socialists, or should we (somehow) combine liberalism and socialism?” then it is the wrong – or, more exactly, a premature – question to ask.
It is always an open question whether policymakers possess the knowledge required to realize some policy objective. It should never be assumed a priori that policymaker knowledge is adequate to the policy tasks with which policymakers are charged. Politicians need knowledge concerning the causes of social phenomena adequate to control events sufficiently well to ensure the success of their policies. No argument has ever been offered for the standard, if only implicit, assumption that policymakers, somehow automatically, possess this knowledge. In many contexts, there is no reason to believe that policymakers possess or can acquire this knowledge. Indeed, a bit of reflection reveals how unlikely it is that and how rare the circumstances must be in which policymakers meet this condition, which political philosophers, theorists, economists, and other political thinkers have traditionally assumed as a matter of course.
The main purpose of the book is to encourage a conversation among scholars and students of political inquiry (in philosophy and political theory, political science, economics and political economy) concerning the best way to conceive of policymakers for the purposes of such inquiry.
The book defends an alternative, more realistic, method of political analysis. The book argues against the false assumption that policymakers are epistemically privileged. The book presents and defends the alternative assumption that, with respect to the knowledge required to discharge their political tasks effectively, policymakers are at least as ignorant as constituents.
The book further argues that whether policymakers are altruistic or knavish is, in the first instance, a function of the nature and extent of their ignorance with regard to constituent-minded policy goals. Policymakers who possess the knowledge required to be effectively altruistic are more likely to be altruistic, other things the same, than policymakers who are ignorant of the knowledge that successful altruism requires.
This being said, my goal is more to leave readers thinking about and inclined to debate these profound issues than to prescribe a particular methodological conclusion (even less to advocate a particular political conclusion). The book is a heuristic for spurring further conversation. It makes of readers fellow interlocutors partnered with the characters (and the author!) of the dialogue.
The vehicle for this analysis is a conversation between four friends, philosophy graduate students, with different interests, different levels and kinds of experience, and different political preferences. The four friends consider how politicians should be conceived for the purposes of analyzing political decision-making and its consequences.
In his famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume concluded that the assumption of an all-knowing and all-powerful God was neither necessary nor sufficient to explain natural phenomena. Dialogues concerning Natural Politics does for social science what Hume did for natural science. Both books undermine the assumption that some epistemically privileged being – God in the case of natural phenomena and God-like politicians in the case of social phenomena – must be invoked to explain relevant phenomena.