Every occupation, social class and religiosus group have their own morals and duties. Furthermore... more Every occupation, social class and religiosus group have their own morals and duties. Furthermore, these moral duties, together with their motivation, differs from time to time and from an individual to individual. Stealing, for instance, is not an immoral action for thiefs; unless they do not steal from each other. Or, digging a pit for someone was immoral before, now, in capitalism, is a rule and necessity. But, is this the whole story? Isn’t there an objective rule, an universal law, at least a formal schema for ethics? According to Kant, there is such a law and schema. He calls that “supreme nature of morality” (1999: 44) and grounds it on the good will and human rationality. In this paper, I will try to explain Kant's “doctrine of morals” (1999: 43) and indicate some examples of it.
In my paper, I will try to compare Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to the 18th century ideal of the b... more In my paper, I will try to compare Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to the 18th century ideal of the beautiful soul and discuss their relevance to Dostoevky’s protagonist, Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. I say “I will” because it very difficult to think of Dostoevky and Myshkin when İstanbul is up in arms. Digressing ethical sphare, and nestling in solitide and silence is like a squering the circle while İstanbul has come together and gone to “Gezi.” Nonetheless, I will do my best.
In my paper, I will try to compare Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain with Edith Wharton's ... more In my paper, I will try to compare Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain with Edith Wharton's novel, The Age of Innocence. Considering the dynamics of Bildungsroman, I will comment on the differences between the Archer Newland and Han Castrop – protagonists of the novels. I will also make some comparisons between two other integral characters - May Welland and Clavdia Chauchat. These comparisons will have some philosophical backgrounds – especially, Kant's duty ethics and Hegel's dialectics of recognition. I will argue that Hans Castrop starts where Archer, or more precisely, Ellen ends. Put it differently, Hegel's ethics starts where Kant's ethics ends. No one is innocent, Hegel is right, “Innocence is merely non-action, like the mere being of a stone, not even that of a child.” (1977: 282)
In this paper, I will try to reveal some integral parts of Wittgenstein's philosophical investiga... more In this paper, I will try to reveal some integral parts of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation – “language game”, “rule following”, and “family resemblance.” I will argue that Wittgenstein's new way of looking at language is intrinsically bounded up with his new way of doing philosophy. In this sense, Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation is a grammatical one. It can also be labeled as a therapeutical work. Nonetheless, the most significant part of my paper will be related to so-called “private language argument.” Because it is the upshot of Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation. It exposes the fact that language is a totality of social agreements which are grounded on human bodies. Primitive reactions, in other words, avowals are prototypes of language. The word prototype reminds of the word foundation. But Wittgenstein deliberately does not use it since it is a very loaded term, and the term with sharpened edges. Wittgenstein does not prefers such terms, he is fond of terms with “blurred edges.” Because language itself is blurred mode of representation - i.e. game. Consequently, “the human body is the best picture of the human soul.” (p. 178) That is to say, we can not think of soul and language without body. It follows that solipsism is the multi-vehicle pileup of dualism created by the old view of looking at language, that is, picture theory of language. Wittgenstein, however, is not a behaviorist. He is a philosopher of neither nor. This conceptualization neither will be the last explanation of my term paper.
In this paper, I will try to explain some basic aspects of Heidegger's philosophy: “Handiness”, “... more In this paper, I will try to explain some basic aspects of Heidegger's philosophy: “Handiness”, “Primordial Time”, and “Double Forgetting.” But firstly, I will examine the concept of Da-sein due to the fact that it is the integral concept of Heidegger's phenomenology. No doubt, in Being and Time (from now on BT), Heidegger's philosophical investigation starts with the emphasis on the priority of the question of Being. Because, according to him, Being, and the question of the meaning of it, has been forgotten by the traditional Western philosophy. As you see, philosophy itself is part of “Double Forgetting.” Having accomplished that I will focus on the “Handiness”: the first existential of Da-sein. In this point, I hope to give an explanation also for the third existential: “Worldiness.” Of course, worldiness can only be explained in the terms of its relationship with handiness. Therefore, section on handiness actually will contain some main points of worldiness. Afterwards, I will resume my paper with the concept of “Primordial Temporality”, since the meaning of the Being reveals also itself within temporality. No doubt, Dasein exists in space and time. The last subject of my paper will be “Double Forgetting.” Nonetheless, I will not be able to go into the details of it in spite of the fact that Heidegger uses this term in a very broad sense. In Being and Time, you can see it everywhere. It is like a shadow, it pursues his owner everywhere he goes- from throwness to death, from handiness to worldiness, that is, in general, from history to philosophy.
In my term paper, I will try to give an exposition of Hegel's concept of desire given that Phenom... more In my term paper, I will try to give an exposition of Hegel's concept of desire given that Phenomenology of Spirit, as a Bildungs roman (Gürle 1996: 23), is actually the story of desire which educate itself by otherness of the others. Desire prominently appears at the beginning of the 4th chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit as follows: “Self-consciousness is Begierde überhaupt.” That is to say, “Self-consciousness is desire in general.” But it could also be translated as “desire in itself,” or “desire, generally” or “mere desire.” In Terry Pinkard's translation, for example, it is “desire in itself” (see Pippin 2010: 20).
This is one of the most favorite assertions of the book. Since it occurs “at the juncture point” (Butler 1987: 25) of Desire's Bildungs roman, it has many interpretations as well as translations. Kojeve, for instance, propose that desire -Begierhe- plays a key role in Hegel's phenomenology since it does not only relates subject with itself but also relates subject with other subjects. According to him, without desire, it is impossible to speak of “I”, therefore, “We” either. Self-consciousness, in other words, “I” entails not only desire but desire for another self-consciousness (Kojeve 1980: 37).
But how a capacity which is shared with animals could generate self-consciousness? In Jenkins' (2009) words, “How could a capacity that human beings share with mere animals be identical with, or somehow constitute, a relation to self?” Or, can desire be described as rational, or, can philosophy hold desire without losing its philosophical character? (Butler 1987: 3) Hegel, unfortunately, does not provide us with clear answers of the first two questions. Nonetheless, we have several definitions of the concept in relation to the other fundamental concepts: life, work, and etc. For example, according to Hegel, life is immediate object of desire (1977: 106) whereas work is desire held in check (1977: 118).
In my paper, I will try to explain the ontology of desire. Following Butler's arguments, I will argue against Kojeve for whom self-consciousness is possible if and only if desire is directed not toward a being but toward a nonbeing - that is, toward another desire (1969: 40). I agree with Butler that “Desire is intentional in that it is always desire of or for a given object or Other, but it is also reflective in the sense that desire is a modality in which the subject is both discovered and enhanced.” (1987: 25).
In term my paper, I will also give some other interpretation of the desire. For example, Findley, the writer of foreword and analyses of the Oxford edition of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” defines nature of Desire as abolishing the otherness of the Other (1977: 518). According to him, the abolishment of otherness of the other occurs only in “a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness,” that is, in a state, “where the object of consciousness is also its subject” (1977: 520). Or, Gadamer says that Hegel refers to desire on occasion as the "unadulterated feeling of self" (Hegel 1977 148, see Gadamer 1976: 154). There are heaps of interpretations like these. Therefore, I will just focus on two of them: Pippin's and Hypolitte’s interpretations. Because Pippin argues that he when Hegel says “self-consciousness is desire in general” he means that to be relevant to the nature of consciousness itself (Pippin 2010: 14). Or, Hyppolite suggests that desire is "the power of the negative in human life" (1969: 27). Conceived as a lack, a being-without, desire initially signifies nothing but negativity, according to Hypolitte. For him, “Human self-consciousness is in the first place Desire, but this desire is never satisfied” (1969: 28).
In my paper, I will try to give an exposition of Foucault's archeology and geneology of the self,... more In my paper, I will try to give an exposition of Foucault's archeology and geneology of the self, since Foucault is interested not merely in 'technologies of domination' but also in 'technologies of the self.' Foucault, especially in his later works, focus on the 'technologies of the self' and argues that identity is not simply imposed from above, i.e. identity is not outcome of a repression, but rather is actively and willingly determined by individuals through deployment of practices of the self.
In my paper, I will try to give a sense of what is happening right now in Turkey using theoretica... more In my paper, I will try to give a sense of what is happening right now in Turkey using theoretical approaches of Gramsci, Foucault, Agamben and Benjamin in as much as we have discussed in class. I will proceed my paper with Gramsci and put an end to it with Benjamin since Benjamin indicates the power of the resistence whereas Gramsci designates its reasons and needs. Following Gramsci, I will argue that one can neither succeed in revolution nor protect a sovereignity unless s/he realize the significance of the civil society in modernity. Foucault's theoretical approach will cover a small space in my paper. I will just reminds his insurgence of subjugated knowledges. Nevertheless, usig his definition I will call Gezi resistence the insurgence. In my paper, I will mainly dwell upon Agamben due to the fact that he is both the transcension and continuation of Foucault's biopolitics. In this context, I will come up with the idea that the Gezi insurgence is a good representation of the state of exception. As he remarks, “so in the person of the sovereign, the werewolf, the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city.” And sometimes s/he hits the city as well.
Every occupation, social class and religiosus group have their own morals and duties. Furthermore... more Every occupation, social class and religiosus group have their own morals and duties. Furthermore, these moral duties, together with their motivation, differs from time to time and from an individual to individual. Stealing, for instance, is not an immoral action for thiefs; unless they do not steal from each other. Or, digging a pit for someone was immoral before, now, in capitalism, is a rule and necessity. But, is this the whole story? Isn’t there an objective rule, an universal law, at least a formal schema for ethics? According to Kant, there is such a law and schema. He calls that “supreme nature of morality” (1999: 44) and grounds it on the good will and human rationality. In this paper, I will try to explain Kant's “doctrine of morals” (1999: 43) and indicate some examples of it.
In my paper, I will try to compare Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to the 18th century ideal of the b... more In my paper, I will try to compare Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to the 18th century ideal of the beautiful soul and discuss their relevance to Dostoevky’s protagonist, Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. I say “I will” because it very difficult to think of Dostoevky and Myshkin when İstanbul is up in arms. Digressing ethical sphare, and nestling in solitide and silence is like a squering the circle while İstanbul has come together and gone to “Gezi.” Nonetheless, I will do my best.
In my paper, I will try to compare Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain with Edith Wharton's ... more In my paper, I will try to compare Thomas Mann’s novel, The Magic Mountain with Edith Wharton's novel, The Age of Innocence. Considering the dynamics of Bildungsroman, I will comment on the differences between the Archer Newland and Han Castrop – protagonists of the novels. I will also make some comparisons between two other integral characters - May Welland and Clavdia Chauchat. These comparisons will have some philosophical backgrounds – especially, Kant's duty ethics and Hegel's dialectics of recognition. I will argue that Hans Castrop starts where Archer, or more precisely, Ellen ends. Put it differently, Hegel's ethics starts where Kant's ethics ends. No one is innocent, Hegel is right, “Innocence is merely non-action, like the mere being of a stone, not even that of a child.” (1977: 282)
In this paper, I will try to reveal some integral parts of Wittgenstein's philosophical investiga... more In this paper, I will try to reveal some integral parts of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation – “language game”, “rule following”, and “family resemblance.” I will argue that Wittgenstein's new way of looking at language is intrinsically bounded up with his new way of doing philosophy. In this sense, Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation is a grammatical one. It can also be labeled as a therapeutical work. Nonetheless, the most significant part of my paper will be related to so-called “private language argument.” Because it is the upshot of Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation. It exposes the fact that language is a totality of social agreements which are grounded on human bodies. Primitive reactions, in other words, avowals are prototypes of language. The word prototype reminds of the word foundation. But Wittgenstein deliberately does not use it since it is a very loaded term, and the term with sharpened edges. Wittgenstein does not prefers such terms, he is fond of terms with “blurred edges.” Because language itself is blurred mode of representation - i.e. game. Consequently, “the human body is the best picture of the human soul.” (p. 178) That is to say, we can not think of soul and language without body. It follows that solipsism is the multi-vehicle pileup of dualism created by the old view of looking at language, that is, picture theory of language. Wittgenstein, however, is not a behaviorist. He is a philosopher of neither nor. This conceptualization neither will be the last explanation of my term paper.
In this paper, I will try to explain some basic aspects of Heidegger's philosophy: “Handiness”, “... more In this paper, I will try to explain some basic aspects of Heidegger's philosophy: “Handiness”, “Primordial Time”, and “Double Forgetting.” But firstly, I will examine the concept of Da-sein due to the fact that it is the integral concept of Heidegger's phenomenology. No doubt, in Being and Time (from now on BT), Heidegger's philosophical investigation starts with the emphasis on the priority of the question of Being. Because, according to him, Being, and the question of the meaning of it, has been forgotten by the traditional Western philosophy. As you see, philosophy itself is part of “Double Forgetting.” Having accomplished that I will focus on the “Handiness”: the first existential of Da-sein. In this point, I hope to give an explanation also for the third existential: “Worldiness.” Of course, worldiness can only be explained in the terms of its relationship with handiness. Therefore, section on handiness actually will contain some main points of worldiness. Afterwards, I will resume my paper with the concept of “Primordial Temporality”, since the meaning of the Being reveals also itself within temporality. No doubt, Dasein exists in space and time. The last subject of my paper will be “Double Forgetting.” Nonetheless, I will not be able to go into the details of it in spite of the fact that Heidegger uses this term in a very broad sense. In Being and Time, you can see it everywhere. It is like a shadow, it pursues his owner everywhere he goes- from throwness to death, from handiness to worldiness, that is, in general, from history to philosophy.
In my term paper, I will try to give an exposition of Hegel's concept of desire given that Phenom... more In my term paper, I will try to give an exposition of Hegel's concept of desire given that Phenomenology of Spirit, as a Bildungs roman (Gürle 1996: 23), is actually the story of desire which educate itself by otherness of the others. Desire prominently appears at the beginning of the 4th chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit as follows: “Self-consciousness is Begierde überhaupt.” That is to say, “Self-consciousness is desire in general.” But it could also be translated as “desire in itself,” or “desire, generally” or “mere desire.” In Terry Pinkard's translation, for example, it is “desire in itself” (see Pippin 2010: 20).
This is one of the most favorite assertions of the book. Since it occurs “at the juncture point” (Butler 1987: 25) of Desire's Bildungs roman, it has many interpretations as well as translations. Kojeve, for instance, propose that desire -Begierhe- plays a key role in Hegel's phenomenology since it does not only relates subject with itself but also relates subject with other subjects. According to him, without desire, it is impossible to speak of “I”, therefore, “We” either. Self-consciousness, in other words, “I” entails not only desire but desire for another self-consciousness (Kojeve 1980: 37).
But how a capacity which is shared with animals could generate self-consciousness? In Jenkins' (2009) words, “How could a capacity that human beings share with mere animals be identical with, or somehow constitute, a relation to self?” Or, can desire be described as rational, or, can philosophy hold desire without losing its philosophical character? (Butler 1987: 3) Hegel, unfortunately, does not provide us with clear answers of the first two questions. Nonetheless, we have several definitions of the concept in relation to the other fundamental concepts: life, work, and etc. For example, according to Hegel, life is immediate object of desire (1977: 106) whereas work is desire held in check (1977: 118).
In my paper, I will try to explain the ontology of desire. Following Butler's arguments, I will argue against Kojeve for whom self-consciousness is possible if and only if desire is directed not toward a being but toward a nonbeing - that is, toward another desire (1969: 40). I agree with Butler that “Desire is intentional in that it is always desire of or for a given object or Other, but it is also reflective in the sense that desire is a modality in which the subject is both discovered and enhanced.” (1987: 25).
In term my paper, I will also give some other interpretation of the desire. For example, Findley, the writer of foreword and analyses of the Oxford edition of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” defines nature of Desire as abolishing the otherness of the Other (1977: 518). According to him, the abolishment of otherness of the other occurs only in “a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness,” that is, in a state, “where the object of consciousness is also its subject” (1977: 520). Or, Gadamer says that Hegel refers to desire on occasion as the "unadulterated feeling of self" (Hegel 1977 148, see Gadamer 1976: 154). There are heaps of interpretations like these. Therefore, I will just focus on two of them: Pippin's and Hypolitte’s interpretations. Because Pippin argues that he when Hegel says “self-consciousness is desire in general” he means that to be relevant to the nature of consciousness itself (Pippin 2010: 14). Or, Hyppolite suggests that desire is "the power of the negative in human life" (1969: 27). Conceived as a lack, a being-without, desire initially signifies nothing but negativity, according to Hypolitte. For him, “Human self-consciousness is in the first place Desire, but this desire is never satisfied” (1969: 28).
In my paper, I will try to give an exposition of Foucault's archeology and geneology of the self,... more In my paper, I will try to give an exposition of Foucault's archeology and geneology of the self, since Foucault is interested not merely in 'technologies of domination' but also in 'technologies of the self.' Foucault, especially in his later works, focus on the 'technologies of the self' and argues that identity is not simply imposed from above, i.e. identity is not outcome of a repression, but rather is actively and willingly determined by individuals through deployment of practices of the self.
In my paper, I will try to give a sense of what is happening right now in Turkey using theoretica... more In my paper, I will try to give a sense of what is happening right now in Turkey using theoretical approaches of Gramsci, Foucault, Agamben and Benjamin in as much as we have discussed in class. I will proceed my paper with Gramsci and put an end to it with Benjamin since Benjamin indicates the power of the resistence whereas Gramsci designates its reasons and needs. Following Gramsci, I will argue that one can neither succeed in revolution nor protect a sovereignity unless s/he realize the significance of the civil society in modernity. Foucault's theoretical approach will cover a small space in my paper. I will just reminds his insurgence of subjugated knowledges. Nevertheless, usig his definition I will call Gezi resistence the insurgence. In my paper, I will mainly dwell upon Agamben due to the fact that he is both the transcension and continuation of Foucault's biopolitics. In this context, I will come up with the idea that the Gezi insurgence is a good representation of the state of exception. As he remarks, “so in the person of the sovereign, the werewolf, the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city.” And sometimes s/he hits the city as well.
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Papers by Şenol Gürkan
This is one of the most favorite assertions of the book. Since it occurs “at the juncture point” (Butler 1987: 25) of Desire's Bildungs roman, it has many interpretations as well as translations. Kojeve, for instance, propose that desire -Begierhe- plays a key role in Hegel's phenomenology since it does not only relates subject with itself but also relates subject with other subjects. According to him, without desire, it is impossible to speak of “I”, therefore, “We” either. Self-consciousness, in other words, “I” entails not only desire but desire for another self-consciousness (Kojeve 1980: 37).
But how a capacity which is shared with animals could generate self-consciousness? In Jenkins' (2009) words, “How could a capacity that human beings share with mere animals be identical with, or somehow constitute, a relation to self?” Or, can desire be described as rational, or, can philosophy hold desire without losing its philosophical character? (Butler 1987: 3) Hegel, unfortunately, does not provide us with clear answers of the first two questions. Nonetheless, we have several definitions of the concept in relation to the other fundamental concepts: life, work, and etc. For example, according to Hegel, life is immediate object of desire (1977: 106) whereas work is desire held in check (1977: 118).
In my paper, I will try to explain the ontology of desire. Following Butler's arguments, I will argue against Kojeve for whom self-consciousness is possible if and only if desire is directed not toward a being but toward a nonbeing - that is, toward another desire (1969: 40). I agree with Butler that “Desire is intentional in that it is always desire of or for a given object or Other, but it is also reflective in the sense that desire is a modality in which the subject is both discovered and enhanced.” (1987: 25).
In term my paper, I will also give some other interpretation of the desire. For example, Findley, the writer of foreword and analyses of the Oxford edition of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” defines nature of Desire as abolishing the otherness of the Other (1977: 518). According to him, the abolishment of otherness of the other occurs only in “a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness,” that is, in a state, “where the object of consciousness is also its subject” (1977: 520). Or, Gadamer says that Hegel refers to desire on occasion as the "unadulterated feeling of self" (Hegel 1977 148, see Gadamer 1976: 154). There are heaps of interpretations like these. Therefore, I will just focus on two of them: Pippin's and Hypolitte’s interpretations. Because Pippin argues that he when Hegel says “self-consciousness is desire in general” he means that to be relevant to the nature of consciousness itself (Pippin 2010: 14). Or, Hyppolite suggests that desire is "the power of the negative in human life" (1969: 27). Conceived as a lack, a being-without, desire initially signifies nothing but negativity, according to Hypolitte. For him, “Human self-consciousness is in the first place Desire, but this desire is never satisfied” (1969: 28).
This is one of the most favorite assertions of the book. Since it occurs “at the juncture point” (Butler 1987: 25) of Desire's Bildungs roman, it has many interpretations as well as translations. Kojeve, for instance, propose that desire -Begierhe- plays a key role in Hegel's phenomenology since it does not only relates subject with itself but also relates subject with other subjects. According to him, without desire, it is impossible to speak of “I”, therefore, “We” either. Self-consciousness, in other words, “I” entails not only desire but desire for another self-consciousness (Kojeve 1980: 37).
But how a capacity which is shared with animals could generate self-consciousness? In Jenkins' (2009) words, “How could a capacity that human beings share with mere animals be identical with, or somehow constitute, a relation to self?” Or, can desire be described as rational, or, can philosophy hold desire without losing its philosophical character? (Butler 1987: 3) Hegel, unfortunately, does not provide us with clear answers of the first two questions. Nonetheless, we have several definitions of the concept in relation to the other fundamental concepts: life, work, and etc. For example, according to Hegel, life is immediate object of desire (1977: 106) whereas work is desire held in check (1977: 118).
In my paper, I will try to explain the ontology of desire. Following Butler's arguments, I will argue against Kojeve for whom self-consciousness is possible if and only if desire is directed not toward a being but toward a nonbeing - that is, toward another desire (1969: 40). I agree with Butler that “Desire is intentional in that it is always desire of or for a given object or Other, but it is also reflective in the sense that desire is a modality in which the subject is both discovered and enhanced.” (1987: 25).
In term my paper, I will also give some other interpretation of the desire. For example, Findley, the writer of foreword and analyses of the Oxford edition of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” defines nature of Desire as abolishing the otherness of the Other (1977: 518). According to him, the abolishment of otherness of the other occurs only in “a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness,” that is, in a state, “where the object of consciousness is also its subject” (1977: 520). Or, Gadamer says that Hegel refers to desire on occasion as the "unadulterated feeling of self" (Hegel 1977 148, see Gadamer 1976: 154). There are heaps of interpretations like these. Therefore, I will just focus on two of them: Pippin's and Hypolitte’s interpretations. Because Pippin argues that he when Hegel says “self-consciousness is desire in general” he means that to be relevant to the nature of consciousness itself (Pippin 2010: 14). Or, Hyppolite suggests that desire is "the power of the negative in human life" (1969: 27). Conceived as a lack, a being-without, desire initially signifies nothing but negativity, according to Hypolitte. For him, “Human self-consciousness is in the first place Desire, but this desire is never satisfied” (1969: 28).