Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles by Jacob F . Tischer
East Asian Journal of Popular Culture, 2022
The article outlines the Taiwanese government's strategy of using cute and humorous messages in i... more The article outlines the Taiwanese government's strategy of using cute and humorous messages in its official communication via social media during the initial phase of COVID-19. Subjected to Chinese influence campaigns on social media, the government devised playful memes to 'inoculate' the public against disinformation and rumours. While the images contained important information, what made them appealing, memorable and spreadable as memes was their self-deprecating humour and cute aesthetics. Adopting the memetic logic of replication, the communication strategy devised such benign, non-aggressive humour as part of a broad, holistic approach towards improving Taiwan's democracy with technologyassisted, consensus-based decision-making. This strategy entailed wider-reaching social effects. Informed by an analysis of memes as a genre of cultural artefacts, the article traces how government-sponsored cute aesthetics resonated in society through being shared, imitated and repurposed. For example, government representatives such as 'digital minister' Audrey Tang and Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung became memetic icons animated through fan art. In this realm of increasingly self-referential social intimacy, ordinary citizens and the government co-created not only immunity to misinformation but also an affective community of Taiwanese national proportions.
Review of Religion and Chinese Society, 2021
Religious institutions continue to provide important stages on which politicians participate in p... more Religious institutions continue to provide important stages on which politicians participate in public rituals in secular democratic Taiwan. In particular, the annual Mazu pilgrimages bring together tens of thousands of people from all over the island, including candidates in presidential elections. I interpret temple ritual as a public arena in which the community of worshipers creates a reservoir of symbolic capital. Political and economic elites seek to gain access to this resource and appeal to the mass of worshipers by conducting what has essentially become a nation-defining ritual. At the same time, relying on temples as institutions of cultural authority raises the profile of their managing elites, who may themselves become influential powerbrokers. I explore these dynamics by referring to the case of Zhenlangong, the temple organizing Taiwan’s largest Mazu pilgrimage, and its longtime manager, a former Mafia boss who uses the temple to legitimate and expand his political activities.
Global Politics Review, 2018
In this article, I argue that folk ritual provides a privileged site for the creation of cultural... more In this article, I argue that folk ritual provides a privileged site for the creation of cultural intimacy in Taiwan, specifically during pilgrimages in honor of the folk goddess Mazu. Sharing cultural intimacy allows the participants to develop a framework of meaning with which they imagine – and put into practice – a community based on the geographical contours of the island. Following Sandria Freitag’s work on colonial India, I interpret pilgrimages as public arenas in which the participants experience a sense of their collective belonging and cooperate to sketch a vision of the national imaginary. Annual Mazu pilgrimages constitute the biggest and most popular such spaces, which is one of the reasons for why they have become stages for political representation and contestation. After situating the Mazu pilgrimages in the trajectory of Taiwanese history, I will trace their progressive integration into political processes and community imagination on the island. Finally, I will draw theoretical conclusions regarding the production of the spatially imagined community through shared ritual experience.
Books by Jacob F . Tischer
"Wie kann eine chinesische Göttin zum Symbol einer nationalen taiwanischen Identität werden? Welc... more "Wie kann eine chinesische Göttin zum Symbol einer nationalen taiwanischen Identität werden? Welchen Einfluss üben lokale Gemeindetempel auf die Formulierung politischer Maßnahmen der taiwanischen Regierung aus? Welche institutionelle Rolle spielen sie im demokratischen Prozess? Diesen Fragen widmet sich Jacob Tischer in seiner Analyse der heutigen Bedeutung Mazus, deren Entwicklung er historisch nachverfolgt und dabei neben der religiösen auch politische und soziokulturelle Dimensionen einbezieht.
Mazu ist mit über 800 ihr gewidmeten Tempeln eine der bedeutendsten Gottheiten Taiwans. Obwohl aus China stammend, ist die Göttin ein wichtiger Anker für verschiedene lokale und regionale Identitäten und wird sogar als Repräsentantin der Einheit aller Taiwanerinnen und Taiwaner wahrgenommen. Mazus Stellung als Schutzpatronin Taiwans ist jedoch – wie die politische Unabhängigkeit des Inselstaats selbst – aufgrund chinesischer Ansprüche prekär."
Papers by Jacob F . Tischer
»Fifty Key Thinkers on Religion« erschien 2012 in der Routledge-Serie »Key Guides«. Sein Verfasse... more »Fifty Key Thinkers on Religion« erschien 2012 in der Routledge-Serie »Key Guides«. Sein Verfasser, Gary E. Kessler, ist Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Religious Studies an der California State University, Bakersfield. Kessler veroffentlichte bereits mehrere Einfuhrungen in das Studium der Religionen, darunter »Studying Religion: An Introduction Through Cases« (McGraw-Hill, 2002) und »Ways of Being Religious« (Mayfield, 1999). Ein groses Verdienst des Buches ist es, eine Art »Zeitstrahl...
Routledge eBooks, May 30, 2023
Review of Religion and Chinese Society, 2020
Religious institutions continue to provide important stages on which politicians participate in p... more Religious institutions continue to provide important stages on which politicians participate in public rituals in secular democratic Taiwan. In particular, the annual Mazu pilgrimages bring together tens of thousands of people from all over the island, including candidates in presidential elections. I interpret temple ritual as a public arena in which the community of worshipers creates a reservoir of symbolic capital. Political and economic elites seek to gain access to this resource and appeal to the mass of worshipers by conducting what has essentially become a nation-defining ritual. At the same time, relying on temples as institutions of cultural authority raises the profile of their managing elites, who may themselves become influential powerbrokers. I explore these dynamics by referring to the case of Zhenlangong, the temple organizing Taiwan’s largest Mazu pilgrimage, and its longtime manager, a former Mafia boss who uses the temple to legitimate and expand his political act...
East Asian Journal of Popular Culture
The article outlines the Taiwanese government’s strategy of using cute and humorous messages in i... more The article outlines the Taiwanese government’s strategy of using cute and humorous messages in its official communication via social media during the initial phase of COVID-19. Subjected to Chinese influence campaigns on social media, the government devised playful memes to ‘inoculate’ the public against disinformation and rumours. While the images contained important information, what made them appealing, memorable and spreadable as memes was their self-deprecating humour and cute aesthetics. Adopting the memetic logic of replication, the communication strategy devised such benign, non-aggressive humour as part of a broad, holistic approach towards improving Taiwan’s democracy with technology-assisted, consensus-based decision-making. This strategy entailed wider-reaching social effects. Informed by an analysis of memes as a genre of cultural artefacts, the article traces how government-sponsored cute aesthetics resonated in society through being shared, imitated and repurposed. F...
[Note: This is a graduate seminar paper. Please contact me if you wish to cite or circulate it.]
... more [Note: This is a graduate seminar paper. Please contact me if you wish to cite or circulate it.]
In the current political climate of nation-building in Taiwan, Taipei’s elites are using the media to produce an image of contemporary Taiwanese identity. In this context, the rural stereotype of the Taike figures as an antithesis of sorts to the way Taipei’s elites are imagining a Taiwanese modernity as seen from the metropolis. Before this background, it appears as somewhat ironic that the proliferation of Taike images in the media has the unintended effect of promoting Taike as a formative element of a positively imagined Taiwanese culture. It becomes a “familiar other,” and enables the Taiwanese to reflect ironically on the other side of national culture. This other side is the countryside, often broadly defined as “The South,” against which Taipei, the global city, asserts its dominance and from where it draws its resources, mostly in the form of human labor. I argue, then, that while the term Taike reflects a Taipei-centered language ideology, it also creates a shared intimacy capable of creating a Taiwanese imagined community. I will discuss this recent phenomenon in the theoretical framework of language ideologies.
[Note: This is a graduate seminar paper. Please contact me if you wish to cite or circulate it.]
... more [Note: This is a graduate seminar paper. Please contact me if you wish to cite or circulate it.]
This graduate seminar paper looks at different perspectives that have situated Taiwan differently in history: An objectivist, governance- and large-personae-oriented view, a China-centric perspective influenced by theories on core and periphery, and a post-colonial version of history culminating in democratization. While I am sympathetic to the latter, I argue that any historical narrative about Taiwan is by necessity political and serves contemporary political ends. I consequently reject the possibility of an objectivist historiography and maintain instead that our understanding of history needs to be grounded in the anthropological here and now. I then use the notion of cultural intimacy to explain how a popular but suppressed narrative of Taiwan-as-Taiwan could survive the KMT's Chinese nationalism and impose itself as the dominant understanding of Taiwanese history today, as well as lay the foundation for nation-building in Taiwan. Democratization in this reading allowed the institutions of the state to be aligned with an understanding of history shared by the majority of the population.
Other Publications by Jacob F . Tischer
Von Aposteln bis Zionisten: Religiöse Kultur im Leipzig des Kaiserreichs, Aug 2010
Conference Presentations and Papers by Jacob F . Tischer
[Note: This is a translation I made of my book chapter on early Buddhism in Germany. Please conta... more [Note: This is a translation I made of my book chapter on early Buddhism in Germany. Please contact me if you wish to cite or circulate this paper.]
Although the entrance of Buddhism into German culture was prepared by philosophers such as Schopenhauer, it was only popularized at the turn of the 20 th century by the proliferation of a wider lifestyle reform movement. Proponents of Buddhism tried to appeal to a changing religious landscape by presenting a reformed, rational, and modern version of their faith. The first Buddhist association on European soil was founded in Leipzig in 1903. Until about 1914, Leipzig remained the center of organized Buddhism in Europe. However, the first Buddhist adherents in Germany, a small group of dedicated men, met with numerous obstacles. Continuous disagreement and infighting must be considered the gravest of their problems. It ultimately weakened these first attempts at institutionalizing and proselytizing Buddhism in Germany to the point that they crumbled under the impact of the First World War.
Over the course of the last century, the island of Taiwan has been subject to different secular p... more Over the course of the last century, the island of Taiwan has been subject to different secular political regimes. In this paper, I shall focus on the period after 1945. For theoretical clarity, I will distinguish two ideal-typical sets of policies employed by the secular nation-state, and their impact on and relationship with religious institutions. These are, first, the period of authoritarian KMT rule by martial law, and second, the era of political liberalization and democratization beginning in 1987. There are significant differences between both types of formally secular political environments.
Popular community-representative temples form the empirical basis for my argument. The martial-law KMT acted very much in competition with such temples for local resources that can be regarded as the foundation of the public sphere. To govern local Taiwanese society, the party had to rely on the co-optation of local factions that often took temples as their organizational base. Many temples thus sustained a high level of political influence. Nevertheless, the KMT strove to replace these nominally “superstitious” institutions with more “modern” ones directly subordinate to the state – local “culture centers“ designed to disseminate a unified notion of “high” Chinese culture.
This paradigm of competition has since given way to a more pluralized relationship. Since democratization, popular temples with a nation-wide outreach have come to present highly visible stages for politicians vying for office. As loci for the negotiation of different forms of “capital”, they have thus become an intrinsic part of Taiwanese political culture. However, through the representation of community interests and the “common good”, temples may also represent a localized version of the public sphere.
While much attention has been paid to the changing contents of Taiwan's nation-building, the difference in attitude toward popular temples has had a major impact on the appearance and practice of its political culture. It can be argued that early post-war KMT policies reflected a Western-based concept of secularism in a programmatically “Chinese” tune, whereas development since democratization has resulted in a unique environment shared by multiple actors. These do not easily fit “religious” or “secular” frames but are informed by various influences stemming from historical sources indigenous and foreign. Community temples, in turn, have taken on a role reminiscent of their pre-modern societal significance. Taiwan can contribute to larger debates about religion and secularity by offering a democratic Asian venue for comparison, one with implications and influence upon, but not limited to, developments in China.
This paper concerns the relationship of (popular) religion and local/communal vis-à-vis national ... more This paper concerns the relationship of (popular) religion and local/communal vis-à-vis national politics in Taiwan. My empirical focus rests on temples dedicated to the immensely popular goddess Mazu which, when run as religious enterprises, provide their responsible actors with plenty of resources. Such temples are very often controlled by local economic and political elites, and operated by them as political institutions in the public sphere of communal society. Some, such as Dajia’s Zhenlangong, by way of their temple board’s political involvement have become centers of political power and campaigning stages of national relevance. Using empirical data, I contend that such temples deserve serious consideration as actors in the political field by political scientists. Moreover, they challenge the allegedly “secular” character of politics and the public sphere in the Taiwanese context. We ought to question if and why there is the notion of “secular” politics in the face of contradictory empirical evidence. Which ends do secular preconditions serve in concrete contexts? I suggest that this conflict reflects the self-proclaimed secular nation-state’s stepping into competition with traditional power centers, most often communal temples. This perspective has wider implications, even touching upon the PR Chinese government’s attitude toward (autonomous) communal religion.
This abstract concerns the relationship of (popular) religion and local/communal vis-à-vis nation... more This abstract concerns the relationship of (popular) religion and local/communal vis-à-vis national politics in Taiwan. My empirical research focus rests on temples dedicated to the immensely popular goddess Mazu which, when run as religious enterprises, provide their representative agents with plenty of resources and thus may serve to accumulate and showcase (political) power. Such temples are very often controlled by local economic and political elites, which operate them as institutional basis for enhancing their political influence in the public sphere of communal society. Some, such as Zhenlangong in Dajia (central-west Taiwan), by way of the temple administration’s political involvement have become important centers of political power and election campaigning stages of national relevance. Using empirical data, I contend that such temples, and the network of agents whose focal point they represent, deserve serious consideration as actors in the political field. Moreover, their religious inclination and ritual make-up in the Taiwanese context challenge the allegedly “secular” character of politics and the public sphere. This leads us to question for what reasons the notion of “secular” politics, in the face of contradictory empirical evidence, is being upheld in the first place. Which normative ends do secular preconditions serve in concrete context? I will suggest that this conflict reflects the self-proclaimed secular nation-state’s stepping into competition with traditional centers of power, most often situated in communal temples. In order to understand and appreciate potentials for an indigenous public sphere past and present, communal temples need to be taken into account. This perspective has wider ramifications as far as touching upon the PR Chinese government’s attitude toward (autonomous) communal religion, which historically has repeatedly challenged the central state’s legitimacy. Subduing religious actors to secular control and de-legitimizing popular religion as “superstition” served to remove this competition from the public sphere.
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Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles by Jacob F . Tischer
Books by Jacob F . Tischer
Mazu ist mit über 800 ihr gewidmeten Tempeln eine der bedeutendsten Gottheiten Taiwans. Obwohl aus China stammend, ist die Göttin ein wichtiger Anker für verschiedene lokale und regionale Identitäten und wird sogar als Repräsentantin der Einheit aller Taiwanerinnen und Taiwaner wahrgenommen. Mazus Stellung als Schutzpatronin Taiwans ist jedoch – wie die politische Unabhängigkeit des Inselstaats selbst – aufgrund chinesischer Ansprüche prekär."
Papers by Jacob F . Tischer
In the current political climate of nation-building in Taiwan, Taipei’s elites are using the media to produce an image of contemporary Taiwanese identity. In this context, the rural stereotype of the Taike figures as an antithesis of sorts to the way Taipei’s elites are imagining a Taiwanese modernity as seen from the metropolis. Before this background, it appears as somewhat ironic that the proliferation of Taike images in the media has the unintended effect of promoting Taike as a formative element of a positively imagined Taiwanese culture. It becomes a “familiar other,” and enables the Taiwanese to reflect ironically on the other side of national culture. This other side is the countryside, often broadly defined as “The South,” against which Taipei, the global city, asserts its dominance and from where it draws its resources, mostly in the form of human labor. I argue, then, that while the term Taike reflects a Taipei-centered language ideology, it also creates a shared intimacy capable of creating a Taiwanese imagined community. I will discuss this recent phenomenon in the theoretical framework of language ideologies.
This graduate seminar paper looks at different perspectives that have situated Taiwan differently in history: An objectivist, governance- and large-personae-oriented view, a China-centric perspective influenced by theories on core and periphery, and a post-colonial version of history culminating in democratization. While I am sympathetic to the latter, I argue that any historical narrative about Taiwan is by necessity political and serves contemporary political ends. I consequently reject the possibility of an objectivist historiography and maintain instead that our understanding of history needs to be grounded in the anthropological here and now. I then use the notion of cultural intimacy to explain how a popular but suppressed narrative of Taiwan-as-Taiwan could survive the KMT's Chinese nationalism and impose itself as the dominant understanding of Taiwanese history today, as well as lay the foundation for nation-building in Taiwan. Democratization in this reading allowed the institutions of the state to be aligned with an understanding of history shared by the majority of the population.
Other Publications by Jacob F . Tischer
Conference Presentations and Papers by Jacob F . Tischer
Although the entrance of Buddhism into German culture was prepared by philosophers such as Schopenhauer, it was only popularized at the turn of the 20 th century by the proliferation of a wider lifestyle reform movement. Proponents of Buddhism tried to appeal to a changing religious landscape by presenting a reformed, rational, and modern version of their faith. The first Buddhist association on European soil was founded in Leipzig in 1903. Until about 1914, Leipzig remained the center of organized Buddhism in Europe. However, the first Buddhist adherents in Germany, a small group of dedicated men, met with numerous obstacles. Continuous disagreement and infighting must be considered the gravest of their problems. It ultimately weakened these first attempts at institutionalizing and proselytizing Buddhism in Germany to the point that they crumbled under the impact of the First World War.
Popular community-representative temples form the empirical basis for my argument. The martial-law KMT acted very much in competition with such temples for local resources that can be regarded as the foundation of the public sphere. To govern local Taiwanese society, the party had to rely on the co-optation of local factions that often took temples as their organizational base. Many temples thus sustained a high level of political influence. Nevertheless, the KMT strove to replace these nominally “superstitious” institutions with more “modern” ones directly subordinate to the state – local “culture centers“ designed to disseminate a unified notion of “high” Chinese culture.
This paradigm of competition has since given way to a more pluralized relationship. Since democratization, popular temples with a nation-wide outreach have come to present highly visible stages for politicians vying for office. As loci for the negotiation of different forms of “capital”, they have thus become an intrinsic part of Taiwanese political culture. However, through the representation of community interests and the “common good”, temples may also represent a localized version of the public sphere.
While much attention has been paid to the changing contents of Taiwan's nation-building, the difference in attitude toward popular temples has had a major impact on the appearance and practice of its political culture. It can be argued that early post-war KMT policies reflected a Western-based concept of secularism in a programmatically “Chinese” tune, whereas development since democratization has resulted in a unique environment shared by multiple actors. These do not easily fit “religious” or “secular” frames but are informed by various influences stemming from historical sources indigenous and foreign. Community temples, in turn, have taken on a role reminiscent of their pre-modern societal significance. Taiwan can contribute to larger debates about religion and secularity by offering a democratic Asian venue for comparison, one with implications and influence upon, but not limited to, developments in China.
Mazu ist mit über 800 ihr gewidmeten Tempeln eine der bedeutendsten Gottheiten Taiwans. Obwohl aus China stammend, ist die Göttin ein wichtiger Anker für verschiedene lokale und regionale Identitäten und wird sogar als Repräsentantin der Einheit aller Taiwanerinnen und Taiwaner wahrgenommen. Mazus Stellung als Schutzpatronin Taiwans ist jedoch – wie die politische Unabhängigkeit des Inselstaats selbst – aufgrund chinesischer Ansprüche prekär."
In the current political climate of nation-building in Taiwan, Taipei’s elites are using the media to produce an image of contemporary Taiwanese identity. In this context, the rural stereotype of the Taike figures as an antithesis of sorts to the way Taipei’s elites are imagining a Taiwanese modernity as seen from the metropolis. Before this background, it appears as somewhat ironic that the proliferation of Taike images in the media has the unintended effect of promoting Taike as a formative element of a positively imagined Taiwanese culture. It becomes a “familiar other,” and enables the Taiwanese to reflect ironically on the other side of national culture. This other side is the countryside, often broadly defined as “The South,” against which Taipei, the global city, asserts its dominance and from where it draws its resources, mostly in the form of human labor. I argue, then, that while the term Taike reflects a Taipei-centered language ideology, it also creates a shared intimacy capable of creating a Taiwanese imagined community. I will discuss this recent phenomenon in the theoretical framework of language ideologies.
This graduate seminar paper looks at different perspectives that have situated Taiwan differently in history: An objectivist, governance- and large-personae-oriented view, a China-centric perspective influenced by theories on core and periphery, and a post-colonial version of history culminating in democratization. While I am sympathetic to the latter, I argue that any historical narrative about Taiwan is by necessity political and serves contemporary political ends. I consequently reject the possibility of an objectivist historiography and maintain instead that our understanding of history needs to be grounded in the anthropological here and now. I then use the notion of cultural intimacy to explain how a popular but suppressed narrative of Taiwan-as-Taiwan could survive the KMT's Chinese nationalism and impose itself as the dominant understanding of Taiwanese history today, as well as lay the foundation for nation-building in Taiwan. Democratization in this reading allowed the institutions of the state to be aligned with an understanding of history shared by the majority of the population.
Although the entrance of Buddhism into German culture was prepared by philosophers such as Schopenhauer, it was only popularized at the turn of the 20 th century by the proliferation of a wider lifestyle reform movement. Proponents of Buddhism tried to appeal to a changing religious landscape by presenting a reformed, rational, and modern version of their faith. The first Buddhist association on European soil was founded in Leipzig in 1903. Until about 1914, Leipzig remained the center of organized Buddhism in Europe. However, the first Buddhist adherents in Germany, a small group of dedicated men, met with numerous obstacles. Continuous disagreement and infighting must be considered the gravest of their problems. It ultimately weakened these first attempts at institutionalizing and proselytizing Buddhism in Germany to the point that they crumbled under the impact of the First World War.
Popular community-representative temples form the empirical basis for my argument. The martial-law KMT acted very much in competition with such temples for local resources that can be regarded as the foundation of the public sphere. To govern local Taiwanese society, the party had to rely on the co-optation of local factions that often took temples as their organizational base. Many temples thus sustained a high level of political influence. Nevertheless, the KMT strove to replace these nominally “superstitious” institutions with more “modern” ones directly subordinate to the state – local “culture centers“ designed to disseminate a unified notion of “high” Chinese culture.
This paradigm of competition has since given way to a more pluralized relationship. Since democratization, popular temples with a nation-wide outreach have come to present highly visible stages for politicians vying for office. As loci for the negotiation of different forms of “capital”, they have thus become an intrinsic part of Taiwanese political culture. However, through the representation of community interests and the “common good”, temples may also represent a localized version of the public sphere.
While much attention has been paid to the changing contents of Taiwan's nation-building, the difference in attitude toward popular temples has had a major impact on the appearance and practice of its political culture. It can be argued that early post-war KMT policies reflected a Western-based concept of secularism in a programmatically “Chinese” tune, whereas development since democratization has resulted in a unique environment shared by multiple actors. These do not easily fit “religious” or “secular” frames but are informed by various influences stemming from historical sources indigenous and foreign. Community temples, in turn, have taken on a role reminiscent of their pre-modern societal significance. Taiwan can contribute to larger debates about religion and secularity by offering a democratic Asian venue for comparison, one with implications and influence upon, but not limited to, developments in China.