This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of ex... more This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of experience. I use the Ramsey-Lewis method to define the theoretical term "experiential representation". I clarify and discuss various questions for representationalists, for instance, "how rich is the content of experience?" and "is the content of visual experience singular or general?" Finally, I address some objections to representationalism - in particular, that it cannot explain perceptual presence (John Campbell), and that it cannot explain the "laws of appearance" (constraints on how things can appear). WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of ... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion.
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
This paper has two parts. In the first par... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home This paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism, on the grounds that it fails to accommodate what I call "internal dependence" and it requires an empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion". It accommodates internal dependence. But it may retain the empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. And it faces other empirical problems. Representationalism about experiences avoids those problems and is to be preferred.
The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball is white. [2] The proposition tha... more The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball is white. [2] The proposition that the ball is white and the ball is round represents that the ball is white and the ball is round.
This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments... more This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Rep... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Representation, Williams sketches biconditional reductive definitions of representational states in non-representational terms. The central idea is an extremely innovative variety of interpretationism about belief and desire. Williams is inspired by David Lewis but departs significantly from him. I am sympathetic to interpretationism for some basic beliefs and desires. However, I will raise three worries for Williams’s version (§2–4). It neglects the role of conscious experience, it makes beliefs and desire too dependent on "hidden facts", and it commits to the unmotivated and problematic claim that mental content is always explanatorily prior to linguistic content. Then, I will suggest a modified version that avoids these problems (§5). I will conclude with a general question (§6).
I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a... more I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a multistage version of David Lewis's interpretationism in which phenomenal intentionality plays the role of source intentionality.
In this superb book, Williams sets a very ambitious goal for himself: to sketch biconditionals th... more In this superb book, Williams sets a very ambitious goal for himself: to sketch biconditionals that define representational conditions in nonrepresentational terms. Representation is not a spooky, primitive capacity of the mind; it is built from more basic ingredients. At the center is his radical interpretation theory of belief and desire, inspired by the work of David Lewis.
In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, d... more In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states.
This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state v... more This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state view of sensory experience (Papineau, McLaughlin, others). I criticize an argument against it based on the "transparency observation". Then I develop two alternative arguments against it. The first is a Leibniz's Law argument based on the essentially externally directed character of some experiences. The second concerns "brains in vats". Finally I consider a recent response due to David Papineau, which involves rejecting essential external directedness.
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
Unlike identity physicalism, ground physic... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism.
In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constr... more In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constraints on how things can visually appear. The puzzle is about how to explain them. I have no satisfying solution. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is a puzzle. I will develop the puzzle as it arises for representationalism about experience because it is currently the most popular theory of experience and I think it is along the right lines. However, everyone faces a form of the puzzle, including the naïve realist. In §1 I explain representationalism about experience. In § §2-3 I develop the puzzle and criticize a response due to Ned Block and Jeff Speaks and another response based on a novel form of representationalism ("sensa representationalism"). In §4 I argue that defenders of "perceptual confidence" face an instance of the puzzle. In §5 I suggest that everyone faces a form of the puzzle.
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour, 2020
Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds ... more Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing a distinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us call it “sensible redness” to highlight the fact that the representation of this property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out there in the space before you?
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, 2020
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to... more According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.
In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like ... more In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would have to be non-physical sense data. They might instead explain this by saying that BIV “phenomenally represents” various shape properties. But since BIV lacks any interesting physical relations to shapes, this would imply that phenomenally representation is an irreducible relation.
I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical resul... more I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical results. Next, I develop two new empirical arguments against simple naive realism. Then I briefly look at two new, more complex forms of naïve realism: one due to Keith Allen and the other due to Heather Logue and Ori Beck. I argue that they are not satisfactory retreats for naive realists. The right course is to reject naive realism altogether. My stalking horse is contemporary naive realism but there is a larger, positive lesson: new empirical results support a brain-based theory of sensory consciousness.
In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the con... more In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears "lucky". I raise a counterexample to Chalmers's formulation of the problem. Then I develop an alternative formulation. Finally, I consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness. Chalmers' meta-problem about consciousness concerns the explanation of our problem responses to consciousness, where those responses are characterized in physical-functional terms. For instance, why are we disposed to utter sentences like "consciousness is irreducible" and "the quality red is distinct from any physical property"? Given the causal closure of the physical realm, there are bound to be computational processes in the brain that explain such verbal reports, as Chalmers notes (p.8). What, then, is the problem? Chalmers suggests that one problem is that it is lucky that these processes are accompanied by consciousness. I will first raise some questions about Chalmers's luck problem. Then I will develop a problem in the vicinity, the normative harmony problem. Finally, I will consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness. 1. What is Chalmers's Luck Problem? Here is Chalmers's most general characterization of his luck problem: As long as we have modal independence, so that the meta-problem processes [the computational processes that explain our reports-AP] could have come apart from consciousness, it can seem lucky that they have not. . .Where realization is concerned, it seems lucky that the * Thanks to David Chalmers, François Kammerer, Brad Saad and an anonymous referee for very helpful discussion or comments.
Comments on John Morrison. I try to clarify the dispute between Morrison, Neander, Shea and other... more Comments on John Morrison. I try to clarify the dispute between Morrison, Neander, Shea and others over "What is representation?" (as it figures in cognitive science).
Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception flies in the face of orthodoxy, proposing a revolu... more Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception flies in the face of orthodoxy, proposing a revolution in our understanding of perceptual justification. It is both creative and rigorous. She first defends what she calls the Downgrade Thesis about perceptual justification. Then she suggests a bold explanation of Downgrade: experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. I will pursue a question about her foundational Downgrade Thesis. In closing, I will briefly address her bold proposed explanation of it.
In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘le... more In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of consciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a green and square thing. I will raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. I also raise some questions about the explanation of qualitative content.
This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of ex... more This is a chapter from my introductory book *Perception* covering the representational view of experience. I use the Ramsey-Lewis method to define the theoretical term "experiential representation". I clarify and discuss various questions for representationalists, for instance, "how rich is the content of experience?" and "is the content of visual experience singular or general?" Finally, I address some objections to representationalism - in particular, that it cannot explain perceptual presence (John Campbell), and that it cannot explain the "laws of appearance" (constraints on how things can appear). WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of ... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion.
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
This paper has two parts. In the first par... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home This paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism, on the grounds that it fails to accommodate what I call "internal dependence" and it requires an empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion". It accommodates internal dependence. But it may retain the empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. And it faces other empirical problems. Representationalism about experiences avoids those problems and is to be preferred.
The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball is white. [2] The proposition tha... more The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball is white. [2] The proposition that the ball is white and the ball is round represents that the ball is white and the ball is round.
This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments... more This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Rep... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Representation, Williams sketches biconditional reductive definitions of representational states in non-representational terms. The central idea is an extremely innovative variety of interpretationism about belief and desire. Williams is inspired by David Lewis but departs significantly from him. I am sympathetic to interpretationism for some basic beliefs and desires. However, I will raise three worries for Williams’s version (§2–4). It neglects the role of conscious experience, it makes beliefs and desire too dependent on "hidden facts", and it commits to the unmotivated and problematic claim that mental content is always explanatorily prior to linguistic content. Then, I will suggest a modified version that avoids these problems (§5). I will conclude with a general question (§6).
I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a... more I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a multistage version of David Lewis's interpretationism in which phenomenal intentionality plays the role of source intentionality.
In this superb book, Williams sets a very ambitious goal for himself: to sketch biconditionals th... more In this superb book, Williams sets a very ambitious goal for himself: to sketch biconditionals that define representational conditions in nonrepresentational terms. Representation is not a spooky, primitive capacity of the mind; it is built from more basic ingredients. At the center is his radical interpretation theory of belief and desire, inspired by the work of David Lewis.
In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, d... more In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states.
This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state v... more This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state view of sensory experience (Papineau, McLaughlin, others). I criticize an argument against it based on the "transparency observation". Then I develop two alternative arguments against it. The first is a Leibniz's Law argument based on the essentially externally directed character of some experiences. The second concerns "brains in vats". Finally I consider a recent response due to David Papineau, which involves rejecting essential external directedness.
WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home
Unlike identity physicalism, ground physic... more WEBSITE: https://sites.google.com/view/adampautz/home Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism.
In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constr... more In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constraints on how things can visually appear. The puzzle is about how to explain them. I have no satisfying solution. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is a puzzle. I will develop the puzzle as it arises for representationalism about experience because it is currently the most popular theory of experience and I think it is along the right lines. However, everyone faces a form of the puzzle, including the naïve realist. In §1 I explain representationalism about experience. In § §2-3 I develop the puzzle and criticize a response due to Ned Block and Jeff Speaks and another response based on a novel form of representationalism ("sensa representationalism"). In §4 I argue that defenders of "perceptual confidence" face an instance of the puzzle. In §5 I suggest that everyone faces a form of the puzzle.
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour, 2020
Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds ... more Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing a distinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us call it “sensible redness” to highlight the fact that the representation of this property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out there in the space before you?
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, 2020
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to... more According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.
In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like ... more In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would have to be non-physical sense data. They might instead explain this by saying that BIV “phenomenally represents” various shape properties. But since BIV lacks any interesting physical relations to shapes, this would imply that phenomenally representation is an irreducible relation.
I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical resul... more I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical results. Next, I develop two new empirical arguments against simple naive realism. Then I briefly look at two new, more complex forms of naïve realism: one due to Keith Allen and the other due to Heather Logue and Ori Beck. I argue that they are not satisfactory retreats for naive realists. The right course is to reject naive realism altogether. My stalking horse is contemporary naive realism but there is a larger, positive lesson: new empirical results support a brain-based theory of sensory consciousness.
In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the con... more In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears "lucky". I raise a counterexample to Chalmers's formulation of the problem. Then I develop an alternative formulation. Finally, I consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness. Chalmers' meta-problem about consciousness concerns the explanation of our problem responses to consciousness, where those responses are characterized in physical-functional terms. For instance, why are we disposed to utter sentences like "consciousness is irreducible" and "the quality red is distinct from any physical property"? Given the causal closure of the physical realm, there are bound to be computational processes in the brain that explain such verbal reports, as Chalmers notes (p.8). What, then, is the problem? Chalmers suggests that one problem is that it is lucky that these processes are accompanied by consciousness. I will first raise some questions about Chalmers's luck problem. Then I will develop a problem in the vicinity, the normative harmony problem. Finally, I will consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness. 1. What is Chalmers's Luck Problem? Here is Chalmers's most general characterization of his luck problem: As long as we have modal independence, so that the meta-problem processes [the computational processes that explain our reports-AP] could have come apart from consciousness, it can seem lucky that they have not. . .Where realization is concerned, it seems lucky that the * Thanks to David Chalmers, François Kammerer, Brad Saad and an anonymous referee for very helpful discussion or comments.
Comments on John Morrison. I try to clarify the dispute between Morrison, Neander, Shea and other... more Comments on John Morrison. I try to clarify the dispute between Morrison, Neander, Shea and others over "What is representation?" (as it figures in cognitive science).
Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception flies in the face of orthodoxy, proposing a revolu... more Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception flies in the face of orthodoxy, proposing a revolution in our understanding of perceptual justification. It is both creative and rigorous. She first defends what she calls the Downgrade Thesis about perceptual justification. Then she suggests a bold explanation of Downgrade: experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. I will pursue a question about her foundational Downgrade Thesis. In closing, I will briefly address her bold proposed explanation of it.
In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘le... more In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of consciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a green and square thing. I will raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. I also raise some questions about the explanation of qualitative content.
n previous work (Nanay ed. 2017, Phil Issues 2020), I developed "the problem of the laws of appea... more n previous work (Nanay ed. 2017, Phil Issues 2020), I developed "the problem of the laws of appearance" for representationalism. There are metaphysically necessary constraints appearance and representationalists have difficulty explaining them. Here I develop the problem in a somewhat different way. Then I address the question of whether naive realist might be better placed than representationalists to answer the problem. Perhaps they can derive constraints on appearance from constraints on reality. If so, then the laws of appearance provide a neglected argument for naive realism over representationalism. However, in the end I question whether naive realists really are better placed to answer the problem.
I reply to Geoff Lee and Casey O'Callaghan's comments on my empirical arguments against phenomena... more I reply to Geoff Lee and Casey O'Callaghan's comments on my empirical arguments against phenomenal externalism
Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great d... more Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naïve realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics.
Ned Block has made groundbreaking contributions to the
philosophy of mind concerning intelligence... more Ned Block has made groundbreaking contributions to the philosophy of mind concerning intelligence, representation and consciousness. This book is a collection of eighteen new essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, along with substantive and wide-ranging replies by Block. In addition to addressing Block’s past contributions, the essays and Block’s replies are rich with new ideas and arguments. They not only indicate where Block currently stands but also move the debates forward. The essays and Block’s replies importantly clarify many key elements of Block’s work, including: his pessimism concerning thought-experiments like Commander Data and the Nation of China, his more general pessimism about intuitions and introspection in the philosophy of mind, the empirical case for an antifunctionalist biological theory of phenomenal consciousness, the fading qualia problem for a biological theory, the link between phenomenal consciousness and representation (especially spatial representation), and the reducibility of phenomenal representation.
We take it that conscious acquaintance has great epistemic value. I develop a new problem for red... more We take it that conscious acquaintance has great epistemic value. I develop a new problem for reductive physicalism concerning the epistemic value of acquaintance. The problem concerns "multiple candidate cases". (This develops a theme of my paper *The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness", Philosophical Perspectives 2017.)
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Papers by Adam Pautz
In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism, on the grounds that it fails to accommodate what I call "internal dependence" and it requires an empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion". It accommodates internal dependence. But it may retain the empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. And it faces other empirical problems. Representationalism about experiences avoids those problems and is to be preferred.
In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Representation, Williams sketches biconditional reductive definitions of representational states in non-representational terms. The central idea is an extremely innovative variety of interpretationism about belief and desire. Williams is inspired by David Lewis but departs significantly from him. I am sympathetic to interpretationism for some basic beliefs and desires. However, I will raise three worries for Williams’s version (§2–4). It neglects the role of conscious experience, it makes beliefs and desire too dependent on "hidden facts", and it commits to the unmotivated and problematic claim that mental content is always explanatorily prior to linguistic content. Then, I will suggest a modified version that avoids these problems (§5). I will conclude with a general question (§6).
terms. Representation is not a spooky, primitive capacity of the mind; it is built from more basic ingredients. At the center is his radical interpretation theory of belief and desire, inspired by the work of David Lewis.
Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism.
In his excellent book *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience* (2021), David Papineau argues against standard theories of sensory experience: the sense datum view, representationalism, naïve realism, and so on. The only view left standing is his own “qualitative view”. On Papineau’s physicalist version, all experiences are nothing but neural states, and the only features essentially involved in experience are intrinsic neural properties (29-30, 95-97). In my book *Perception* (2021), I developed an argument from spatial experience against this kind of view (also Pautz 2010, 2017). Here I elaborate on that argument in the light of Papineau’s discussion.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue against what I call "basic" naive realism, on the grounds that it fails to accommodate what I call "internal dependence" and it requires an empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. Then I turn Craig French and Ian Phillips’ modified naïve realism as set out in their recent paper "Austerity and Illusion". It accommodates internal dependence. But it may retain the empirically implausible theory of sensible properties. And it faces other empirical problems. Representationalism about experiences avoids those problems and is to be preferred.
In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Representation, Williams sketches biconditional reductive definitions of representational states in non-representational terms. The central idea is an extremely innovative variety of interpretationism about belief and desire. Williams is inspired by David Lewis but departs significantly from him. I am sympathetic to interpretationism for some basic beliefs and desires. However, I will raise three worries for Williams’s version (§2–4). It neglects the role of conscious experience, it makes beliefs and desire too dependent on "hidden facts", and it commits to the unmotivated and problematic claim that mental content is always explanatorily prior to linguistic content. Then, I will suggest a modified version that avoids these problems (§5). I will conclude with a general question (§6).
terms. Representation is not a spooky, primitive capacity of the mind; it is built from more basic ingredients. At the center is his radical interpretation theory of belief and desire, inspired by the work of David Lewis.
Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism.
philosophy of mind concerning intelligence, representation
and consciousness. This book is a collection of eighteen new
essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, along with substantive
and wide-ranging replies by Block. In addition to addressing
Block’s past contributions, the essays and Block’s replies are
rich with new ideas and arguments. They not only indicate
where Block currently stands but also move the debates
forward. The essays and Block’s replies importantly clarify
many key elements of Block’s work, including: his pessimism
concerning thought-experiments like Commander Data and
the Nation of China, his more general pessimism about
intuitions and introspection in the philosophy of mind, the
empirical case for an antifunctionalist biological theory of
phenomenal consciousness, the fading qualia problem for a
biological theory, the link between phenomenal
consciousness and representation (especially spatial
representation), and the reducibility of phenomenal
representation.