I got my PhD in Philosophy at the University of Miami in 2014. My research interests lie mainly in metaphysics. My dissertation project focuses on metaontology and methodological issues in metaphysics. I am also interested in ontological issues in philosophy of computer science, ontology of art. I have an ongoing research project (2014-2016) in medical ethics, which is funded by TUBITAK about the right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey.
I am the section editor at Philpapers for the categories 'Artifacts', 'Ontological Pluralism', and 'Ontological Disagreement'.
Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type rea... more Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type realists seem to agree that types, unlike properties, are objects in their own right, they argue that there is a metaphysically intimate tie between the existence conditions of types and properties. In particular, most type realists believe that types are, in a certain sense, determined by the properties that underlie them. I argue that this is a mistake, especially for those type realists who believe that social and cultural types such as works of music and fiction or words are artifacts. I offer an alternative version of type realism where social and cultural types are dependent objects that should be understood in analogy with concrete artifacts.
Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosoph... more Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that (a) words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and (b) words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets.
This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though... more This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of treatment crucially requires that patients be properly informed and asked for their consent before the treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’ tendency to ignore the right to decline medical treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part of the problem is the legal framework, which, in essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify medical intervention against a patient's will. I conclude the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents defining and regulating patient rights, including the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution for the past several years, so my proposal should best be understood as contributing to public discussion of the new Constitution by initiating debate about medical paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.
of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Amie Thomasson... more of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Amie Thomasson. No. of pages in text. (168) Serious ontology is the view that metaphysical debates about existence are deep, theoretical, quasi-scientific debates about the nature and constituents of reality. Serious ontology has been the dominant metaontology for the last few decades, but recently it has come under attack. Eli Hirsch’s Quantifier Variantism is one of the most compelling criticisms of serious ontology. According to Hirsch many ontological debates are merely verbal because the alleged rivals in these debates can each agree that the other side is saying something true given the meanings of the existential quantifier in their own language, and none of those quantifier meanings is objectively privileged. The most well developed response to skeptical metaontologies such as Quantifier Variantism is due to Theodore Sider’s (2011) Writing the Book of the World. Sider agrees that the meaning of the existential quantifier may vary in different languages. However, he argues that even though the quantifier variantist might be right that both parties to the debate make true existential claims, the debate might still be substantive. On Sider’s view it is substantive if one of the languages is objectively better than the other, where it is better if the quantifiers in the language map the structure of reality or carve perfectly at the world’s logical joints. I argue that Sider’s defense of serious ontology does not succeed, as he overlooks a very important assumption about the comparative evaluation of different languages. On my view, different languages could be comparatively evaluated only on the condition that they are introduced for the same purpose(s). Consider, for example, two countries, Leftia and Rightland, which share a border. The border is close to an inclined fault line according to which all Leftia and a very small part of Rightland in the region are on a lower wall and the almost all of Rightland is on a higher wall. Which language, geological or political, is objectively better at describing the region? It seems clear that the question ‘Which language is better?’ is incomplete without saying anything about the purpose of the description. But once we specify the purpose the answer seems to be fairly obvious. If the purpose of the description is to state geological facts (perhaps one of the two countries is planning to build a nuclear power plant in the region) then obviously the geological language is better, whereas if we aim to lay out the political facts (perhaps there is a significant archeological discovery on the border) then, of course, we should choose the political language. Hence, in order to claim that one language is better than the other they must serve the same purpose. If they do not have the same purpose we are not able to compare them at all. I argue that in most ontological debates, if not all, putatively rival languages are put forward for different purposes, and thus Sider’s way of reinstating serious ontology in the face of the threat of Quantifier Variantism fails. I consider the ontological debate over the existence of ordinary objects as a case study. I argue that in this debate between people like Lynne Baker and Trenton Merricks, putatively competing languages don’t have the same set of purposes; they are meant to do different things. Assuming that they are successful with respect to their purposes, we simply cannot deny either ontology on the grounds that one is objectively better than the other. I conclude, pace Sider, that there are many different books of the same world, and that, given that these different books are written for different purposes, they cannot be compared. For all we know it can be the case that different languages such as the language of economics, biology, physics, or sociology could mark the objective similarities and differences in the world equally well. So perhaps we need not a book of the world, but an ever-growing encyclopedia, to serve our ever-expanding purposes. The way ontologists can contribute to the writing of this encyclopedia, I argue, is not by engaging in debates about the complete inventory of what there is, but instead asking questions about the natures of the things that there are. By looking at both linguistic and non-linguistic practices concerning the objects in question, ontologists can answer questions such as under what conditions these kind of objects come into existence, how they persist, or how and on which entities their existence depends. Therefore, the conclusion is not that we should eliminate ontology altogether, but rather reorient its questions. In an appendix to my dissertation I give an example of how ontology may proceed along these lines, by taking up these questions for software where I argue that software is a kind of abstract artifact.
Artworks have authors. According to Christy Mag Uidhir, this simple assumption has significant co... more Artworks have authors. According to Christy Mag Uidhir, this simple assumption has significant consequences for the ontology of artworks. One such consequence is that artworks cannot be identified with abstract entities: if there are works of art, they are concrete entities. Therefore, one cannot create an abstract work of art. Mag Uidhir presents a novel challenge against abstract creationism, the view that certain kinds of art objects are abstract artifacts. This article has two aims. First, it provides a defense of abstract creationism against Mag Uidhir’s arguments. Second, it argues that creation, even in the case of concrete artifacts, is never purely causal: to create an artifact is to bring about the conditions on which the created object ontologically depends. I conclude that a properly developed account of creation provides a better understanding of the question of how one comes to create an artifact, be it abstract or concrete.
Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are inte... more Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy of abstracta. I argue that creationists should rather reject the principle that creation requires causation. Creation, in my view, is a non-causal relation that can be explained using an appropriate notion of ontological dependence. The existence and the creation of abstract artifacts depend on certain individuals with appropriate intentions, along with events of a certain kind that include but are not limited to creations of certain concrete objects.
Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosoph... more Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that a) words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfil various kinds of purposes, and b) words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets.
This paper examines the current state of right to refuse
medical treatment in Turkey. Even though... more This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of treatment crucially requires that patients be properly informed and asked for their consent before the treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’ tendency to ignore the right to decline medical treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part of the problem is the legal framework, which, in essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify medical intervention against a patient’s will. I conclude the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents defining and regulating patient rights, including the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution for the past several years, so my proposal should best be understood as contributing to public discussion of the new Constitution by initiating debate about medical paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.
Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in ... more Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in certain cases there occur a conflict between obligations of beneficence and autonomy. On the one hand, physicians have a duty to preserve life, which entails intervening hunger strike before the hunger striker loses his life. On the other hand, physicians’ duty to respect autonomy implies that attending physicians have to respect hunger strikers’ decision to refuse nutrition. International medical guidelines state that physicians should follow the strikers’ unpressured advance directives. When physicians encounter an unconscious striker, in the absence of reliable advance directives the guidelines advise physicians to make a decision on the basis of the patient’s values, previously expressed wishes and best interest. I argue that if there are no advance directives and the striker has already lost his competence, the physician has the responsibility to resuscitate the striker. Once the striker regains his decision-making capacity, he should be asked about his decision. If he is determined to continue fasting and refuses treatment the physician has a moral obligation to respect this decision and follow his advance directives.
Felsefe Tartışmaları: A Turkish Journal of Philosophy (49. Kitap), 2014
Ontik Yapısal Realizm’e göre içinde yaşadığımız evrenin temel yapıtaşını nesneler değil ilişkiler... more Ontik Yapısal Realizm’e göre içinde yaşadığımız evrenin temel yapıtaşını nesneler değil ilişkiler oluşturur. Bir başka deyişle gerçekliğin temelini oluşturan şey bireyler değil evrenin objektif kipsel ve kanunsal yapısıdır. Bu yazıda metafizik bir tez olarak yapısal realizmin oldukça önemli problemlerle karşı karşıya olduğunu, bununla beraber bu itirazların yapısal realizmin daha ılımlı bir versiyonu için geçerli olmadığını savunacağım. Daha ılımlı bu yapısal realizmi kabaca resmedecek ve sonuç olarak da bir yapısal realist için bu görüşün pek çok konuda Ontik Yapısal Realizm’den daha makul bir teori olduğunu savunacağım.
Theodore Sider in his latest book provides a defense of the substantivity of the first-order onto... more Theodore Sider in his latest book provides a defense of the substantivity of the first-order ontological debates against recent deflationary attacks. He articulates and defends several realist theses: (a) nature has an objective structure, (b) there is an objectively privileged language to describe the structure, and (c) ontological debates are substantive. Sider’s defense of metaontological realism, (c), crucially depends on his realism about fundamental languages, (b). I argue that (b) is wrong. As a result, Sider’s metaontological realism fails to establish the substantivity of certain ontological disputes. Nonetheless, I will argue denying metaontological realism does not require giving up on the realism about structure, (a), that most of us would like to preserve: namely the idea that there are objective similarities and differences in the world that we try to wrap our minds around.
Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type rea... more Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type realists seem to agree that types, unlike properties, are objects in their own right, they argue that there is a metaphysically intimate tie between the existence conditions of types and properties. In particular, most type realists believe that types are, in a certain sense, determined by the properties that underlie them. I argue that this is a mistake, especially for those type realists who believe that social and cultural types such as works of music and fiction or words are artifacts. I offer an alternative version of type realism where social and cultural types are dependent objects that should be understood in analogy with concrete artifacts.
Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosoph... more Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that (a) words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and (b) words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets.
This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though... more This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of treatment crucially requires that patients be properly informed and asked for their consent before the treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’ tendency to ignore the right to decline medical treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part of the problem is the legal framework, which, in essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify medical intervention against a patient's will. I conclude the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents defining and regulating patient rights, including the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution for the past several years, so my proposal should best be understood as contributing to public discussion of the new Constitution by initiating debate about medical paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.
of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Amie Thomasson... more of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Amie Thomasson. No. of pages in text. (168) Serious ontology is the view that metaphysical debates about existence are deep, theoretical, quasi-scientific debates about the nature and constituents of reality. Serious ontology has been the dominant metaontology for the last few decades, but recently it has come under attack. Eli Hirsch’s Quantifier Variantism is one of the most compelling criticisms of serious ontology. According to Hirsch many ontological debates are merely verbal because the alleged rivals in these debates can each agree that the other side is saying something true given the meanings of the existential quantifier in their own language, and none of those quantifier meanings is objectively privileged. The most well developed response to skeptical metaontologies such as Quantifier Variantism is due to Theodore Sider’s (2011) Writing the Book of the World. Sider agrees that the meaning of the existential quantifier may vary in different languages. However, he argues that even though the quantifier variantist might be right that both parties to the debate make true existential claims, the debate might still be substantive. On Sider’s view it is substantive if one of the languages is objectively better than the other, where it is better if the quantifiers in the language map the structure of reality or carve perfectly at the world’s logical joints. I argue that Sider’s defense of serious ontology does not succeed, as he overlooks a very important assumption about the comparative evaluation of different languages. On my view, different languages could be comparatively evaluated only on the condition that they are introduced for the same purpose(s). Consider, for example, two countries, Leftia and Rightland, which share a border. The border is close to an inclined fault line according to which all Leftia and a very small part of Rightland in the region are on a lower wall and the almost all of Rightland is on a higher wall. Which language, geological or political, is objectively better at describing the region? It seems clear that the question ‘Which language is better?’ is incomplete without saying anything about the purpose of the description. But once we specify the purpose the answer seems to be fairly obvious. If the purpose of the description is to state geological facts (perhaps one of the two countries is planning to build a nuclear power plant in the region) then obviously the geological language is better, whereas if we aim to lay out the political facts (perhaps there is a significant archeological discovery on the border) then, of course, we should choose the political language. Hence, in order to claim that one language is better than the other they must serve the same purpose. If they do not have the same purpose we are not able to compare them at all. I argue that in most ontological debates, if not all, putatively rival languages are put forward for different purposes, and thus Sider’s way of reinstating serious ontology in the face of the threat of Quantifier Variantism fails. I consider the ontological debate over the existence of ordinary objects as a case study. I argue that in this debate between people like Lynne Baker and Trenton Merricks, putatively competing languages don’t have the same set of purposes; they are meant to do different things. Assuming that they are successful with respect to their purposes, we simply cannot deny either ontology on the grounds that one is objectively better than the other. I conclude, pace Sider, that there are many different books of the same world, and that, given that these different books are written for different purposes, they cannot be compared. For all we know it can be the case that different languages such as the language of economics, biology, physics, or sociology could mark the objective similarities and differences in the world equally well. So perhaps we need not a book of the world, but an ever-growing encyclopedia, to serve our ever-expanding purposes. The way ontologists can contribute to the writing of this encyclopedia, I argue, is not by engaging in debates about the complete inventory of what there is, but instead asking questions about the natures of the things that there are. By looking at both linguistic and non-linguistic practices concerning the objects in question, ontologists can answer questions such as under what conditions these kind of objects come into existence, how they persist, or how and on which entities their existence depends. Therefore, the conclusion is not that we should eliminate ontology altogether, but rather reorient its questions. In an appendix to my dissertation I give an example of how ontology may proceed along these lines, by taking up these questions for software where I argue that software is a kind of abstract artifact.
Artworks have authors. According to Christy Mag Uidhir, this simple assumption has significant co... more Artworks have authors. According to Christy Mag Uidhir, this simple assumption has significant consequences for the ontology of artworks. One such consequence is that artworks cannot be identified with abstract entities: if there are works of art, they are concrete entities. Therefore, one cannot create an abstract work of art. Mag Uidhir presents a novel challenge against abstract creationism, the view that certain kinds of art objects are abstract artifacts. This article has two aims. First, it provides a defense of abstract creationism against Mag Uidhir’s arguments. Second, it argues that creation, even in the case of concrete artifacts, is never purely causal: to create an artifact is to bring about the conditions on which the created object ontologically depends. I conclude that a properly developed account of creation provides a better understanding of the question of how one comes to create an artifact, be it abstract or concrete.
Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are inte... more Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy of abstracta. I argue that creationists should rather reject the principle that creation requires causation. Creation, in my view, is a non-causal relation that can be explained using an appropriate notion of ontological dependence. The existence and the creation of abstract artifacts depend on certain individuals with appropriate intentions, along with events of a certain kind that include but are not limited to creations of certain concrete objects.
Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosoph... more Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that a) words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfil various kinds of purposes, and b) words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets.
This paper examines the current state of right to refuse
medical treatment in Turkey. Even though... more This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of treatment crucially requires that patients be properly informed and asked for their consent before the treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’ tendency to ignore the right to decline medical treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part of the problem is the legal framework, which, in essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify medical intervention against a patient’s will. I conclude the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents defining and regulating patient rights, including the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution for the past several years, so my proposal should best be understood as contributing to public discussion of the new Constitution by initiating debate about medical paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.
Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in ... more Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in certain cases there occur a conflict between obligations of beneficence and autonomy. On the one hand, physicians have a duty to preserve life, which entails intervening hunger strike before the hunger striker loses his life. On the other hand, physicians’ duty to respect autonomy implies that attending physicians have to respect hunger strikers’ decision to refuse nutrition. International medical guidelines state that physicians should follow the strikers’ unpressured advance directives. When physicians encounter an unconscious striker, in the absence of reliable advance directives the guidelines advise physicians to make a decision on the basis of the patient’s values, previously expressed wishes and best interest. I argue that if there are no advance directives and the striker has already lost his competence, the physician has the responsibility to resuscitate the striker. Once the striker regains his decision-making capacity, he should be asked about his decision. If he is determined to continue fasting and refuses treatment the physician has a moral obligation to respect this decision and follow his advance directives.
Felsefe Tartışmaları: A Turkish Journal of Philosophy (49. Kitap), 2014
Ontik Yapısal Realizm’e göre içinde yaşadığımız evrenin temel yapıtaşını nesneler değil ilişkiler... more Ontik Yapısal Realizm’e göre içinde yaşadığımız evrenin temel yapıtaşını nesneler değil ilişkiler oluşturur. Bir başka deyişle gerçekliğin temelini oluşturan şey bireyler değil evrenin objektif kipsel ve kanunsal yapısıdır. Bu yazıda metafizik bir tez olarak yapısal realizmin oldukça önemli problemlerle karşı karşıya olduğunu, bununla beraber bu itirazların yapısal realizmin daha ılımlı bir versiyonu için geçerli olmadığını savunacağım. Daha ılımlı bu yapısal realizmi kabaca resmedecek ve sonuç olarak da bir yapısal realist için bu görüşün pek çok konuda Ontik Yapısal Realizm’den daha makul bir teori olduğunu savunacağım.
Theodore Sider in his latest book provides a defense of the substantivity of the first-order onto... more Theodore Sider in his latest book provides a defense of the substantivity of the first-order ontological debates against recent deflationary attacks. He articulates and defends several realist theses: (a) nature has an objective structure, (b) there is an objectively privileged language to describe the structure, and (c) ontological debates are substantive. Sider’s defense of metaontological realism, (c), crucially depends on his realism about fundamental languages, (b). I argue that (b) is wrong. As a result, Sider’s metaontological realism fails to establish the substantivity of certain ontological disputes. Nonetheless, I will argue denying metaontological realism does not require giving up on the realism about structure, (a), that most of us would like to preserve: namely the idea that there are objective similarities and differences in the world that we try to wrap our minds around.
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Papers by Nurbay Irmak
medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only
a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their
attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue
that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed
consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish
physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right
to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of
treatment crucially requires that patients be properly
informed and asked for their consent before the
treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’
tendency to ignore the right to decline medical
treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic
approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part
of the problem is the legal framework, which, in
essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the
frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in
the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify
medical intervention against a patient’s will. I conclude
the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents
defining and regulating patient rights, including the
Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue
that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in
Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution
for the past several years, so my proposal should best be
understood as contributing to public discussion of the
new Constitution by initiating debate about medical
paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.
medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only
a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their
attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue
that recent studies on physicians’ views on informed
consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish
physicians do not tend to recognise their patients’ right
to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of
treatment crucially requires that patients be properly
informed and asked for their consent before the
treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers’
tendency to ignore the right to decline medical
treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic
approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part
of the problem is the legal framework, which, in
essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the
frequent appearance of the phrase ‘medical necessity’ in
the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify
medical intervention against a patient’s will. I conclude
the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents
defining and regulating patient rights, including the
Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue
that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in
Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution
for the past several years, so my proposal should best be
understood as contributing to public discussion of the
new Constitution by initiating debate about medical
paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine.