David Widerker is Professor at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He has published widely on the topics of free will and moral responsibility. He is a co-editor (with Michael McKenna) of Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Ashgate 2003). His recent articles include "Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (Philosophical Review 1995), "Agent-Causation and the Control-Problem" (Faith and Philosophy 2005), “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios” (The Journal of Philosophy 2006), "The Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Moral Responsibility and Determinism," (together with Ira Schnall), in David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014. "On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism," (together with Ira Schnall.) In Andrei Buckareff, et alia (eds.) Agency and Responsibility, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015, "A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?" Analysis 2016), "Defending Non-Causal Libertarianism." American Philosophical Quarterly 2018): 1-14. Phone: +972508113206 Address: Joseph Nakar 35 13/4
In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Poss... more In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (ii) unsupporte
This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writin... more This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect the agent to have done something else. It argues that in situations of such kinds, agents can be held morally responsible for their actions, even in a libertarian sense. This views is called “Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.” It argues that this more “Frankfurt-friendly” view is another possible option open to libertarians in response to Frankfurt-type examples.
Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like... more Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by ...
The Extensionality Argument* David Widerker bar-ilan university In his well-known article "T... more The Extensionality Argument* David Widerker bar-ilan university In his well-known article "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" ([9]), WV Quine argues that: Genuine violation of the extensionality policy, by admitting non-truth-functional occurrences of statements within statements ...
This paper is an in-depth examination of the Ockhamist solution to the tension between divine fo... more This paper is an in-depth examination of the Ockhamist solution to the tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In it, I question the adequacy of the Ockhamistic approach, which tries to treat God's prior beliefs about the future as soft facts about the past, as opposed to hard facts about the past. I argue that there is an important asymmetry between divine forebeliefs about the future, and soft past facts which bears importantly on the question of fixity of divine forebeliefs, thus refuting the Ockhamist position. In the paper, I offer an account of the intuitive non-fixity of soft facts about the past, and argue that, on pain of leading to counterintuitive consequences, this account cannot be applied to facts about divine foreknowledge. In its last part, I examine a recent attempt by John Fischer which is also intended to bring out the asymmetry between forebeliefs and and standard cases of soft facts and contend that it is incomplete.
Chapter 3 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Poss... more Chapter 3 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities* David Widerker 1. Introduction A widely accepted moral principle affirms that PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given act A only if he could have ...
Non-Causal Libertananism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal accoun... more Non-Causal Libertananism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. Non-Causal Libertarianism has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and, therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have even gone so far as to claim that NCL does not offer a plausible account of action. This paper is intended to defend NCL against these charges. It addresses specifically, The Disappearing Agent Objection, Peter van Inwagen’s Mind Argument, and some objections by Randolph Clarke.
C ARL GINET ([1] pp. 182-3; [2] pp. 391-2) and Peter van Inwagen ([3] pp. 55-105) have recently d... more C ARL GINET ([1] pp. 182-3; [2] pp. 391-2) and Peter van Inwagen ([3] pp. 55-105) have recently defended a certain modal argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. In this paper, I seek to examine this argument and to show that it is not sound. I conclude by ...
'The dissenters include Davidson (1973, 149-50); Naylor (1984); Hein-aman (1986, 275-76); an... more 'The dissenters include Davidson (1973, 149-50); Naylor (1984); Hein-aman (1986, 275-76); and Lamb (1993, 522-23). Among those who agree with Frankfurt in his rejection of PAP, we may find, for example, Blumen-feld (1971, 340-41); Fischer (1982, 33-34); ...
In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Poss... more In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (ii) unsupporte
This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writin... more This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect the agent to have done something else. It argues that in situations of such kinds, agents can be held morally responsible for their actions, even in a libertarian sense. This views is called “Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.” It argues that this more “Frankfurt-friendly” view is another possible option open to libertarians in response to Frankfurt-type examples.
Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like... more Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by ...
The Extensionality Argument* David Widerker bar-ilan university In his well-known article "T... more The Extensionality Argument* David Widerker bar-ilan university In his well-known article "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" ([9]), WV Quine argues that: Genuine violation of the extensionality policy, by admitting non-truth-functional occurrences of statements within statements ...
This paper is an in-depth examination of the Ockhamist solution to the tension between divine fo... more This paper is an in-depth examination of the Ockhamist solution to the tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In it, I question the adequacy of the Ockhamistic approach, which tries to treat God's prior beliefs about the future as soft facts about the past, as opposed to hard facts about the past. I argue that there is an important asymmetry between divine forebeliefs about the future, and soft past facts which bears importantly on the question of fixity of divine forebeliefs, thus refuting the Ockhamist position. In the paper, I offer an account of the intuitive non-fixity of soft facts about the past, and argue that, on pain of leading to counterintuitive consequences, this account cannot be applied to facts about divine foreknowledge. In its last part, I examine a recent attempt by John Fischer which is also intended to bring out the asymmetry between forebeliefs and and standard cases of soft facts and contend that it is incomplete.
Chapter 3 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Poss... more Chapter 3 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities* David Widerker 1. Introduction A widely accepted moral principle affirms that PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given act A only if he could have ...
Non-Causal Libertananism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal accoun... more Non-Causal Libertananism (NCL) is a libertarian position that aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. Non-Causal Libertarianism has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and, therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have even gone so far as to claim that NCL does not offer a plausible account of action. This paper is intended to defend NCL against these charges. It addresses specifically, The Disappearing Agent Objection, Peter van Inwagen’s Mind Argument, and some objections by Randolph Clarke.
C ARL GINET ([1] pp. 182-3; [2] pp. 391-2) and Peter van Inwagen ([3] pp. 55-105) have recently d... more C ARL GINET ([1] pp. 182-3; [2] pp. 391-2) and Peter van Inwagen ([3] pp. 55-105) have recently defended a certain modal argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. In this paper, I seek to examine this argument and to show that it is not sound. I conclude by ...
'The dissenters include Davidson (1973, 149-50); Naylor (1984); Hein-aman (1986, 275-76); an... more 'The dissenters include Davidson (1973, 149-50); Naylor (1984); Hein-aman (1986, 275-76); and Lamb (1993, 522-23). Among those who agree with Frankfurt in his rejection of PAP, we may find, for example, Blumen-feld (1971, 340-41); Fischer (1982, 33-34); ...
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