On April 20, 2011, under the light of the internal and international demand for better institutio... more On April 20, 2011, under the light of the internal and international demand for better institutions and a more competitive national economy, the New Greek Law, numbered 3959/2011, on the protection of free competition, came into force. Former Law 703/1977 on the same subject, which enjoyed considerable recognition in the country, was abolished, instead of being amended one more time, as the legislator declared its intention to avoid the risk of conflicting rules and oversights and to produce a coherent statute which is easier to understand and to implement. The paper will briefly present the main changes introduced by Law 3959/2011, and will attempt a first appraisal of their success, especially with regard to the above mentioned objectives.
Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directiv... more Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directive) deals with the division of public limited liability companies in a single EU country. It covers the protection of shareholders, creditors and employees. The Domestic Divisions Directive addresses the different ways companies can be divided up, but concerns only national (and not cross-border) divisions. Directive 2005/56/EC entered into force on 15 December 2005 and provides a specific legal framework for cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (Cross-Border Mergers Directive - CBMD, or Tenth Council Directive). The CBMD is generally regarded in a very positive manner. It harmonised the cross-border mergers of limited liability companies in all EU and EEA Member States and provided a common framework facilitating cross-border mergers. More specifically, it required all EU and EEA Member States to permit cross-border mergers of limited liability companies and established a ...
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2017
A number of EU counties have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence: Germany,... more A number of EU counties have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence: Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Czech Republic and Greece. In most countries the economic dependence provisions are included in the respective competition act and are more or less conceptually associated with the notion of abuse of dominance. Indicatively, in the case of Germany, Section 20 (2) of the Competition Act applies to companies enjoying market power (not reaching that of the classical dominant position) in bilateral relations vis a vis their suppliers and/or buyers. By contrast, a number of other countries have enacted equivalent provisions, not in their competition acts but in their fair trade legislation or other, whereby competency for the enforcement of the economic dependence rules may or may not be entrusted to a competition authority. In Greece, the provisions regarding economic dependence formed part of the former Competition Act, Law No. 703/1977. The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) received, in the 12 years of its competency for the enforcement of said provision, numerous complaints and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissing the respective claims. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have easily been resolved by civil courts, it was abolished from the Competition Act in the year 2009. Voices from the legal theory had seconded this development expressing concerns about the private interests of the weaker party which the provision sought to protect, unlike the main goals of competition law. As a result, the economic dependence provision was transferred to Law 146/1914 on Unfair Competition Practices, as Section 18a thereof. When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application may be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement. In this regard, the paper builds on the Greek example to touch upon a number of points of interest for European law enforcement, and in particular: How does the inclusion or exclusion of a particular provision from the competition act affect its enforcement? Which would be an optimal allocation of responsibilities between private parties, the courts and competition authorities in relative abuse of dominance cases? Is the division between unfair trade practices and competition law entirely clear? And finally, how does the aim of competition law to protect competition versus competitors affect the application of the respective provisions?
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council “on certain rules governing acti... more Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council “on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union” was issued at last, on November 26, 2014. In its introductory remarks, the Directive acknowledges that there are a number of differences in the rules governing actions for damages on grounds of breach of EU or national competition law before courts in the various member-states, and that the respective legal requirements are often hard to fulfill. The Directive therefore declares as its objective, firstly, to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law can effectively exercise the right to full compensation, secondly, to promote a minimum level of harmonization of national rules in order to achieve equivalent protection of injured parties in the EU, and thirdly, to coordinate the enforcement of antitrust legislation by competition authorities and national courts (the public and the private enforcement). The present paper argues that the Directive contains some useful procedural rules but is mostly characterized by general and vague goal-setting provisions which are very often not applicable as such, and cannot be incorporated in the national compensation systems without further specification. Instead, in many critical instances the Directive simply instructs the member states to ensure that their judges will achieve a particular, often formless, justice-serving purpose, without providing an actual rule, whereby leaving great room for action (or inaction) by the national legislators and judges. Effective transposition of the Directive into national law therefore presupposes that each member state will convert the Directive goals to actual applicable provisions on its own accord. Alternatively, judges will be handed the general pleadings for justice included in the Directive and will be left alone with the heavy task of transforming them into actual rulings. In both cases, it does not seem likely that the Directive will achieve a large degree of harmonization of the national antitrust damages rules. In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most member states, where it is needed. The only objective, which the Directive expressly intends to serve and might actually succeed in doing, is the coordination of private (private) and public enforcement (public enforcement) rules of competition, albeit here also with some degree of uncertainty.
... See also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules,... more ... See also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 Duke LJ 1279, 1316 (2000) (explaining that despite the superficial similarity to a court action, an ... at 81, 82; Jean-Flavien Lalive, Immunity of Arbitrators under Swiss Law, in id. ...
Since the late 1990s, the telecommunications sector in all EU countries has shown a significant s... more Since the late 1990s, the telecommunications sector in all EU countries has shown a significant structural transformation from national monopolies to competition. Before that, public authorities were responsible to guarantee that telephony services were available to every citizen at prices that were not monopolistic, as communications were considered an essential service. Since the liberalisation process begun, competition has become the ultimate goal of every act of privatisation. While the national competition authorities (NCAs) increase their role in the partially deregulated markets, the established national regulatory authorities (NRAs) ensure the smooth transition of the monopoly sector to full liberalisation. To this end, the national legislator has often entrusted the monitoring of compliance with the provisions for the protection of free competition (also) to the national regulatory authorities. As a result, and during the liberalisation process, various issues arise as reg...
Προβλέποντας τα πλεονεκτήματα αλλά και τους κινδύνους από την αναπόφευκτη εξάπλωση των εν λόγω τ... more Προβλέποντας τα πλεονεκτήματα αλλά και τους κινδύνους από την αναπόφευκτη εξάπλωση των εν λόγω τεχνολογιών, τα όργανα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ανέπτυξαν τα τελευταία χρόνια σημαντικές πρωτοβουλίες με σκοπό να καταστεί η Ευρώπη παγκόσμιος κόμβος αξιόπιστης τεχνητής νοημοσύνης. Η παρούσα μελέτη παρουσιάζει τις σημαντικότερες πρωτοβουλίες των οργάνων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στον τομέα της (εξωσυμβατικής) ευθύνης για ζημίες που προκαλούνται από τις εφαρμογές των τεχνολογιών ΤΝ, επιχειρώντας μια πρώτη αξιολόγηση της πορείας προς τη δημιουργία του νέου αυτού ενωσιακού συστήματος ευθύνης.
Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directiv... more Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directive) deals with the division of public limited liability companies in a single EU country. It covers the protection of shareholders, creditors and employees. The Domestic Divisions Directive addresses the different ways companies can be divided up, but concerns only national (and not cross-border) divisions. Directive 2005/56/EC entered into force on 15 December 2005 and provides a specific legal framework for cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (Cross-Border Mergers Directive - CBMD, or Tenth Council Directive). The CBMD is generally regarded in a very positive manner. It harmonised the cross-border mergers of limited liability companies in all EU and EEA Member States and provided a common framework facilitating cross-border mergers. More specifically, it required all EU and EEA Member States to permit cross-border mergers of limited liability companies and established a ...
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect on 25 May 2018, on which date Directive... more The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect on 25 May 2018, on which date Directive 95/46/EC was repealed. The new GDPR has in some ways enhanced the protection of personal data: data subjects have expanded rights and plaintiffs suffering harm for a data breach may file for restitution for their damage on the basis of the more comprehensive and coherent liability provision of Article 82. Many of the amendments and clarifications of this new provision are intended to (a) address the significant divergence in the liability rules transposing Article 23 of the repealed Data Protection Directive into national legislation and (b) complement such rules. These amendments are, mostly, very welcome, including: an explicit provision for compensation of moral damage, liability under certain conditions of the processor and joint liability of persons who have jointly caused the damage, and a right of representation of the data subject by a competent association.
A number of EU countries have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence. These p... more A number of EU countries have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence. These provisions are included in the respective competition acts and are more or less conceptually associated with the notion of abuse of dominance. In Greece, these provisions formed part of the former Competition Act. The Hellenic Competition Commission received in 12 years numerous complaints, and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissive. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and the Greek economy, and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have been resolved before a civil court, it was abolished from the Competition Act in 2009 and transferred to the Law on Unfair Competition Practices. When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application can be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement. The paper examines, in the example of Greece, the differences in the application of the economic dependence rules when they are transferred from a Competition Act to the Unfair Commercial Practices Act, and in result, the competency shifts from a competition authority to the civil courts. Also, it provides a first assessment about the positive and negative effects of such relocation, aiming to contribute to a “best practices” discussion about the enforcement of economic dependence rules.
This study presents an evaluation of the implementation and effects of the provisions of EU law o... more This study presents an evaluation of the implementation and effects of the provisions of EU law on cross-border mergers and divisions. In this context, it focuses, in particular, on the EU Directives on the division of public limited liability companies (82/891/EEC) and on cross-border mergers of limited-liability companies (2005/56/EC), analysing their relevance, and in particular, the gaps and challenges in the application of these directives, in view of the potential for a further legislative initiative in this field.
Το Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξέδωσε σχετικά πρόσφατα απόφαση επί του ζητήματος, κατά πόσο... more Το Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξέδωσε σχετικά πρόσφατα απόφαση επί του ζητήματος, κατά πόσον είναι δυνατόν, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, τα μέλη ενός καρτέλ που παραβιάζει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο, να ευθύνονται για ζημίες που προκαλούνται σε τρίτους (μη πελάτες τους) από το λεγόμενο «umbrella pricing», δηλαδή την αύξηση τιμής από επιχείρηση η οποία επωφελήθηκε της απαγορευμένης σύμπραξης, χωρίς να μετέχει σε αυτήν. Το ζήτημα που δημιουργείται στις περιπτώσεις αυτές προκύπτει από το γεγονός ότι εταιρείες που δε συμμετέχουν σε μια παράνομη σύμπραξη είναι δυνατόν να είναι σε θέση να ορίζουν υψηλότερες τιμές στην αγορά στην οποία υπάρχει η σύμπραξη «υπό την ομπρέλα της συμπράξεως» (προξενώντας ζημία στους πελάτες τους), ενώ κάτι τέτοιο δε θα ήταν δυνατόν σε συνθήκες ανταγωνισμού. Παρέχει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο στους πελάτες των τρίτων - εκτός συμπράξεως επιχειρήσεων, τη δυνατότητα να προσφύγουν ενώπιον των εθνικών δικαστηρίων και να ζητήσουν, με βάση τις εθνικές τους διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, αποζημίωση από τα μέλη του καρτέλ για τις υπερβολικά υψηλές τιμές των τρίτων αυτών επιχειρήσεων; Ή αντίθετα, μπορούν τα κράτη μέλη να αποκλείουν μια τέτοια υποχρέωση αποζημίωσης στο πλαίσιο του εθνικού τους δικαίου αποζημίωσης, επειδή αυτές αποτελούν έμμεσες, δηλαδή πολύ απομακρυσμένες ζημίες ; Η παρούσα μελέτη στοχεύει αφενός, στην παρουσίαση της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου, η οποία απάντησε σαφώς στο ανωτέρω ερώτημα, θετικά, αποφαινόμενο ότι τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ δεν μπορούν να αποκλείουν εκ των προτέρων, χωρίς εξέταση των ειδικών ανά περίπτωση περιστάσεων, τη δυνατότητα αποζημίωσης των τρίτων για τη σχετική ζημία, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών ∙ αφετέρου, στην έναρξη διαλόγου περί της σημασίας της απόφασης ως προς τα όρια της αιτιώδους συνάφειας, επί των οποίων κινούνται οι εν λόγω αξιώσεις, κατά το ελληνικό δίκαιο αδικοπραξιών. Η ενωσιακή ερμηνεία δεσμεύει, βεβαίως, πλέον τα ελληνικά δικαστήρια, ως προς την εκδίκαση των σχετικών αδικοπρακτικών αξιώσεων, με βάση το άρθρο 914 ΑΚ, οσάκις οι ζημίες προκλήθηκαν από σύμπραξη που παραβίαζε το άρθρο 101 παρ. 1 της Συνθήκης για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ). Τι γίνεται, ωστόσο, στις περιπτώσεις που οι ζημίες τρίτων εκ του φαινομένου «τιμολογιακής ομπρέλας» προκλήθηκαν από καρτέλ που αποτελούσε παράβαση (όχι της ενωσιακής διάταξης αλλά) της αντίστοιχης εθνικής, δηλαδή του άρθρου 1 παρ. 1 Ν. 3959/2011; Είναι δυνατόν και εδώ να πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 914 ΑΚ, δηλαδή πρωτίστως η προϋπόθεση του παρανόμου και της αιτιώδους συνάφειας μεταξύ της παράνομης και υπαίτιας πράξης και της ζημίας;
Σπανίως δύο ιατρικές ειδικότητες είναι τόσο στενά συνδεδεμένες η μία με την άλλη, όσο οι ειδικότη... more Σπανίως δύο ιατρικές ειδικότητες είναι τόσο στενά συνδεδεμένες η μία με την άλλη, όσο οι ειδικότητες αναισθησιολόγου και χειρουργού. Πράγματι, συνήθως ο χειρουργός θα μπορεί να παράσχει τις ιατρικές του υπηρεσίες για μια χειρουργική επέμβαση στον ασθενή μόνον αφού αυτός βρίσκεται υπό αναισθησία, και αντίστοιχα, κατά κανόνα οι υπηρεσίες του αναισθησιολόγου θα είναι απαραίτητες όταν ο ασθενής πρόκειται να υποβληθεί σε χειρουργική επέμβαση. Τι γίνεται, όμως, όταν σε συνέχεια της επέμβασης του χειρουργού, για την οποία δέχθηκε αναισθησία, η υγεία του ασθενούς χειροτερεύει; Ευθύνη του γιατρού για τη δυσμενή εξέλιξη της υγείας του ασθενούς δημιουργείται μόνον εφόσον: α) υπάρχει ιατρικό λάθος του γιατρού, το οποίο οδήγησε στη βλάβη της υγείας του ασθενούς ή/και β) υπήρξε παράβαση της υποχρέωσης ενημέρωσης του ασθενούς, οπότε στον γιατρό καταλογίζεται η βλάβη της ζημίας του ασθενούς, επειδή ο ασθενής λόγω της πλημμελούς ενημέρωσης δεν ήταν σε θέση να αξιολογήσει τους κινδύνους της ιατρικής πράξης, οπότε και θα μπορούσε να την έχει αποφύγει . Πότε ευθύνονται όμως για αυτά ο αναισθησιολόγος, πότε ο χειρουργός, και πότε και οι δύο; Επισημαίνεται ότι η παρούσα ανάλυση επικεντρώνεται στα θέματα αστικών αξιώσεων των ζημιωθέντων, κατά των εναγόμενων γιατρών.
As some time has passed since its adoption, it now appears that Directive 2014/104/EE on Damages ... more As some time has passed since its adoption, it now appears that Directive 2014/104/EE on Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements contains useful procedural rules but is mostly characterised by general and vague goal-setting provisions, which are very often not applicable as such and cannot be incorporated in the national compensation systems without further specification.
The Directive might hence not achieve a large degree of harmonisation of the national antitrust damages rules.
In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules, it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most Member States.
If there is one objective that the Directive could achieve, it is probably to establish better coordination between private and public enforcement.
On April 20, 2011, under the light of the internal and international demand for better institutio... more On April 20, 2011, under the light of the internal and international demand for better institutions and a more competitive national economy, the New Greek Law, numbered 3959/2011, on the protection of free competition, came into force. Former Law 703/1977 on the same subject, which enjoyed considerable recognition in the country, was abolished, instead of being amended one more time, as the legislator declared its intention to avoid the risk of conflicting rules and oversights and to produce a coherent statute which is easier to understand and to implement. The paper will briefly present the main changes introduced by Law 3959/2011, and will attempt a first appraisal of their success, especially with regard to the above mentioned objectives.
Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directiv... more Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directive) deals with the division of public limited liability companies in a single EU country. It covers the protection of shareholders, creditors and employees. The Domestic Divisions Directive addresses the different ways companies can be divided up, but concerns only national (and not cross-border) divisions. Directive 2005/56/EC entered into force on 15 December 2005 and provides a specific legal framework for cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (Cross-Border Mergers Directive - CBMD, or Tenth Council Directive). The CBMD is generally regarded in a very positive manner. It harmonised the cross-border mergers of limited liability companies in all EU and EEA Member States and provided a common framework facilitating cross-border mergers. More specifically, it required all EU and EEA Member States to permit cross-border mergers of limited liability companies and established a ...
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2017
A number of EU counties have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence: Germany,... more A number of EU counties have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence: Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Czech Republic and Greece. In most countries the economic dependence provisions are included in the respective competition act and are more or less conceptually associated with the notion of abuse of dominance. Indicatively, in the case of Germany, Section 20 (2) of the Competition Act applies to companies enjoying market power (not reaching that of the classical dominant position) in bilateral relations vis a vis their suppliers and/or buyers. By contrast, a number of other countries have enacted equivalent provisions, not in their competition acts but in their fair trade legislation or other, whereby competency for the enforcement of the economic dependence rules may or may not be entrusted to a competition authority. In Greece, the provisions regarding economic dependence formed part of the former Competition Act, Law No. 703/1977. The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) received, in the 12 years of its competency for the enforcement of said provision, numerous complaints and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissing the respective claims. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have easily been resolved by civil courts, it was abolished from the Competition Act in the year 2009. Voices from the legal theory had seconded this development expressing concerns about the private interests of the weaker party which the provision sought to protect, unlike the main goals of competition law. As a result, the economic dependence provision was transferred to Law 146/1914 on Unfair Competition Practices, as Section 18a thereof. When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application may be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement. In this regard, the paper builds on the Greek example to touch upon a number of points of interest for European law enforcement, and in particular: How does the inclusion or exclusion of a particular provision from the competition act affect its enforcement? Which would be an optimal allocation of responsibilities between private parties, the courts and competition authorities in relative abuse of dominance cases? Is the division between unfair trade practices and competition law entirely clear? And finally, how does the aim of competition law to protect competition versus competitors affect the application of the respective provisions?
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council “on certain rules governing acti... more Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council “on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union” was issued at last, on November 26, 2014. In its introductory remarks, the Directive acknowledges that there are a number of differences in the rules governing actions for damages on grounds of breach of EU or national competition law before courts in the various member-states, and that the respective legal requirements are often hard to fulfill. The Directive therefore declares as its objective, firstly, to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law can effectively exercise the right to full compensation, secondly, to promote a minimum level of harmonization of national rules in order to achieve equivalent protection of injured parties in the EU, and thirdly, to coordinate the enforcement of antitrust legislation by competition authorities and national courts (the public and the private enforcement). The present paper argues that the Directive contains some useful procedural rules but is mostly characterized by general and vague goal-setting provisions which are very often not applicable as such, and cannot be incorporated in the national compensation systems without further specification. Instead, in many critical instances the Directive simply instructs the member states to ensure that their judges will achieve a particular, often formless, justice-serving purpose, without providing an actual rule, whereby leaving great room for action (or inaction) by the national legislators and judges. Effective transposition of the Directive into national law therefore presupposes that each member state will convert the Directive goals to actual applicable provisions on its own accord. Alternatively, judges will be handed the general pleadings for justice included in the Directive and will be left alone with the heavy task of transforming them into actual rulings. In both cases, it does not seem likely that the Directive will achieve a large degree of harmonization of the national antitrust damages rules. In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most member states, where it is needed. The only objective, which the Directive expressly intends to serve and might actually succeed in doing, is the coordination of private (private) and public enforcement (public enforcement) rules of competition, albeit here also with some degree of uncertainty.
... See also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules,... more ... See also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 Duke LJ 1279, 1316 (2000) (explaining that despite the superficial similarity to a court action, an ... at 81, 82; Jean-Flavien Lalive, Immunity of Arbitrators under Swiss Law, in id. ...
Since the late 1990s, the telecommunications sector in all EU countries has shown a significant s... more Since the late 1990s, the telecommunications sector in all EU countries has shown a significant structural transformation from national monopolies to competition. Before that, public authorities were responsible to guarantee that telephony services were available to every citizen at prices that were not monopolistic, as communications were considered an essential service. Since the liberalisation process begun, competition has become the ultimate goal of every act of privatisation. While the national competition authorities (NCAs) increase their role in the partially deregulated markets, the established national regulatory authorities (NRAs) ensure the smooth transition of the monopoly sector to full liberalisation. To this end, the national legislator has often entrusted the monitoring of compliance with the provisions for the protection of free competition (also) to the national regulatory authorities. As a result, and during the liberalisation process, various issues arise as reg...
Προβλέποντας τα πλεονεκτήματα αλλά και τους κινδύνους από την αναπόφευκτη εξάπλωση των εν λόγω τ... more Προβλέποντας τα πλεονεκτήματα αλλά και τους κινδύνους από την αναπόφευκτη εξάπλωση των εν λόγω τεχνολογιών, τα όργανα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ανέπτυξαν τα τελευταία χρόνια σημαντικές πρωτοβουλίες με σκοπό να καταστεί η Ευρώπη παγκόσμιος κόμβος αξιόπιστης τεχνητής νοημοσύνης. Η παρούσα μελέτη παρουσιάζει τις σημαντικότερες πρωτοβουλίες των οργάνων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στον τομέα της (εξωσυμβατικής) ευθύνης για ζημίες που προκαλούνται από τις εφαρμογές των τεχνολογιών ΤΝ, επιχειρώντας μια πρώτη αξιολόγηση της πορείας προς τη δημιουργία του νέου αυτού ενωσιακού συστήματος ευθύνης.
Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directiv... more Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 (Domestic Divisions Directive, or Sixth Council Directive) deals with the division of public limited liability companies in a single EU country. It covers the protection of shareholders, creditors and employees. The Domestic Divisions Directive addresses the different ways companies can be divided up, but concerns only national (and not cross-border) divisions. Directive 2005/56/EC entered into force on 15 December 2005 and provides a specific legal framework for cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (Cross-Border Mergers Directive - CBMD, or Tenth Council Directive). The CBMD is generally regarded in a very positive manner. It harmonised the cross-border mergers of limited liability companies in all EU and EEA Member States and provided a common framework facilitating cross-border mergers. More specifically, it required all EU and EEA Member States to permit cross-border mergers of limited liability companies and established a ...
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect on 25 May 2018, on which date Directive... more The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect on 25 May 2018, on which date Directive 95/46/EC was repealed. The new GDPR has in some ways enhanced the protection of personal data: data subjects have expanded rights and plaintiffs suffering harm for a data breach may file for restitution for their damage on the basis of the more comprehensive and coherent liability provision of Article 82. Many of the amendments and clarifications of this new provision are intended to (a) address the significant divergence in the liability rules transposing Article 23 of the repealed Data Protection Directive into national legislation and (b) complement such rules. These amendments are, mostly, very welcome, including: an explicit provision for compensation of moral damage, liability under certain conditions of the processor and joint liability of persons who have jointly caused the damage, and a right of representation of the data subject by a competent association.
A number of EU countries have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence. These p... more A number of EU countries have adopted specific rules on the abuse of economic dependence. These provisions are included in the respective competition acts and are more or less conceptually associated with the notion of abuse of dominance. In Greece, these provisions formed part of the former Competition Act. The Hellenic Competition Commission received in 12 years numerous complaints, and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissive. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and the Greek economy, and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have been resolved before a civil court, it was abolished from the Competition Act in 2009 and transferred to the Law on Unfair Competition Practices. When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application can be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement. The paper examines, in the example of Greece, the differences in the application of the economic dependence rules when they are transferred from a Competition Act to the Unfair Commercial Practices Act, and in result, the competency shifts from a competition authority to the civil courts. Also, it provides a first assessment about the positive and negative effects of such relocation, aiming to contribute to a “best practices” discussion about the enforcement of economic dependence rules.
This study presents an evaluation of the implementation and effects of the provisions of EU law o... more This study presents an evaluation of the implementation and effects of the provisions of EU law on cross-border mergers and divisions. In this context, it focuses, in particular, on the EU Directives on the division of public limited liability companies (82/891/EEC) and on cross-border mergers of limited-liability companies (2005/56/EC), analysing their relevance, and in particular, the gaps and challenges in the application of these directives, in view of the potential for a further legislative initiative in this field.
Το Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξέδωσε σχετικά πρόσφατα απόφαση επί του ζητήματος, κατά πόσο... more Το Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξέδωσε σχετικά πρόσφατα απόφαση επί του ζητήματος, κατά πόσον είναι δυνατόν, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, τα μέλη ενός καρτέλ που παραβιάζει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο, να ευθύνονται για ζημίες που προκαλούνται σε τρίτους (μη πελάτες τους) από το λεγόμενο «umbrella pricing», δηλαδή την αύξηση τιμής από επιχείρηση η οποία επωφελήθηκε της απαγορευμένης σύμπραξης, χωρίς να μετέχει σε αυτήν. Το ζήτημα που δημιουργείται στις περιπτώσεις αυτές προκύπτει από το γεγονός ότι εταιρείες που δε συμμετέχουν σε μια παράνομη σύμπραξη είναι δυνατόν να είναι σε θέση να ορίζουν υψηλότερες τιμές στην αγορά στην οποία υπάρχει η σύμπραξη «υπό την ομπρέλα της συμπράξεως» (προξενώντας ζημία στους πελάτες τους), ενώ κάτι τέτοιο δε θα ήταν δυνατόν σε συνθήκες ανταγωνισμού. Παρέχει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο στους πελάτες των τρίτων - εκτός συμπράξεως επιχειρήσεων, τη δυνατότητα να προσφύγουν ενώπιον των εθνικών δικαστηρίων και να ζητήσουν, με βάση τις εθνικές τους διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, αποζημίωση από τα μέλη του καρτέλ για τις υπερβολικά υψηλές τιμές των τρίτων αυτών επιχειρήσεων; Ή αντίθετα, μπορούν τα κράτη μέλη να αποκλείουν μια τέτοια υποχρέωση αποζημίωσης στο πλαίσιο του εθνικού τους δικαίου αποζημίωσης, επειδή αυτές αποτελούν έμμεσες, δηλαδή πολύ απομακρυσμένες ζημίες ; Η παρούσα μελέτη στοχεύει αφενός, στην παρουσίαση της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου, η οποία απάντησε σαφώς στο ανωτέρω ερώτημα, θετικά, αποφαινόμενο ότι τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ δεν μπορούν να αποκλείουν εκ των προτέρων, χωρίς εξέταση των ειδικών ανά περίπτωση περιστάσεων, τη δυνατότητα αποζημίωσης των τρίτων για τη σχετική ζημία, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών ∙ αφετέρου, στην έναρξη διαλόγου περί της σημασίας της απόφασης ως προς τα όρια της αιτιώδους συνάφειας, επί των οποίων κινούνται οι εν λόγω αξιώσεις, κατά το ελληνικό δίκαιο αδικοπραξιών. Η ενωσιακή ερμηνεία δεσμεύει, βεβαίως, πλέον τα ελληνικά δικαστήρια, ως προς την εκδίκαση των σχετικών αδικοπρακτικών αξιώσεων, με βάση το άρθρο 914 ΑΚ, οσάκις οι ζημίες προκλήθηκαν από σύμπραξη που παραβίαζε το άρθρο 101 παρ. 1 της Συνθήκης για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ). Τι γίνεται, ωστόσο, στις περιπτώσεις που οι ζημίες τρίτων εκ του φαινομένου «τιμολογιακής ομπρέλας» προκλήθηκαν από καρτέλ που αποτελούσε παράβαση (όχι της ενωσιακής διάταξης αλλά) της αντίστοιχης εθνικής, δηλαδή του άρθρου 1 παρ. 1 Ν. 3959/2011; Είναι δυνατόν και εδώ να πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 914 ΑΚ, δηλαδή πρωτίστως η προϋπόθεση του παρανόμου και της αιτιώδους συνάφειας μεταξύ της παράνομης και υπαίτιας πράξης και της ζημίας;
Σπανίως δύο ιατρικές ειδικότητες είναι τόσο στενά συνδεδεμένες η μία με την άλλη, όσο οι ειδικότη... more Σπανίως δύο ιατρικές ειδικότητες είναι τόσο στενά συνδεδεμένες η μία με την άλλη, όσο οι ειδικότητες αναισθησιολόγου και χειρουργού. Πράγματι, συνήθως ο χειρουργός θα μπορεί να παράσχει τις ιατρικές του υπηρεσίες για μια χειρουργική επέμβαση στον ασθενή μόνον αφού αυτός βρίσκεται υπό αναισθησία, και αντίστοιχα, κατά κανόνα οι υπηρεσίες του αναισθησιολόγου θα είναι απαραίτητες όταν ο ασθενής πρόκειται να υποβληθεί σε χειρουργική επέμβαση. Τι γίνεται, όμως, όταν σε συνέχεια της επέμβασης του χειρουργού, για την οποία δέχθηκε αναισθησία, η υγεία του ασθενούς χειροτερεύει; Ευθύνη του γιατρού για τη δυσμενή εξέλιξη της υγείας του ασθενούς δημιουργείται μόνον εφόσον: α) υπάρχει ιατρικό λάθος του γιατρού, το οποίο οδήγησε στη βλάβη της υγείας του ασθενούς ή/και β) υπήρξε παράβαση της υποχρέωσης ενημέρωσης του ασθενούς, οπότε στον γιατρό καταλογίζεται η βλάβη της ζημίας του ασθενούς, επειδή ο ασθενής λόγω της πλημμελούς ενημέρωσης δεν ήταν σε θέση να αξιολογήσει τους κινδύνους της ιατρικής πράξης, οπότε και θα μπορούσε να την έχει αποφύγει . Πότε ευθύνονται όμως για αυτά ο αναισθησιολόγος, πότε ο χειρουργός, και πότε και οι δύο; Επισημαίνεται ότι η παρούσα ανάλυση επικεντρώνεται στα θέματα αστικών αξιώσεων των ζημιωθέντων, κατά των εναγόμενων γιατρών.
As some time has passed since its adoption, it now appears that Directive 2014/104/EE on Damages ... more As some time has passed since its adoption, it now appears that Directive 2014/104/EE on Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements contains useful procedural rules but is mostly characterised by general and vague goal-setting provisions, which are very often not applicable as such and cannot be incorporated in the national compensation systems without further specification.
The Directive might hence not achieve a large degree of harmonisation of the national antitrust damages rules.
In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules, it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most Member States.
If there is one objective that the Directive could achieve, it is probably to establish better coordination between private and public enforcement.
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Papers by Emmanuela Truli
In Greece, these provisions formed part of the former Competition Act. The Hellenic Competition Commission received in 12 years numerous complaints, and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissive. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and the Greek economy, and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have been resolved before a civil court, it was abolished from the Competition Act in 2009 and transferred to the Law on Unfair Competition Practices.
When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application can be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement.
The paper examines, in the example of Greece, the differences in the application of the economic dependence rules when they are transferred from a Competition Act to the Unfair Commercial Practices Act, and in result, the competency shifts from a competition authority to the civil courts. Also, it provides a first assessment about the positive and negative effects of such relocation, aiming to contribute to a “best practices” discussion about the enforcement of economic dependence rules.
Παρέχει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο στους πελάτες των τρίτων - εκτός συμπράξεως επιχειρήσεων, τη δυνατότητα να προσφύγουν ενώπιον των εθνικών δικαστηρίων και να ζητήσουν, με βάση τις εθνικές τους διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, αποζημίωση από τα μέλη του καρτέλ για τις υπερβολικά υψηλές τιμές των τρίτων αυτών επιχειρήσεων; Ή αντίθετα, μπορούν τα κράτη μέλη να αποκλείουν μια τέτοια υποχρέωση αποζημίωσης στο πλαίσιο του εθνικού τους δικαίου αποζημίωσης, επειδή αυτές αποτελούν έμμεσες, δηλαδή πολύ απομακρυσμένες ζημίες ;
Η παρούσα μελέτη στοχεύει αφενός, στην παρουσίαση της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου, η οποία απάντησε σαφώς στο ανωτέρω ερώτημα, θετικά, αποφαινόμενο ότι τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ δεν μπορούν να αποκλείουν εκ των προτέρων, χωρίς εξέταση των ειδικών ανά περίπτωση περιστάσεων, τη δυνατότητα αποζημίωσης των τρίτων για τη σχετική ζημία, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών ∙ αφετέρου, στην έναρξη διαλόγου περί της σημασίας της απόφασης ως προς τα όρια της αιτιώδους συνάφειας, επί των οποίων κινούνται οι εν λόγω αξιώσεις, κατά το ελληνικό δίκαιο αδικοπραξιών. Η ενωσιακή ερμηνεία δεσμεύει, βεβαίως, πλέον τα ελληνικά δικαστήρια, ως προς την εκδίκαση των σχετικών αδικοπρακτικών αξιώσεων, με βάση το άρθρο 914 ΑΚ, οσάκις οι ζημίες προκλήθηκαν από σύμπραξη που παραβίαζε το άρθρο 101 παρ. 1 της Συνθήκης για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ). Τι γίνεται, ωστόσο, στις περιπτώσεις που οι ζημίες τρίτων εκ του φαινομένου «τιμολογιακής ομπρέλας» προκλήθηκαν από καρτέλ που αποτελούσε παράβαση (όχι της ενωσιακής διάταξης αλλά) της αντίστοιχης εθνικής, δηλαδή του άρθρου 1 παρ. 1 Ν. 3959/2011; Είναι δυνατόν και εδώ να πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 914 ΑΚ, δηλαδή πρωτίστως η προϋπόθεση του παρανόμου και της αιτιώδους συνάφειας μεταξύ της παράνομης και υπαίτιας πράξης και της ζημίας;
Τι γίνεται, όμως, όταν σε συνέχεια της επέμβασης του χειρουργού, για την οποία δέχθηκε αναισθησία, η υγεία του ασθενούς χειροτερεύει;
Ευθύνη του γιατρού για τη δυσμενή εξέλιξη της υγείας του ασθενούς δημιουργείται μόνον εφόσον: α) υπάρχει ιατρικό λάθος του γιατρού, το οποίο οδήγησε στη βλάβη της υγείας του ασθενούς ή/και β) υπήρξε παράβαση της υποχρέωσης ενημέρωσης του ασθενούς, οπότε στον γιατρό καταλογίζεται η βλάβη της ζημίας του ασθενούς, επειδή ο ασθενής λόγω της πλημμελούς ενημέρωσης δεν ήταν σε θέση να αξιολογήσει τους κινδύνους της ιατρικής πράξης, οπότε και θα μπορούσε να την έχει αποφύγει .
Πότε ευθύνονται όμως για αυτά ο αναισθησιολόγος, πότε ο χειρουργός, και πότε και οι δύο;
Επισημαίνεται ότι η παρούσα ανάλυση επικεντρώνεται στα θέματα αστικών αξιώσεων των ζημιωθέντων, κατά των εναγόμενων γιατρών.
The Directive might hence not achieve a large degree of harmonisation of the national antitrust damages rules.
In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules, it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most Member States.
If there is one objective that the Directive could achieve, it is probably to establish better coordination between private and public enforcement.
In Greece, these provisions formed part of the former Competition Act. The Hellenic Competition Commission received in 12 years numerous complaints, and issued over forty economic dependence decisions - mostly dismissive. Due to this burden on the authority, and also because it was too often invoked by enterprises with only minor impact on competition and the Greek economy, and, more often than not, involved private disputes which could have been resolved before a civil court, it was abolished from the Competition Act in 2009 and transferred to the Law on Unfair Competition Practices.
When a particular provision changes position, it is interesting to see what the effect on its application can be. Possible changes include changes in the requirements of a provision, its legal consequences (sanctions, commitments etc.), protection scope, and other conditions of enforcement.
The paper examines, in the example of Greece, the differences in the application of the economic dependence rules when they are transferred from a Competition Act to the Unfair Commercial Practices Act, and in result, the competency shifts from a competition authority to the civil courts. Also, it provides a first assessment about the positive and negative effects of such relocation, aiming to contribute to a “best practices” discussion about the enforcement of economic dependence rules.
Παρέχει το ενωσιακό δίκαιο στους πελάτες των τρίτων - εκτός συμπράξεως επιχειρήσεων, τη δυνατότητα να προσφύγουν ενώπιον των εθνικών δικαστηρίων και να ζητήσουν, με βάση τις εθνικές τους διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών, αποζημίωση από τα μέλη του καρτέλ για τις υπερβολικά υψηλές τιμές των τρίτων αυτών επιχειρήσεων; Ή αντίθετα, μπορούν τα κράτη μέλη να αποκλείουν μια τέτοια υποχρέωση αποζημίωσης στο πλαίσιο του εθνικού τους δικαίου αποζημίωσης, επειδή αυτές αποτελούν έμμεσες, δηλαδή πολύ απομακρυσμένες ζημίες ;
Η παρούσα μελέτη στοχεύει αφενός, στην παρουσίαση της απόφασης του Δικαστηρίου, η οποία απάντησε σαφώς στο ανωτέρω ερώτημα, θετικά, αποφαινόμενο ότι τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ δεν μπορούν να αποκλείουν εκ των προτέρων, χωρίς εξέταση των ειδικών ανά περίπτωση περιστάσεων, τη δυνατότητα αποζημίωσης των τρίτων για τη σχετική ζημία, με βάση τις εθνικές διατάξεις περί αδικοπραξιών ∙ αφετέρου, στην έναρξη διαλόγου περί της σημασίας της απόφασης ως προς τα όρια της αιτιώδους συνάφειας, επί των οποίων κινούνται οι εν λόγω αξιώσεις, κατά το ελληνικό δίκαιο αδικοπραξιών. Η ενωσιακή ερμηνεία δεσμεύει, βεβαίως, πλέον τα ελληνικά δικαστήρια, ως προς την εκδίκαση των σχετικών αδικοπρακτικών αξιώσεων, με βάση το άρθρο 914 ΑΚ, οσάκις οι ζημίες προκλήθηκαν από σύμπραξη που παραβίαζε το άρθρο 101 παρ. 1 της Συνθήκης για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΣΛΕΕ). Τι γίνεται, ωστόσο, στις περιπτώσεις που οι ζημίες τρίτων εκ του φαινομένου «τιμολογιακής ομπρέλας» προκλήθηκαν από καρτέλ που αποτελούσε παράβαση (όχι της ενωσιακής διάταξης αλλά) της αντίστοιχης εθνικής, δηλαδή του άρθρου 1 παρ. 1 Ν. 3959/2011; Είναι δυνατόν και εδώ να πληρούνται οι προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 914 ΑΚ, δηλαδή πρωτίστως η προϋπόθεση του παρανόμου και της αιτιώδους συνάφειας μεταξύ της παράνομης και υπαίτιας πράξης και της ζημίας;
Τι γίνεται, όμως, όταν σε συνέχεια της επέμβασης του χειρουργού, για την οποία δέχθηκε αναισθησία, η υγεία του ασθενούς χειροτερεύει;
Ευθύνη του γιατρού για τη δυσμενή εξέλιξη της υγείας του ασθενούς δημιουργείται μόνον εφόσον: α) υπάρχει ιατρικό λάθος του γιατρού, το οποίο οδήγησε στη βλάβη της υγείας του ασθενούς ή/και β) υπήρξε παράβαση της υποχρέωσης ενημέρωσης του ασθενούς, οπότε στον γιατρό καταλογίζεται η βλάβη της ζημίας του ασθενούς, επειδή ο ασθενής λόγω της πλημμελούς ενημέρωσης δεν ήταν σε θέση να αξιολογήσει τους κινδύνους της ιατρικής πράξης, οπότε και θα μπορούσε να την έχει αποφύγει .
Πότε ευθύνονται όμως για αυτά ο αναισθησιολόγος, πότε ο χειρουργός, και πότε και οι δύο;
Επισημαίνεται ότι η παρούσα ανάλυση επικεντρώνεται στα θέματα αστικών αξιώσεων των ζημιωθέντων, κατά των εναγόμενων γιατρών.
The Directive might hence not achieve a large degree of harmonisation of the national antitrust damages rules.
In view of the increased complexity of some of the compensation rules, it is also questionable whether we will see an overall improvement in the effectiveness of private enforcement in most Member States.
If there is one objective that the Directive could achieve, it is probably to establish better coordination between private and public enforcement.