I am a lecturer of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Cameroon, Bamenda. I also serve as the director of Academic Affairs. I obtained a doctorate degree in Philosophy in 2009 from the Pontifical Urban University in Rome.
The international library of environmental, agricultural and food ethics/The International library of environmental, agricultural and food ethics, 2023
That an African is notoriously religious as affirmed by Mbiti, is a fact which has been tested an... more That an African is notoriously religious as affirmed by Mbiti, is a fact which has been tested and proven by many Philosophers. This aspect transcends all categories of the African expression and appreciation of life, in such fashion that every element is seen as intrinsically connected with the Supreme Being. The consequence is a multiplicity of names for the Supreme Being that gives the impression of a plurality. This paper, while affirming the exigency of the African "God" concept maintains that underlying the seeming plurality is a fundamental unicity. The African God, so to speak, is but one God, viewed from different dimensions of an African's relationship with him in all aspects of the African life. This paper argues that western contentions that conclude to the multiplicity of Gods in Africa are misconceptions and misunderstandings of African Traditional Religion and its inherent belief systems and modes of expression.
The "Is-Ought" distinction in Philosophy explicitly draws its roots from Hume and has since found... more The "Is-Ought" distinction in Philosophy explicitly draws its roots from Hume and has since found fluidity among many thinkers. Hume is vehement that no "Ought" can be derived from the "Is". This paper argues critically with Jonas that the "Ought" can effectively be derived from the "Is". The "Is" refers to metaphysics while the "Ought" refers to ethics. It is thus understandable why Hume, who launched a book-burning campaign against metaphysics, would deny that ethical values can be derived from metaphysics. Thus, the fundamental problem addressed by Jonas here is that of basing ethical values on metaphysical principles. In a world characterized by the vehement rejection of metaphysics in favour of science, moral values are claimed to be socially constructed rather than having an ontological foundation. This paper, examines Jonas" solution to the "Is-Ought" problem. It concludes that life is self-affirmative and therefore, must be allowed to be in an authentic fashion.
International Journal of Social Science and Human Research, 2021
Contemporary debates on bioethical issues have tended to remain generally inconclusive and this i... more Contemporary debates on bioethical issues have tended to remain generally inconclusive and this is due in part to the fact that these issues are differentially perceived and interpreted across different indigenous cultural and ethical worldviews. These issues are cross-culturally evaluated using culture specific normative parameters and therefore reflect values that are culturally relative and diverse. These debates often portray stark disagreements between views that advocate for divergent or contradictory positions on central bioethical issues. This article, while contemplating the present and projected advances in genetic and reproductive technologies that soar beyond the traditional medical goals of healing disease and relieving suffering - coupled with the many negative consequences therein contained, attempts to give an African touch to the debates by rethinking them through the parameters of African indigenous cultural norms and values. This article employs the comparative ap...
Against all forms of distorted love, Hildebrand asserts that love is a value response to a partic... more Against all forms of distorted love, Hildebrand asserts that love is a value response to a particular person, an unrepeatable individual who bears the framework of an imago Dei. In this paper I argue that this “Hildebrandian “value response” is not a new appellation of the ancient reason for love which is based on the fulfilment of a need but a gift inhering in life itself, which arises exclusively from a participation in the value of the beloved person. In Hildebrand’s “value response” it is not selfish to want to have one’s own subjectivity, to be loved in return, to be happy in loving – as long as these desires are embedded in the value-responding affirmation of the beloved person. Therefore, love can exist only if it seeks no reward, but once it exists, it is rewarded.
The international library of environmental, agricultural and food ethics/The International library of environmental, agricultural and food ethics, 2023
That an African is notoriously religious as affirmed by Mbiti, is a fact which has been tested an... more That an African is notoriously religious as affirmed by Mbiti, is a fact which has been tested and proven by many Philosophers. This aspect transcends all categories of the African expression and appreciation of life, in such fashion that every element is seen as intrinsically connected with the Supreme Being. The consequence is a multiplicity of names for the Supreme Being that gives the impression of a plurality. This paper, while affirming the exigency of the African "God" concept maintains that underlying the seeming plurality is a fundamental unicity. The African God, so to speak, is but one God, viewed from different dimensions of an African's relationship with him in all aspects of the African life. This paper argues that western contentions that conclude to the multiplicity of Gods in Africa are misconceptions and misunderstandings of African Traditional Religion and its inherent belief systems and modes of expression.
The "Is-Ought" distinction in Philosophy explicitly draws its roots from Hume and has since found... more The "Is-Ought" distinction in Philosophy explicitly draws its roots from Hume and has since found fluidity among many thinkers. Hume is vehement that no "Ought" can be derived from the "Is". This paper argues critically with Jonas that the "Ought" can effectively be derived from the "Is". The "Is" refers to metaphysics while the "Ought" refers to ethics. It is thus understandable why Hume, who launched a book-burning campaign against metaphysics, would deny that ethical values can be derived from metaphysics. Thus, the fundamental problem addressed by Jonas here is that of basing ethical values on metaphysical principles. In a world characterized by the vehement rejection of metaphysics in favour of science, moral values are claimed to be socially constructed rather than having an ontological foundation. This paper, examines Jonas" solution to the "Is-Ought" problem. It concludes that life is self-affirmative and therefore, must be allowed to be in an authentic fashion.
International Journal of Social Science and Human Research, 2021
Contemporary debates on bioethical issues have tended to remain generally inconclusive and this i... more Contemporary debates on bioethical issues have tended to remain generally inconclusive and this is due in part to the fact that these issues are differentially perceived and interpreted across different indigenous cultural and ethical worldviews. These issues are cross-culturally evaluated using culture specific normative parameters and therefore reflect values that are culturally relative and diverse. These debates often portray stark disagreements between views that advocate for divergent or contradictory positions on central bioethical issues. This article, while contemplating the present and projected advances in genetic and reproductive technologies that soar beyond the traditional medical goals of healing disease and relieving suffering - coupled with the many negative consequences therein contained, attempts to give an African touch to the debates by rethinking them through the parameters of African indigenous cultural norms and values. This article employs the comparative ap...
Against all forms of distorted love, Hildebrand asserts that love is a value response to a partic... more Against all forms of distorted love, Hildebrand asserts that love is a value response to a particular person, an unrepeatable individual who bears the framework of an imago Dei. In this paper I argue that this “Hildebrandian “value response” is not a new appellation of the ancient reason for love which is based on the fulfilment of a need but a gift inhering in life itself, which arises exclusively from a participation in the value of the beloved person. In Hildebrand’s “value response” it is not selfish to want to have one’s own subjectivity, to be loved in return, to be happy in loving – as long as these desires are embedded in the value-responding affirmation of the beloved person. Therefore, love can exist only if it seeks no reward, but once it exists, it is rewarded.
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Papers by Fr. Peter Takov