This chapter addresses the question as to whether a human agent is the same person online as they... more This chapter addresses the question as to whether a human agent is the same person online as they are offline. It aims to outline a perspective from which it is plausible to assume that one might, in virtual reality, be a different self (or indeed a series of different selves) from one’s real life self (or again selves). In some respects this is an outdated approach to the question of selfhood and virtual reality. While the possibility of a sundering of real life and online selves was defended in the 1990s, by the likes of Turkle, this position has fallen somewhat by the wayside, not least due to the pervasive role that web 2.0 plays in the way in which humans now use online profiles to organise their offline lives. This chapter is concerned specifically with the possibility that an avatar within a Massively Multiple Online World (MMOW, or multi-user virtual environment (MUVE)), such as Second Life or There.com, might not be the real life self by which it is driven
<jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doct... more <jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doctorate from the University of Frankfurt, is best known as a leader of the Frankfurt School, along with Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. From 1930 to 1958 (with a significant hiatus from 1934 to 1948), Horkheimer served as the Director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), founded in 1923 to promote multidisciplinary research in the social sciences with a particular focus on Marxian thought; along with his colleague Adorno, Horkheimer was responsible for developing the distinctive form of Marxist philosophy that framed this research through the methodologies of German critical theory. Instead of just describing social systems through "objective" means, critical theory would endeavor to uncover the social context and raise questions about truth and social justice, acknowledging also that critical theory cannot produce universal truths. At best, the critical theorist simply expresses the contradictions and falsehoods of the society within which they work. Critical theory was applied in a sweeping analysis of Western civilization in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947; Dialectic of Enlightenment), in which Adorno and Horkheimer argued that the progress of enlightened Western culture was simultaneously a regression into a new barbarism and an entanglement in myth. In modernist art, such as the work of James Joyce and Pablo Picasso, Horkheimer identified a crucial source of resistance to the political and economic oppression of late capitalist society. Horkheimer, who was Jewish, escaped Nazi Germany and taught at Columbia University from 1935 to 1941; he lived in Los Angeles during the 1940s, but eventually returned to Germany where died in Nuremburg in 1973.</jats:p>
<jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doct... more <jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doctorate from the University of Frankfurt, is best known as a leader of the Frankfurt School, along with Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. From 1930 to 1958 (with a significant hiatus from 1934 to 1948), Horkheimer served as the Director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), founded in 1923 to promote multidisciplinary research in the social sciences with a particular focus on Marxian thought; along with his colleague Adorno, Horkheimer was responsible for developing the distinctive form of Marxist philosophy that framed this research through the methodologies of German critical theory. Instead of just describing social systems through "objective" means, critical theory would endeavor to uncover the social context and raise questions about truth and social justice, acknowledging also that critical theory cannot produce universal truths. At best, the critical theorist simply expresses the contradictions and falsehoods of the society within which they work. Critical theory was applied in a sweeping analysis of Western civilization in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947; Dialectic of Enlightenment), in which Adorno and Horkheimer argued that the progress of enlightened Western culture was simultaneously a regression into a new barbarism and an entanglement in myth. In modernist art, such as the work of James Joyce and Pablo Picasso, Horkheimer identified a crucial source of resistance to the political and economic oppression of late capitalist society. Horkheimer, who was Jewish, escaped Nazi Germany and taught at Columbia University from 1935 to 1941; he lived in Los Angeles during the 1940s, but eventually returned to Germany where died in Nuremburg in 1973.</jats:p>
This paper uses the social theory of Erving Goffman in order to argue that confidentiality should... more This paper uses the social theory of Erving Goffman in order to argue that confidentiality should be understood in relation to the mundane social skills by which individuals present and respect specific self-images of themselves and others during social interaction. The breaching of confidentiality is analysed in terms of one person's capacity to embarrass another, and so to expose that person as incompetent. Respecting confidentiality may at once serve to protect the vulnerable from an unjust society, and yet also protect the guilty from just accusation. Ethical reasoning about confidentiality must therefore recognize the dangers of prejudice and violence inherent in decisions to breach or to respect confidentiality. Case studies are used to illustrate the efficacy of this account, culminating with analyses of three examples from the UKCC document Confidentiality.
HABERMAS An independently minded champion of `the project of modernity' in a supposedly post... more HABERMAS An independently minded champion of `the project of modernity' in a supposedly post-modern age, JuÈrgen Habermas (1929-) is one of the most widely in¯uential thinkers of our times. Habermas: The Key Concepts is an easy-to-use AZ guide to a body of work that ...
The Meanings of Genetics Accounts of Biotechnology in the work of Habermas, Baudrillard and Derri... more The Meanings of Genetics Accounts of Biotechnology in the work of Habermas, Baudrillard and Derrida. Yulia Egorova, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Andrew Edgar, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Stephen Pattison, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Abstract: There can ...
Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy, Jan 4, 2016
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of 'flourishing' that is relevant to hea... more The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of 'flourishing' that is relevant to health care provision, both in terms of the flourishing of the individual patient and carer, and in terms of the flourishing of the caring institution. It is argued that, unlike related concepts such as 'happiness', 'well-being' or 'quality of life', 'flourishing' uniquely has the power to capture the importance of the vulnerability of human being. Drawing on the likes of Heidegger and Nussbaum, it is argued that humans are at once beings who are autonomous and thereby capable of making sense of their lives, but also subject to the contingencies of their bodies and environments. To flourish requires that one engages, imaginatively and creatively, with those contingencies. The experience of illness, highlighting the vulnerability of the human being, thereby becomes an important experience, stimulating reflection in order to make sense of one's life as a na...
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biopolitical response to certain ethical questions po... more The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biopolitical response to certain ethical questions posed by chronic disorders of consciousness (CDoC). This response will draw on Giogio Agamben’s account of homo sacer (Agamben G, Home Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans: Heller-Roazen D). Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998). ‘Homo sacer’ is a somewhat obscure term, found in Roman law, designating someone who has been expelled from the protection of the law. By addressing Agamben’s own analysis of the ‘overcoma’ and the case of Karen Quinlan, it will be argued that a distinctive normative status can be ascribed to the CDoC patient: the CDoC patient exemplifies the condition of homo sacer, and as such of what Agamben calls ‘bare life’. This argument poses a radical challenge to traditional approaches to bioethics and law. Precisely because homo sacer is placed outside the law, traditional legal or moral conceptions of rights are rendered inapplicable. However, it will also b...
This chapter addresses the question as to whether a human agent is the same person online as they... more This chapter addresses the question as to whether a human agent is the same person online as they are offline. It aims to outline a perspective from which it is plausible to assume that one might, in virtual reality, be a different self (or indeed a series of different selves) from one’s real life self (or again selves). In some respects this is an outdated approach to the question of selfhood and virtual reality. While the possibility of a sundering of real life and online selves was defended in the 1990s, by the likes of Turkle, this position has fallen somewhat by the wayside, not least due to the pervasive role that web 2.0 plays in the way in which humans now use online profiles to organise their offline lives. This chapter is concerned specifically with the possibility that an avatar within a Massively Multiple Online World (MMOW, or multi-user virtual environment (MUVE)), such as Second Life or There.com, might not be the real life self by which it is driven
<jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doct... more <jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doctorate from the University of Frankfurt, is best known as a leader of the Frankfurt School, along with Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. From 1930 to 1958 (with a significant hiatus from 1934 to 1948), Horkheimer served as the Director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), founded in 1923 to promote multidisciplinary research in the social sciences with a particular focus on Marxian thought; along with his colleague Adorno, Horkheimer was responsible for developing the distinctive form of Marxist philosophy that framed this research through the methodologies of German critical theory. Instead of just describing social systems through "objective" means, critical theory would endeavor to uncover the social context and raise questions about truth and social justice, acknowledging also that critical theory cannot produce universal truths. At best, the critical theorist simply expresses the contradictions and falsehoods of the society within which they work. Critical theory was applied in a sweeping analysis of Western civilization in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947; Dialectic of Enlightenment), in which Adorno and Horkheimer argued that the progress of enlightened Western culture was simultaneously a regression into a new barbarism and an entanglement in myth. In modernist art, such as the work of James Joyce and Pablo Picasso, Horkheimer identified a crucial source of resistance to the political and economic oppression of late capitalist society. Horkheimer, who was Jewish, escaped Nazi Germany and taught at Columbia University from 1935 to 1941; he lived in Los Angeles during the 1940s, but eventually returned to Germany where died in Nuremburg in 1973.</jats:p>
<jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doct... more <jats:p>Born near Stuttgart, Germany, the philosopher Max Horkheimer, who obtained his doctorate from the University of Frankfurt, is best known as a leader of the Frankfurt School, along with Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. From 1930 to 1958 (with a significant hiatus from 1934 to 1948), Horkheimer served as the Director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), founded in 1923 to promote multidisciplinary research in the social sciences with a particular focus on Marxian thought; along with his colleague Adorno, Horkheimer was responsible for developing the distinctive form of Marxist philosophy that framed this research through the methodologies of German critical theory. Instead of just describing social systems through "objective" means, critical theory would endeavor to uncover the social context and raise questions about truth and social justice, acknowledging also that critical theory cannot produce universal truths. At best, the critical theorist simply expresses the contradictions and falsehoods of the society within which they work. Critical theory was applied in a sweeping analysis of Western civilization in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947; Dialectic of Enlightenment), in which Adorno and Horkheimer argued that the progress of enlightened Western culture was simultaneously a regression into a new barbarism and an entanglement in myth. In modernist art, such as the work of James Joyce and Pablo Picasso, Horkheimer identified a crucial source of resistance to the political and economic oppression of late capitalist society. Horkheimer, who was Jewish, escaped Nazi Germany and taught at Columbia University from 1935 to 1941; he lived in Los Angeles during the 1940s, but eventually returned to Germany where died in Nuremburg in 1973.</jats:p>
This paper uses the social theory of Erving Goffman in order to argue that confidentiality should... more This paper uses the social theory of Erving Goffman in order to argue that confidentiality should be understood in relation to the mundane social skills by which individuals present and respect specific self-images of themselves and others during social interaction. The breaching of confidentiality is analysed in terms of one person's capacity to embarrass another, and so to expose that person as incompetent. Respecting confidentiality may at once serve to protect the vulnerable from an unjust society, and yet also protect the guilty from just accusation. Ethical reasoning about confidentiality must therefore recognize the dangers of prejudice and violence inherent in decisions to breach or to respect confidentiality. Case studies are used to illustrate the efficacy of this account, culminating with analyses of three examples from the UKCC document Confidentiality.
HABERMAS An independently minded champion of `the project of modernity' in a supposedly post... more HABERMAS An independently minded champion of `the project of modernity' in a supposedly post-modern age, JuÈrgen Habermas (1929-) is one of the most widely in¯uential thinkers of our times. Habermas: The Key Concepts is an easy-to-use AZ guide to a body of work that ...
The Meanings of Genetics Accounts of Biotechnology in the work of Habermas, Baudrillard and Derri... more The Meanings of Genetics Accounts of Biotechnology in the work of Habermas, Baudrillard and Derrida. Yulia Egorova, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Andrew Edgar, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Stephen Pattison, Cardiff University, United Kingdom Abstract: There can ...
Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy, Jan 4, 2016
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of 'flourishing' that is relevant to hea... more The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of 'flourishing' that is relevant to health care provision, both in terms of the flourishing of the individual patient and carer, and in terms of the flourishing of the caring institution. It is argued that, unlike related concepts such as 'happiness', 'well-being' or 'quality of life', 'flourishing' uniquely has the power to capture the importance of the vulnerability of human being. Drawing on the likes of Heidegger and Nussbaum, it is argued that humans are at once beings who are autonomous and thereby capable of making sense of their lives, but also subject to the contingencies of their bodies and environments. To flourish requires that one engages, imaginatively and creatively, with those contingencies. The experience of illness, highlighting the vulnerability of the human being, thereby becomes an important experience, stimulating reflection in order to make sense of one's life as a na...
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biopolitical response to certain ethical questions po... more The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biopolitical response to certain ethical questions posed by chronic disorders of consciousness (CDoC). This response will draw on Giogio Agamben’s account of homo sacer (Agamben G, Home Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans: Heller-Roazen D). Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998). ‘Homo sacer’ is a somewhat obscure term, found in Roman law, designating someone who has been expelled from the protection of the law. By addressing Agamben’s own analysis of the ‘overcoma’ and the case of Karen Quinlan, it will be argued that a distinctive normative status can be ascribed to the CDoC patient: the CDoC patient exemplifies the condition of homo sacer, and as such of what Agamben calls ‘bare life’. This argument poses a radical challenge to traditional approaches to bioethics and law. Precisely because homo sacer is placed outside the law, traditional legal or moral conceptions of rights are rendered inapplicable. However, it will also b...
This presentation offers a critical exposition of Roger Caillois' typology of play. Caillois, in ... more This presentation offers a critical exposition of Roger Caillois' typology of play. Caillois, in Les Jeux et les Hommes (1958), offers a fourfold typology of games (as agonistic, aleatory, mimetic, and as inducing vertigo-or ilinx). This reading of Caillois will explicate an otherwise overlooked element of this typology, that of 'moral ilinx', a form of vertigo experienced when the everyday capacity for moral judgement is challenged or subverted within a game. The recognition of this sub-category allows Caillois' somewhat conservative philosophy to be read, fruitfully, in tension with the more radical philosophy of his one time collaborator George Bataille, and thus the explication of games as part of Bataille's 'accursed share'. It will be argued that participation in games potentially throws into question presuppositions about the player's moral values and indeed sense of identity. The everyday, non-gaming, world is partially suspended. It follows that games, contrary to a dominant strand of thinking in the philosophy of sport, do not inculcate moral virtues, but rather open a space for violence and immorality. Competitive gaming is grounded in the possibility of doing violence to others and 'joyfully' accepting defeat oneself. The very violence of competitive gaming is argued not to be a moral problem, but rather to be fruitfully transgressive, in Bataille's sense, focussing player and spectator alike on the intrinsic value of play-however threatening that play might be-and thereby throwing into question the instrumental and potentially repressive values that are dominant in the everyday world.
This paper offers a critical exposition of Roger Caillois' typology of play, and applies that typ... more This paper offers a critical exposition of Roger Caillois' typology of play, and applies that typology anew to the phenomenon of video gaming and eSports. The reading of Caillois will explicate an otherwise overlooked element of his typology, that of 'moral ilinx', a form of vertigo experienced when the everyday capacity for moral judgement is challenged or subverted. The recognition of this sub-category allows Caillois' somewhat conservative philosophy to be read, fruitfully, in tension with the more radical philosophy of his one time collaborator George Bataille (a thinker overlooked by the philosophy of sport). This will serve to articulate the moral importance of video games as the mimetic enactment of violence and the experience of killing and death. Video games make explicit, it will be argued, the actual violence that is inherent in all competitive play. It will be concluded that the mimicry of violence and death in video gaming makes explicit the 'joyful' acceptance of the possibility of defeat that is fundamental to all competition. It is in this joy, and thus the appreciation of the intrinsic value of an experience, that eSport and sport proper open up a space for critical moral reflection. The very violence of competitive gaming is argued, not to be a problem, but rather to be fruitfully transgressive, focussing player and spectator alike on the intrinsic value of play, however threatening that play might be, and thereby the throwing into question the repressive, instrumental values that are dominant in the non-playing, everyday, world.
Uploads