Thesis Chapters by David Potts
This chapter introduces the dissertation project, which is to compare theories of experiential aw... more This chapter introduces the dissertation project, which is to compare theories of experiential awareness along two dimensions. One dimension is how a theory conceives of awareness as it exists in experience. The other is what a theory holds that the subject of an experience receives in that experience. These two dimensions are crossed to produce a "Matrix" of theory types, which is then populated with examples drawn from contemporary philosophy of perception. The ultimate aim is to evaluate the prospects of competing theories by comparing them across categories.
In this chapter and the next, we explore the views of one of the most creative and interesting ph... more In this chapter and the next, we explore the views of one of the most creative and interesting philosophers of experience on the current scene, Mark Johnston. This will provide an introduction to some basic issues in the theory of experience, especially sense-experience, and also will acquaint us with some of the basic alternative theories of sensible qualities and with the dialectic that motivates the alternatives. Besides acquainting us with some basic issues, this will have the additional advantage of enabling us to see at close range a reasonable defense of two types of theory that might seem at first not very promising: (a) an Intrinsic View of sensible quality experience that conceives sensible qualities not as mentalistic but as objective properties of external objects; (b) a thoroughgoing Presentationalism. (These are Matrix categories. For explanation, see Chapter 1.)
This chapter continues the review of Mark Johnston's philosophy of experiential awareness begun i... more This chapter continues the review of Mark Johnston's philosophy of experiential awareness begun in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we examine his critique of what he calls the "conjunctive analysis" of sense-experience, characteristic of many Intentionalist theories, and his distinctive, non-disjunctivist defense of Presentationalism. (For explanation of these categories, see Chapter 1.)
This long chapter is the centerpiece of the dissertation. This chapter extends the classification... more This long chapter is the centerpiece of the dissertation. This chapter extends the classification scheme presented in Chapter 1 by incorporating competing approaches to reference determination. Three approaches are examined, Traditional Russellian, Neo-Russellian, and Fregean, and they are added as a third dimension to the Matrix. This chapter also distinguishes experience of particular objects from that of sensible qualities, and examines how the different theory types apply to them. This introduces still a fourth dimension. The resulting, enhanced Matrix is then populated by examining and placing in the Matrix the theories of John Campbell, Bertrand Russell, Mark Johnston, A. D. Smith, David Chalmers, John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, John Searle, Saul Kripke, Fred Dretske, and Michael Tye.
In the remainder of the dissertation, we take up the work of evaluating the prospects for theorie... more In the remainder of the dissertation, we take up the work of evaluating the prospects for theories in the various Matrix cells. This is an enormous task; only a beginning is made in the dissertation. This chapter examines arguments against externalistic versions of the Informational View of sensible quality experience. Three arguments are considered: the causal inefficacy argument, the argument from self-revealing experience, and the final total brain state argument. It is found that although the first argument is weak, the remaining two pose serious problems for externalism.
The previous chapter having examined arguments against the Externalistic Informational View, the ... more The previous chapter having examined arguments against the Externalistic Informational View, the present chapter turns to its principal rivals, the Intrinsic View and the Fregean Informational View. Most attention is devoted to the Intrinsic View. The chapter begins by exploring the features of the Intrinsic View to clarify its entailments and get a better idea of what a defensible Intrinsic View theory might look like. Two criticisms are then examined. First, that Intrinsic View experience is unable to justify belief in the external reality of what is experienced. Second, that whereas the Intrinsic View necessarily emphasizes those aspects of experience that are typically referred to as phenomenal character, and these prominently include intrinsic properties, intrinsic properties seem to be radically intractable. Both these criticisms are found to pose serious difficulties for the Intrinsic View. Finally, the Fregean Informational View is considered and found to avoid the first of the problems raised against the Intrinsic View but to be subject to most aspects of the second.
Having considered at length in the previous two chapters the problems that confront the Externali... more Having considered at length in the previous two chapters the problems that confront the Externalistic Informational View, the Fregean Informational View, and the Intrinsic View, the problems are now compared and it is tentatively concluded that the Intrinsic View has the best prospects for eventually producing a correct theory of sensible quality experience. But this conclusion holds only for sensible quality experience. Concerning experience of particulars, it is concluded that the Externalistic Informational View makes the strongest case. This raises the question, since experience is of both sensible qualities and particulars, whether and how a hybrid theory might be developed that encompasses both Views. This question is considered and a strategy for developing a suitable hybrid theory is briefly sketched.
Unpublished Papers by David Potts
This essay examines and refutes three well-known arguments against the possibility of determinate... more This essay examines and refutes three well-known arguments against the possibility of determinate reference of thoughts and percepts: (a) Hilary Putnam's argument that a brain in a vat couldn't have the thought that it is a brain in a vat; (b) Putnam's model-theoretic argument against any language whatever (including the thoughts and percepts of normal human beings) having determinate referents for its terms; and (c) the application of Max Newman's argument against Russell's conception of structural knowledge of the external world from sense-perception as put forward in his The Analysis of Matter (1927) to contemporary structural realism in the philosophy of science.
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Thesis Chapters by David Potts
Unpublished Papers by David Potts