Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2022
If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad 'family' of realist approaches to political theo... more If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad 'family' of realist approaches to political theory, then it follows there are several ways of 'doing' realism, as illustrated by this collection. Here, I set out one such way, normative behaviourism, by explaining its realist character on four fronts: Its starting point; its values; its ambitions; and its treatment of a shared problem. The argument then considers two key objections to the described approach, both of which affect a range of possible realisms.
Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at t... more Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at the fragmentation of our field, as well as recent urges to become more engaged with the 'real' world, there is now a boom in debates concerning the 'true' nature of our vocation. Yet how can this new work avoid simply recycling old rivalries under new labels? The key is to turn all this socalled methodological interest into a genuinely new programme of 'methodology', defined here as the careful identification and evaluation of all the different methods of reasoning available to us as political philosophers. This programme would clarify, for the first time, all the many ways in which we might argue with one another, thus making us less likely to talk past each another, and more likely to work fruitfully together.
This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philos... more This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/nonideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.
This special edition brings together (1) the recent methodological worries of the moralism/realis... more This special edition brings together (1) the recent methodological worries of the moralism/realism and ideal/non-ideal theory debates with (2) the soaring ambition of work in international or global political theory, as found in, say, theories of global justice. Contributors are as follows: Chris Bertram, Jonathan Floyd, Aaron James, Terry MacDonald, David Miller, Shmulik Nili, Mathias Risse and Matt Sleat.
This article examines the relationship between Raz’s theories of practical reason and political m... more This article examines the relationship between Raz’s theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reason – desires, goals, and competitive pluralism – combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality – what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life options. As it turns out, if we are reasonable, in terms of the former theory, then we are likely to be immoral, in terms of the latter one.
Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that h... more Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the ‘original position’ and an ‘overlapping consensus’. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.
This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory st... more This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns (e.g. conflicting intuitions and judgements) on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – ‘normative behaviourism’ - that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of ‘praxis’ with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second.
This article takes a new idea, ‘normative behaviourism’, and applies it to global political theor... more This article takes a new idea, ‘normative behaviourism’, and applies it to global political theory, in order to address at least one of the problems we might have in mind when accusing that subject of being too ‘unrealistic’. The core of this idea is that political principles can be justified, not just by patterns in our thinking, and in particular our intuitions and considered judgements, but also by patterns in our behaviour, and in particular acts of insurrection and crime. The problem addressed is ‘cultural relativism’, understood here not as a meta-ethical doctrine, but as the apparent ‘fact’ that people around the world have culturally varying intuitions and judgements of a kind that lead them to affirm different political principles. This is a problem because it seems to follow (1) that global agreement on any substantial set of political principles is impossible, and (2) that any political theory in denial of this ‘fact’ would be, for that reason, deeply unrealistic. The solution argued for here is that, if domestic political principles (i.e. principles intended to regulate a single state) could be justified by normative behaviourism, and in reference to culturally invariant behaviour, then an international system supportive of such principles is justifiable by extension.
Bevir’s view that theories are prior to theorists, just insofar as they are prior to any observat... more Bevir’s view that theories are prior to theorists, just insofar as they are prior to any observations which one might make and, by extension, any facts one might invoke in support of any particular interpretative conclusions, is problematic when applied to intellectual history. This is because, although it is in one sense true that all facts are ineluctably constituted by some or other underlying theory, it is also true that, in a vast number of important situations, all human beings share the same basic theory. The most important implication of this shared stock of concepts, observations and facts, is that we shall often be able to see numerous aspects of a long‐dead author’s world in much the same way as he or she saw it.
The accusation that contemporary political philosophy is carried out in too ahistorical a fashion... more The accusation that contemporary political philosophy is carried out in too ahistorical a fashion depends upon it being possible for historical facts to ground normative political principles. This they cannot do. Each of the seven ways in which it might be thought possible for them to do so fails for one or more of four reasons: (1) History yields no timeless set of universal moral values; (2) it displays no convergence upon such a set; (3) it reveals no univocal moral or cultural context in the present; (4) the failure of an ethical tradition to successfully respond to criticism over a long period of time is no guarantee of its inability to do so. Because historical critiques of contemporary normative thought rely upon one or more of these things holding true, they are, as a class of arguments, to be rejected.
Details of a one-day 'hybrid' event on 'mentalism' and 'normative behaviourism', to be hosted on ... more Details of a one-day 'hybrid' event on 'mentalism' and 'normative behaviourism', to be hosted on 21/12/2021 at the University of Bristol.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2022
If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad 'family' of realist approaches to political theo... more If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad 'family' of realist approaches to political theory, then it follows there are several ways of 'doing' realism, as illustrated by this collection. Here, I set out one such way, normative behaviourism, by explaining its realist character on four fronts: Its starting point; its values; its ambitions; and its treatment of a shared problem. The argument then considers two key objections to the described approach, both of which affect a range of possible realisms.
Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at t... more Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at the fragmentation of our field, as well as recent urges to become more engaged with the 'real' world, there is now a boom in debates concerning the 'true' nature of our vocation. Yet how can this new work avoid simply recycling old rivalries under new labels? The key is to turn all this socalled methodological interest into a genuinely new programme of 'methodology', defined here as the careful identification and evaluation of all the different methods of reasoning available to us as political philosophers. This programme would clarify, for the first time, all the many ways in which we might argue with one another, thus making us less likely to talk past each another, and more likely to work fruitfully together.
This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philos... more This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/nonideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.
This special edition brings together (1) the recent methodological worries of the moralism/realis... more This special edition brings together (1) the recent methodological worries of the moralism/realism and ideal/non-ideal theory debates with (2) the soaring ambition of work in international or global political theory, as found in, say, theories of global justice. Contributors are as follows: Chris Bertram, Jonathan Floyd, Aaron James, Terry MacDonald, David Miller, Shmulik Nili, Mathias Risse and Matt Sleat.
This article examines the relationship between Raz’s theories of practical reason and political m... more This article examines the relationship between Raz’s theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reason – desires, goals, and competitive pluralism – combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality – what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life options. As it turns out, if we are reasonable, in terms of the former theory, then we are likely to be immoral, in terms of the latter one.
Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that h... more Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the ‘original position’ and an ‘overlapping consensus’. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.
This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory st... more This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns (e.g. conflicting intuitions and judgements) on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – ‘normative behaviourism’ - that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of ‘praxis’ with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second.
This article takes a new idea, ‘normative behaviourism’, and applies it to global political theor... more This article takes a new idea, ‘normative behaviourism’, and applies it to global political theory, in order to address at least one of the problems we might have in mind when accusing that subject of being too ‘unrealistic’. The core of this idea is that political principles can be justified, not just by patterns in our thinking, and in particular our intuitions and considered judgements, but also by patterns in our behaviour, and in particular acts of insurrection and crime. The problem addressed is ‘cultural relativism’, understood here not as a meta-ethical doctrine, but as the apparent ‘fact’ that people around the world have culturally varying intuitions and judgements of a kind that lead them to affirm different political principles. This is a problem because it seems to follow (1) that global agreement on any substantial set of political principles is impossible, and (2) that any political theory in denial of this ‘fact’ would be, for that reason, deeply unrealistic. The solution argued for here is that, if domestic political principles (i.e. principles intended to regulate a single state) could be justified by normative behaviourism, and in reference to culturally invariant behaviour, then an international system supportive of such principles is justifiable by extension.
Bevir’s view that theories are prior to theorists, just insofar as they are prior to any observat... more Bevir’s view that theories are prior to theorists, just insofar as they are prior to any observations which one might make and, by extension, any facts one might invoke in support of any particular interpretative conclusions, is problematic when applied to intellectual history. This is because, although it is in one sense true that all facts are ineluctably constituted by some or other underlying theory, it is also true that, in a vast number of important situations, all human beings share the same basic theory. The most important implication of this shared stock of concepts, observations and facts, is that we shall often be able to see numerous aspects of a long‐dead author’s world in much the same way as he or she saw it.
The accusation that contemporary political philosophy is carried out in too ahistorical a fashion... more The accusation that contemporary political philosophy is carried out in too ahistorical a fashion depends upon it being possible for historical facts to ground normative political principles. This they cannot do. Each of the seven ways in which it might be thought possible for them to do so fails for one or more of four reasons: (1) History yields no timeless set of universal moral values; (2) it displays no convergence upon such a set; (3) it reveals no univocal moral or cultural context in the present; (4) the failure of an ethical tradition to successfully respond to criticism over a long period of time is no guarantee of its inability to do so. Because historical critiques of contemporary normative thought rely upon one or more of these things holding true, they are, as a class of arguments, to be rejected.
Details of a one-day 'hybrid' event on 'mentalism' and 'normative behaviourism', to be hosted on ... more Details of a one-day 'hybrid' event on 'mentalism' and 'normative behaviourism', to be hosted on 21/12/2021 at the University of Bristol.
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