In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive t... more In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total industry profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the industry profits to increase, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase)...
The demographic history of the Jews in the Middle Ages may be characterized by two main phenomena... more The demographic history of the Jews in the Middle Ages may be characterized by two main phenomena: i) a sharp drop in the number of Jews until the beginning of the modern period, due mainly to conversions; and, ii) early urbanization. Until now, these features have been analyzed as primarily resulting from persecution and restrictions initiated by the political and religious authorities in the host countries. Economic historians have recently proposed an explanation based on mandatory education in the Jewish tradition (Botticini and Eckstein, 2001). We propose a supplementary explanation based on the incentives to switch affiliation and/or location in a dual environment, where potential gains from in-group cooperation for the Jewish minority may well be offset by losses due to intergroup hostility. Our model generates the two results described above (i.e., a decrease in the total number of Jews, and their concentration in urban areas), without having to rely either on discrimination...
This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the gran... more This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties.
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive t... more In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the possibility of product innovation, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase). Se...
In this paper, we differentiate between three aspects of bureaucratic quality - corruption, effec... more In this paper, we differentiate between three aspects of bureaucratic quality - corruption, effectiveness, and the creation of red-tape, and model a tradeoff between red-tape and effectiveness. We show how the levels of these variables are determined endogenously, by considering the interdependent behavior of a legislator and a regulator. In our model, the regulator creates red-tape in the form of regulatory rules that complicate procedures in the industry. As the enactor of these rules and regulations, the regulator has better knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the system, and, indeed, of any loopholes that might exist. This knowledge is valuable to the firms in the industry, and thus, once he has left the public service, the regulator can cash-in on the red-tape he has created. We show that even if we take the government's interests and desire to minimize red-tape into account, we will still get red-tape being created in equilibrium. The reason this is so is that the cost to th...
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive t... more In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total industry profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the industry profits to increase, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase)...
The demographic history of the Jews in the Middle Ages may be characterized by two main phenomena... more The demographic history of the Jews in the Middle Ages may be characterized by two main phenomena: i) a sharp drop in the number of Jews until the beginning of the modern period, due mainly to conversions; and, ii) early urbanization. Until now, these features have been analyzed as primarily resulting from persecution and restrictions initiated by the political and religious authorities in the host countries. Economic historians have recently proposed an explanation based on mandatory education in the Jewish tradition (Botticini and Eckstein, 2001). We propose a supplementary explanation based on the incentives to switch affiliation and/or location in a dual environment, where potential gains from in-group cooperation for the Jewish minority may well be offset by losses due to intergroup hostility. Our model generates the two results described above (i.e., a decrease in the total number of Jews, and their concentration in urban areas), without having to rely either on discrimination...
This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the gran... more This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties.
In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive t... more In a general setting with uncertainty and spillovers in R&D activity, we consider the incentive to cooperate among firms at any or all of the following three stages. Firms can jointly agree on the level of R&D expenditures, they can set up joint research facilities, and/or they can engage in an information sharing agreements, by which they agree to share any findings with the other firm. We compare expenditures on R&D, profit levels, and welfare levels across the different possible cooperative and competitive setups and offer antitrust implications. Our model differs from previous analyses in three important ways. First, most studies consider only research aimed at lowering production costs, and therefore consider only situations where total profits fall as spillovers increase. We allow for the possibility of product innovation, and define the concepts of offsetting spillovers (falling total profits) and incremental spillovers (when total profits increase as spillovers increase). Se...
In this paper, we differentiate between three aspects of bureaucratic quality - corruption, effec... more In this paper, we differentiate between three aspects of bureaucratic quality - corruption, effectiveness, and the creation of red-tape, and model a tradeoff between red-tape and effectiveness. We show how the levels of these variables are determined endogenously, by considering the interdependent behavior of a legislator and a regulator. In our model, the regulator creates red-tape in the form of regulatory rules that complicate procedures in the industry. As the enactor of these rules and regulations, the regulator has better knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the system, and, indeed, of any loopholes that might exist. This knowledge is valuable to the firms in the industry, and thus, once he has left the public service, the regulator can cash-in on the red-tape he has created. We show that even if we take the government's interests and desire to minimize red-tape into account, we will still get red-tape being created in equilibrium. The reason this is so is that the cost to th...
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