Some situations in life rightly compel us to ask why things are the way they are. Randomness seem... more Some situations in life rightly compel us to ask why things are the way they are. Randomness seems to be an appropriate explanation for some trivial non-meaningful events. However, there are some facts (the non-trivial ones) in the world that strike us with an epistemic-force that push us to seek an explanation other than what is available to our senses. Thus, there exists in the world ‘striking facts’ that stand in need of explanation. It is the aim of this essay to demonstrate that there are such striking facts, that randomness is not an epistemically satisfying explanation, and that God is not a surprising solution; rather an intelligent designer is the best explanation available given the facts.
In this essay I hope to be able to elucidate some of the rules of engagement that could be used f... more In this essay I hope to be able to elucidate some of the rules of engagement that could be used for the skeptic and anti-skeptic in entertaining the various skeptical hypotheses. If I could accomplish this task alone I would take it as a great success. I recognize however, that to do so with a completely original argument in a segment of epistemology that has a rich and developed literature is unlikely. Furthermore, I will discuss particular kinds of skeptical arguments that I do not take to be necessarily binding upon rational agents to undertake—arguments that are generally known as ‘bare possibility’ arguments. It will be my contention that such arguments (yet to be defined) do not warrant a response or engagement while in the ordinary position. This assertion primarily rests upon the more fundamental claim that I hope to establish in this essay—at rock bottom, the skeptical hypothesis and resulting worry can be seen as a ‘loose’ or ‘thinly’ empirical issue. Finally, because of the two prior aims of this essay, some might levy against me the charge that I am not ‘taking skepticism seriously’ as I should. I want to briefly explore what that charge really means and then show how I do not fall into this particular snare. It is beyond the scope and intent of this essay to attempt to make a robust argument for all three tenants of this work. Consequently, I will briefly discuss each within their own section, with the goal of showing the connection to each other as an overall argument. To aid me in this monumental task, I will draw heavily upon the excellent work of the philosopher Adam Leite. In section four, I will employ some unique criticism that will be primarily adapted from the philosopher Evelyn Brister.
It would be an almost impossible task to define—with the appropriate scope—the concepts of theism... more It would be an almost impossible task to define—with the appropriate scope—the concepts of theism and atheism as they do or do not apply to religious practice. Either it would be too wide (include things that are clearly not religious for example) or too narrow (include things that are commonly held not to be in this classification). Hence it is not my aim to provide such a definition. Nevertheless, I will employ basic or intuitive definitions throughout, but I am not claiming they hold across all frameworks, contexts, or possible worlds. However, my intention is to claim that one could in some meaningful ways assert that Spinoza is an atheist while another could claim in other meaningful contexts that he is not. Hence, I argue, Spinoza is both a theist and an atheist.
There are many philosophical problems with the DCT that have been articulated by both Latter-day ... more There are many philosophical problems with the DCT that have been articulated by both Latter-day Saint authors and other philosophical traditions. The intent of this paper, however, is not to add or detract from that philosophical debate. Rather, it is the purpose of this paper to outline why members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, in particular, should not accept, endorse, or otherwise utilize DCT in their moral deliberations. In other words, this essay illustrates the DCT’s incompatibility with the metaphysics of the restored gospel.
. In this paper, I examine the most conventional arguments for divine incorporeality and show tha... more . In this paper, I examine the most conventional arguments for divine incorporeality and show that none of them are adequate. Consequently, I conclude conjunctively: none of the traditional arguments for divine incorporeality necessitate the belief that God must be incorporeal, nor does this belief in a corporeal deity preclude him from being a candidate for the greatest possible being.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the belief that divine omnipresence entails divine incorporea... more The aim of this paper is to analyze the belief that divine omnipresence entails divine incorporeality. My hope is to reveal that no such relationship of entailment holds between the two. Critically, however, this should not be seen as a denial of either omnipresence or incorporeality. Rather, it is only a denial that the latter necessarily follows from the former, to the extent that if both attributes are posited, they must be held upon independent grounds. If I am right, this in no way demonstrates that God does have a body; it merely indicates that the belief that God is unembodied has commonly been posited for the wrong reason.
The purpose of this paper is to argue in for substance dualism originally proposed by Renee Desca... more The purpose of this paper is to argue in for substance dualism originally proposed by Renee Descartes. In this paper I will examine multiple arguments for this view, some strong critiques of these arguments, and a put forward a substantive reply in the hopes of demonstrating that these critiques are not considerable or damaging to the theory as a whole. Furthermore, I accept and am working from the foundation of arguments proposed by David Chalmers, who has philosophically demonstrated adequately (in my mind) the positions of predicate and property dualism.
During the course of the development of science and the resulting technology, many have claimed t... more During the course of the development of science and the resulting technology, many have claimed that their findings reflect, correlate, and demonstrate the way the world actually is. Science has now moved into the realm of ontology. This is a bold and powerful assertion. Hence, it is the aim of this essay to evaluate whether or not these claims (and others like it) are well founded or rationally justified.
Assuming libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents can bring it about that so... more Assuming libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents can bring it about that some world is actual. Against arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer a justification for power over the past which takes this suggestion into consideration. I argue that the subsequent account is available to Ockhamists. However, I assert that it is not an open option for Molinists-which leaves them susceptible to incompatibilist arguments.
Some situations in life rightly compel us to ask why things are the way they are. Randomness seem... more Some situations in life rightly compel us to ask why things are the way they are. Randomness seems to be an appropriate explanation for some trivial non-meaningful events. However, there are some facts (the non-trivial ones) in the world that strike us with an epistemic-force that push us to seek an explanation other than what is available to our senses. Thus, there exists in the world ‘striking facts’ that stand in need of explanation. It is the aim of this essay to demonstrate that there are such striking facts, that randomness is not an epistemically satisfying explanation, and that God is not a surprising solution; rather an intelligent designer is the best explanation available given the facts.
In this essay I hope to be able to elucidate some of the rules of engagement that could be used f... more In this essay I hope to be able to elucidate some of the rules of engagement that could be used for the skeptic and anti-skeptic in entertaining the various skeptical hypotheses. If I could accomplish this task alone I would take it as a great success. I recognize however, that to do so with a completely original argument in a segment of epistemology that has a rich and developed literature is unlikely. Furthermore, I will discuss particular kinds of skeptical arguments that I do not take to be necessarily binding upon rational agents to undertake—arguments that are generally known as ‘bare possibility’ arguments. It will be my contention that such arguments (yet to be defined) do not warrant a response or engagement while in the ordinary position. This assertion primarily rests upon the more fundamental claim that I hope to establish in this essay—at rock bottom, the skeptical hypothesis and resulting worry can be seen as a ‘loose’ or ‘thinly’ empirical issue. Finally, because of the two prior aims of this essay, some might levy against me the charge that I am not ‘taking skepticism seriously’ as I should. I want to briefly explore what that charge really means and then show how I do not fall into this particular snare. It is beyond the scope and intent of this essay to attempt to make a robust argument for all three tenants of this work. Consequently, I will briefly discuss each within their own section, with the goal of showing the connection to each other as an overall argument. To aid me in this monumental task, I will draw heavily upon the excellent work of the philosopher Adam Leite. In section four, I will employ some unique criticism that will be primarily adapted from the philosopher Evelyn Brister.
It would be an almost impossible task to define—with the appropriate scope—the concepts of theism... more It would be an almost impossible task to define—with the appropriate scope—the concepts of theism and atheism as they do or do not apply to religious practice. Either it would be too wide (include things that are clearly not religious for example) or too narrow (include things that are commonly held not to be in this classification). Hence it is not my aim to provide such a definition. Nevertheless, I will employ basic or intuitive definitions throughout, but I am not claiming they hold across all frameworks, contexts, or possible worlds. However, my intention is to claim that one could in some meaningful ways assert that Spinoza is an atheist while another could claim in other meaningful contexts that he is not. Hence, I argue, Spinoza is both a theist and an atheist.
There are many philosophical problems with the DCT that have been articulated by both Latter-day ... more There are many philosophical problems with the DCT that have been articulated by both Latter-day Saint authors and other philosophical traditions. The intent of this paper, however, is not to add or detract from that philosophical debate. Rather, it is the purpose of this paper to outline why members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, in particular, should not accept, endorse, or otherwise utilize DCT in their moral deliberations. In other words, this essay illustrates the DCT’s incompatibility with the metaphysics of the restored gospel.
. In this paper, I examine the most conventional arguments for divine incorporeality and show tha... more . In this paper, I examine the most conventional arguments for divine incorporeality and show that none of them are adequate. Consequently, I conclude conjunctively: none of the traditional arguments for divine incorporeality necessitate the belief that God must be incorporeal, nor does this belief in a corporeal deity preclude him from being a candidate for the greatest possible being.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the belief that divine omnipresence entails divine incorporea... more The aim of this paper is to analyze the belief that divine omnipresence entails divine incorporeality. My hope is to reveal that no such relationship of entailment holds between the two. Critically, however, this should not be seen as a denial of either omnipresence or incorporeality. Rather, it is only a denial that the latter necessarily follows from the former, to the extent that if both attributes are posited, they must be held upon independent grounds. If I am right, this in no way demonstrates that God does have a body; it merely indicates that the belief that God is unembodied has commonly been posited for the wrong reason.
The purpose of this paper is to argue in for substance dualism originally proposed by Renee Desca... more The purpose of this paper is to argue in for substance dualism originally proposed by Renee Descartes. In this paper I will examine multiple arguments for this view, some strong critiques of these arguments, and a put forward a substantive reply in the hopes of demonstrating that these critiques are not considerable or damaging to the theory as a whole. Furthermore, I accept and am working from the foundation of arguments proposed by David Chalmers, who has philosophically demonstrated adequately (in my mind) the positions of predicate and property dualism.
During the course of the development of science and the resulting technology, many have claimed t... more During the course of the development of science and the resulting technology, many have claimed that their findings reflect, correlate, and demonstrate the way the world actually is. Science has now moved into the realm of ontology. This is a bold and powerful assertion. Hence, it is the aim of this essay to evaluate whether or not these claims (and others like it) are well founded or rationally justified.
Assuming libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents can bring it about that so... more Assuming libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents can bring it about that some world is actual. Against arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer a justification for power over the past which takes this suggestion into consideration. I argue that the subsequent account is available to Ockhamists. However, I assert that it is not an open option for Molinists-which leaves them susceptible to incompatibilist arguments.
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