Gaussian Processes for Anomaly Description in Production Environments

Christian Beecks

University of Münster and Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology FIT, Germany christian.beecks@uni-muenster.de

> Fabian Berns University of Münster, Germany fabian.berns@uni-muenster.de

ABSTRACT

Concomitant with the rapid spread of cyber-physical systems and the advancement of technologies from the Internet of Things, many modern production environments are characterized by vast amounts of sensor data which are generated throughout different stages of production processes. In this paper, we propose a novel method for discovering the inherent structures of anomalies arising in IoT sensor data. Our idea consists in modeling and describing anomalies by means of kernel expressions, which are combinations of well-known kernels. The results of our empirical analysis show that our proposal is suitable for modeling differently structured anomalies. Moreover, the results indicate that Gaussian processes provide a powerful tool for future algorithmic investigations of IoT sensor data.

1 INTRODUCTION

Concomitant with the rapid spread of cyber-physical systems and the advancement of technologies from the Internet of Things (IoT), many modern production environments are characterized by vast amounts of sensor data which are generated throughout different stages of production processes. These sensor data streams are often considered as valuable information sources with a high economic potential and are characterized by high volume, velocity and variety. Their data-driven value is indisputable for optimizing and fine-tuning industrial production processes.

Monitoring sensor data from complex production processes in order to detect outliers or low-performing production behavior caused by undesired drifts and trends, which we summarize as *anomalies*, is a challenging task. Not only due to the massive amount of sensor data but also due to different types of anomalies, which are potentially unknown in advance, manual or automatic inspection systems are frequently supported by anomaly detection algorithms. While the last years have witnessed the development of different anomaly detection algorithms, cf. the work of Renaudie et al. [21] for a recent performance evaluation in an industrial context, only less effort has been spent to the investigation of the inherent structure of an anomaly.

In this paper, we thus propose a novel method to discover the inherent structure of an anomaly. Our idea consists in modeling and describing anomalies by means of kernel expressions, Kjeld Willy Schmidt University of Münster, Germany kjeld.schmidt@uni-muenster.de

Alexander Grass Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology FIT, Germany alexander.grass@fit.fraunhofer.de

which are combinations of well-known kernels. By fitting kernel expressions to the corresponding sensor data, we are able to decompose the inherent structure of an anomaly and to describe its individual behavior such as linearity and periodicity by natural language. For this purpose, we make use of Gaussian processes [20] and the Compositional Kernel Search model [11]. We carry out our analysis on the recently proposed IoT dataset [5], a real-world industry 4.0 dataset, which has been collected within the EU project MONSOON¹. To sum up, we make the following contributions:

- We propose a machine-learning-based method in order to model anomalies and to describe their inherent components.
- We enrich the MONSOON IoT dataset with a novel ground truth derived from domain experts in order to further stimulate research of anomaly detection algorithms on this real-world dataset.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline related work. In Section 3, we briefly introduce Gaussian processes and their application to adapt kernel expressions to sensor data. The preliminary results of our proposed method are reported and discussed in Section 4, before we conclude our paper with an outlook on future research directions in Section 5.

2 RELATED WORK

Strongly related to our approach are anomaly detection algorithms. There is a plethora of these algorithms including Z-Score [10], Mahalanobis Distance-Based, Empirical Covariance Estimation [18] [9], Mahalanobis Distance-Based, Robust Covariance Estimation [22] [9], Subspace-based PCA Anomaly Detector [9], One-Class SVM [23] [18] [9] [12], Isolation Forest (I-Forest) [16] [18], Gaussian Mixture Model [18] [9] [19], Deep Auto-Encoder [8], Local Outlier Factor [7] [18] [9] [1], Least Squares Anomaly Detector [24], GADPL [14] and k-nearest Neighbour [13] [1] [12].

While these algorithms are all possible options for anomaly detection, as shown in different surveys such as [13], [19] and [9], they are not directly suited for describing the inherent structure of anomalies, which is the major focus of this paper. We choose the means of Gaussian processes for anomaly description due to their capability to not only gather statistical indicators, but deliver the very characteristics of specific anomalous behavior from the data [20].

For describing these characteristics, Lloyd et al. [17] have proposed the Automatic Bayesian Covariance Discovery System that adapts the Compositional Kernel Search Algorithm [11] by

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¹www.spire2030.eu/monsoon



Figure 1: An example of the MONSOON IoT dataset with three anomalies.

adding intuitive natural language descriptions of the function classes described by their models. In [15], these models are expanded to discover kernel structures which are able to explain multiple time series at once.

In this work, we make use of these algorithms in order to describe the inherent structures of anomalies, as shown in the following section.

3 GAUSSIAN PROCESSES

In this section, we describe the analysis of anomalies in sensor data via Gaussian processes. To this end, we assume the sensor data to be univariate² and an anomaly *A* to be a finite subsequence of timestamp-value pairs $A = \{(t_i, v_i)\}_{i=i}^n$ with timestamps $t_i \in \mathbb{T}$ and values $v_i \in \mathbb{R}$.

As we do not know in advance the number of values and the distances between individual timestamps, we can also thought of an anomaly *A* as a mathematical function $A : \mathbb{T} \to \mathbb{R}$, which assigns every timestamp $t \in \mathbb{T}$ a real-valued value $v(t) \in \mathbb{R}$. By considering the individual values v(t) to be random variables following a Gaussian distribution, we can formalize the Gaussian process as

$v(t) \sim GP(m(t), k(t, t')),$

where $m(t) = \mathbb{E}[v(t)]$ is the mean function and $k(t, t') = \mathbb{E}[(v(t) - m(t)) \cdot (v(t') - m(t'))]$ is the covariance function $k : \mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T} \to \mathbb{R}$. In other words, a Gaussian process is a stochastic process over random variables, where every subset of random variables from the Gaussian process follows a normal distribution. The distribution of the Gaussian process is the joint distribution of all of these random variables and it is thus a probability distribution over (the space of) functions in $\mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{T}}$.

While the covariance function k defined above is a general way to model the behavior of data, we aim to describe each anomaly A by its own covariance function k_A . That is, we aim to learn a covariance function k_A , which is then also denoted as kernel expression in the domain of machine learning, by fitting combinations of well-known kernels, such as

- the constant kernel $k_{\mathcal{C}}(t, t') = \lambda \in \mathbb{R}$,
- the linear kernel $k_{\text{LIN}}(t, t') = (t l) \cdot (t' l)$,
- the squared exponential kernel k_{SE}(t, t') = exp \frac{|t-t'|^2}{2l^2},
 or the periodic kernel k_{PER}(t, t') = exp \frac{2 \sin^2 \frac{t-t'}{2}}{l^2}.

In order to individually fit a kernel expression to each anomaly based on the aforementioned kernels, we use the compositional kernel model, as utilized for instance in [17]. This allows us to decompose an anomaly into individual components, which can be ranked by their contribution towards explaining the data. As an

Anomaly	BIC	Kernel Expression
0	-799	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER$
1	-706	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*SE + C$
2	-604	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C$
3	-921	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*PER + C$
4	-742	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}SE + C$
5	-543	$C^*SE^*LIN + C^*SE + C^*WN + C$
6	-630	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*WN + C$
7	-1020	$C^*PER + C^*PER + C^*PER + C^*SE + C$
8	-762	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*PER + C$
9	-1025	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}SE + C$
10	-424	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*SE$
11	-849	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}SE + C$
12	-311	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*PER + C$
13	-860	$C^{*}LIN + C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C$
14	-339	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*SE$
15	-590	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*PER + C^*SE$
16	-503	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C$
17	-602	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*SE + C^*WN + C$
18	-545	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*SE + C$
19	-804	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*WN + C$
20	-281	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*SE$
21	-426	$C^*PER + C^*PER + C^*SE$
22	-425	C*SE*PER + C*PER + C*SE
23	-975	$C^*SE^*PER + C^*PER + C$
24	-1181	C*PER*LIN + C*PER + C*SE
25	-880	C*PER*PER + C*PER + C*PER + C
26	-455	$C^{*}PER + C^{*}PER + C^{*}SE$
27	-542	$C^*PER + C^*SE + C^*SE$

Table 1: Discovered kernel structures and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the encountered 28 anomalies.

example, an anomaly A with a highly weighted linear kernel k_{LIN} indicates a hidden linearity component while a highly weighted periodic kernel k_{PER} indicates an inherent periodicity in the anomaly.

The resulting kernel expressions are reported and discussed in the next section.

4 PRELIMINARY RESULTS

In this section, we report and discuss the results of our preliminary performance evaluation. For this purpose, we use the recently introduced MONSOON IoT dataset [5] which comprises 357,383 data records in total. This dataset is based on a real production line of coffee capsules and the attribute under observation is the plastification time, that is the time which is needed to melt

²It is noteworthy that this approach also applies to multivariate data.

(plastify) the plastic melt for the actual injection molding cycle. More information about this process can be found in [3].

An overview of this attribute value, i.e. the pastification time, as a function of the cycle number is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen in the figure, while the normal plastification time is at approximately 4.2 seconds, it drops down to less then 3 seconds in case of an anomaly. Supported by domain experts, we figured out 28 anomalies in total in this dataset, of which three are shown in the above figure.

In the first series of experiments, we computed the best fitting kernel expressions by means of the ABCD algorithm. The results are shown in Table 1 for each anomaly. Together with the kernel expression of the corresponding anomaly, we also show the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value which models the trade-off between model accuracy and size. As can be seen in the table, all anomalies are well described by their corresponding kernel expression (lower BIC values indicate better fit and vice versa). Surprisingly many kernel expressions do not show a linear component k_{LIN} , although some anomalies clearly show this linear tendency. We figure out that this is due to overfitting of the kernel expression in the ABCD algorithm. We aim to address this issue in future research.

In the second series of experiments, we evaluated how suitable a kernel expression of a certain anomaly fits to other anomalies. The results in form of the corresponding BIC values are summarized in Table 2. As can be seen in this table, kernel expressions of a certain anomaly do in general not fit to other anomalies. One reason for this behavior is the high degree of idiosyncrasy of the anomalies. Another reason might be the overfitting issue mentioned above.

To sum up, we have investigated the potential of describing anomalies in IoT sensor data by means of kernel expressions. Our preliminary results indicate that our proposal is well suited for this purpose. As one major challenge, we figure out that the problem of overfitting needs to be addressed in future research.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have addressed the problem of discovering the inherent structures of anomalies arising in IoT sensor data. To this end, we have proposed to model and describe anomalies by means of kernel expressions, which are combinations of well-known kernels. The results of our empirical analysis show that our proposal is suitable for modeling differently structured anomalies. Moreover, the results indicate that Gaussian processes provide a powerful tool for future algorithmic investigations of IoT sensor data.

In future work, we aim to address the problem of overfitting by modifying the grammar used within the ABCD algorithm for computing the kernel expressions. In addition, we aim to further develop our proposal in order to not only describe anomalies but also detect anomalies (which is not the focus of the current paper). For this purpose, we aim to measure similarity in IoT sensor data by incorporating Gaussian processes into adaptive distance-based similarity models, such as the Signature Matching Distance [6], and query processing algorithms [2, 4].

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27	2 -410	2 -524	3 -515	7 -507	7 -360	1 -522	4 -498	4 -513	6 -543	7 -516	2 5048	3 -511	6 8797	7 -545	3 7290	2 -531	2171	3 -509	0 1030	5 -411	4 9165	8 -468	6 -485	8 -523	-438	5 -513	5 792	7 -542
26	1 -24	-45	-46	-39	-43	-46	-45	-43	-45	-41	5 185	-39	4 757	-47	6 553	-46	1 216	-40	4 -43	-30	4 530	-40	-44	-43	508	-42	0 -45	-43
25	2246	-849	-542	-781	1311	-862	-818	-812	-311	-833	1628	1179	1440	-824	1007	4823	1616	-879	1015	1062	1655	5462	406	-853	461	-880	1029	1034
24	85201	-1008	328	-524	733	-1008	-948	679-	1396	-1030	16334	3229	3 10761	-766	8431	2919	12135	-1073	6388	610	l 15040	4675	647	-798	-1181	-942	5359	8193
23	26246	-922	25	-826	1452	-113	-866	-901	1284	-942	15147	4963	10828	-868	8695	3514	9877	-940	6903	666	14474	4740	819	-975	781	-326	7871	7497
22	212	-310	-423	-150	72	-425	-425	-165	-316	-245	22641	-97	20507	-302	17287	-341	21613	-294	11217	57	20454	6228	-425	-180	461	-190	15764	7129
21	429	-271	-417	-81	232	-413	-415	-124	-308	-188	27159	-26	23140	-315	19687	-320	18906	146	10539	198	34709	-426	-413	-124	80	-127	15172	-231
20	299	-169	-269	-41	-47	-262	-269	-105	-228	-150	-280	-44	12974	-195	3996	-212	-224	-97	-85	127	-281	-259	-251	-69	35	- 77	-185	-151
19	-74	-783	-732	-825	-825	-748	-711	797-	-790	-796	6690	-843	3580	-825	3175	-740	5836	-813	1630	-804	9121	632	-545	-842	866	-809	1934	1349
18	-453	-536	-518	-534	-554	-364	-505	-532	-552	-531	1186	-525	5856	-560	4713	-536	1180	-524	-545	-467	4203	-458	-504	-551	497	-532	439	-535
17	1010	-453	-552	-370	-347	-564	-555	-386	-514	-417	16475	-369	8959	-471	13876	-486	15531	-602	12023	-188	15564	1939	-37	-388	802	-387	12148	6945
16	-336	-456	-471	-448	-517	-481	-467	-443	-473	-445	744	-453	6864	-495	3486	-464	-503	-488	-431	-313	2244	-410	-459	-446	494	-438	-450	-455
15	768	-540	-586	-451	180	-574	-576	-470	-521	-524	14360	-366	22502	-553	12064	-590	18424	-157	10184	-67	13959	7729	392	-487	412	-433	13738	9626
14	-138	-334	-339	-315	-359	-343	-336	-308	-339	-315	-321	-282	2792	-349	-339	-334	-344	-353	-305	-237	-319	-300	-334	-318	496	-302	-322	-318
13	14637	-775	507	244	960	-837	-803	-690	1808	-739	21496	5682	19649	-860	16934	1571	18458	-826	11521	863	24654	5298	807	-757	141	304	9810	9651
12	-290	-291	-266	-304	-317	-278	-265	-289	-295	-295	-256	-308	-311	-298	-286	-284	-304	-293	-289	-257	-257	-232	-261	-305	295	-290	-280	-294
11	4323	-780	-745	-819	-178	-762	-727	-786	-799	-789	8490	-849	7084	-807	4633	109	8375	-795	3878	-205	6279	2186	-205	-828	972	-773	6449	5189
10	19	-323	-369	-220	-188	-340	-353	-280	-346	-295	-424	-205	12444	-338	10135	-349	-353	-152	-273	-53	8444	-348	-330	-254	34	-269	-335	-325
6	201580	-1003	1050	656	2158	-988	-955	-605	3202	-1025	23668	4547	12678	-44	11941	4590	9764	-1057	8144	1111	22178	6198	897	-615	1209	1530	11777	9609
8	12783	-705	-741	-634	2069	-726	-711	-610	-762	-680	17842	1813	15087	-707	15353	3848	15094	-724	6420	1317	15895	7569	419	-687	652	-616	13005	12860
7	104642	-973	1261	1428	1161	-1012	-942	-1020	4043	-949	21496	16915	13649	-531	11292	2757	23901	-1034	11202	595	22105	8595	473	-699	610	1349	10486	11450
9	60870	-384	12783	-131	8272	-596	-630	40	26932	-321	42825	38575	43440	-274	39816	25790	46105	-253	31476	8137	45911	25113	5830	-189	938	-99	43508	35339
C	15065	-427	-522	-252	-188	-543	-519	-277	-435	-353	28200	-275	20436	-390	17399	-460	22063	-192	13235	-70	32643	6647	1187	-337	386	-274	14088	8295
4	1493	-613	-650	-575	-742	-664	-645	-571	-654	-603	9764	-613	10581	-661	10540	-648	6465	-687	2545	-303	14644	844	212	-622	833	-589	4124	2295
3	15859	-874	-307	-921	510	-861	-812	-879	-37	-876	11743	4123	8404	-897	5692	2896	7627	-883	4008	-26	15472	2677	422	-922	-307	-860	5935	4425
2	41283	-371	-604	-49	8037	-603	-598	-203	-251	-341	39634	35152	43065	-329	34307	18892	45060	43	30046	4854	53438	22082	4611	-188	108	-171	32787	32689
1	7434	-706	-706	-689	64	-712	-690	-628	-695	-676	17963	-264	12806	-690	10272	-142	16636	-706	8646	595	22702	6959	618	-690	618	-648	9489	10101
0	-799	- 069-	-644	-746	-757	-664	-630	-710	-705	-707	1100	-768	3497	-725	782	-682	841	-728	239	-666	1073	167	-550	-740	749	-721	108	188
H Kernel	0 0	 e	∾ 2:	ο Εν	4	ი In	9 at	⊳ io	∞ n	° of	01 10	11 12 10	21 B	JI	14 14	15	16	11	v .	61 61	20	21 51	22 1 0	23	24	25	56 126	27

Table 2: Evaluation of the BIC for every kernel expressionagainst every anomaly.

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