

I Want the Opposite of What You Want: Summary of a Study on the Reduction of Fixed-Pie Perceptions in Online Negotiations

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Abstract. Negotiating is a complex task in which negotiators typically try to maximize their own interests without realizing that most conflict situations contain potential for solutions that benefit both parties involved in the dispute. It seems that negotiators typically refrain from exchanging and processing information about their own and the opponent's interests which results in the erroneous belief that their interests are diametrically opposed. These fixed-pie perceptions often impede integrative agreements. According to the negotiation literature, several techniques improve negotiations. In order to test whether these negotiation strategies actually contribute to a reduction in fixed-pie perceptions and hence result in more effective conflict resolution, two experiments have been conducted. The results demonstrate that people reduce their fixed-pie perceptions over the course of a negotiation. This effect seems to be the result of the negotiation itself rather than the negotiation techniques. However, providing negotiators with a negotiation technique was found to lead to an increase in the likelihood of achieving an agreement. The implementation of negotiation techniques in an online environment, the most important findings of the two studies as well as their implications are summarized in the present paper.

Keywords. Online dispute resolution, fixed-pie perception, integrative agreement, negotiation techniques

Introduction

Online dispute resolution (ODR) is an alternative to traditional dispute resolution procedures. It involves two or more parties negotiating by electronic means in order to reach an agreement online. The main advantage of ODR is simplicity as it saves both temporal and monetary costs. People who resolve their disputes online do not have to travel or attend meetings, but can simply negotiate from their computers at home. Sceptics of ODR argue that it is less powerful than face-to-face negotiations since the absence of non-verbal cues interferes with an understanding of the other party's interests which in turn decreases the likelihood of obtaining an integrative agreement [1]. Another problem inherent in both online and offline negotiations refers to the fact

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that negotiation situations are complex and negotiators have limited information-processing capacities which often results in a failure to obtain an optimal outcome. One of these cognitive limitations concerns negotiators' limited perception of potential solutions for a conflict. Negotiators typically seem to believe that the interests of the opposing party are diametrically opposed to their own. These fixed-pie perceptions were identified as a major cause of ineffective conflict resolution and seem to be relatively resistant to change [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In contrast to what negotiators typically seem to believe, most conflict situations contain potential for solutions that benefit both parties involved in the conflict instead of favouring one party at the expense of the other. Integrative agreements can be reached by taking the different patterns of priorities of opposing negotiators into account in order to obtain an outcome that is beneficial to both parties. It has been suggested that a reduction in fixed-pie perception increases the likelihood of achieving an integrative agreement [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].

Key to integrative negotiation is to identify the interests of the other party thereby realizing that they may not be opposed to one's own interests. Several negotiation techniques have been proposed in the negotiation literature that are believed to aid bargainers in decreasing their fixed-pie perceptions and achieving an integrative agreement. These strategies include "expanding the pie", "logrolling", "non-specific compensation", "cost cutting", and "bridging"² [6, 7, 10]. While these techniques have the common goal of generating integrative agreements, the manner in which they achieve this differs. The "expanding the pie" technique includes resources being added in such a way that there are more possible solutions and both parties can achieve their objectives. The "logrolling" strategy refers to both parties exchanging information about their preferences on the resources to be divided. It is thereby assumed to increase willingness to concede on those issues that are of less priority. "Non-specific compensation" means that incentives are given independent from the resources that have to be divided in order to allow one party to obtain his objectives and pay off the other party for giving in. The fourth negotiation technique is "cost cutting", which includes one party achieving her objectives while the other party's costs to go along are reduced. Another technique that is not specifically discussed as a negotiation strategy, but that is nevertheless assumed to improve negotiations refers to knowing one's best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA). Knowing one's BATNA may contribute to the acknowledgement that a disagreement may be disadvantageous. Research has demonstrated that people become more interested in finding a settlement than trying to maximise their own benefit when there is a credible threat of disagreement [8, 11]. While the BATNA does not by itself influence this perception, more effort may be put into finding a solution when a possible settlement is better than an individual's BATNA. With regard to ODR, some of these negotiation techniques are already used in order to facilitate online negotiations. For instance, logrolling is applied in the family_winner system [12] and in Smartsettle (www.smartsettle.com).

The theoretical assumptions that underlie these negotiation techniques are that they require both parties to engage in a meaningful exchange of information about their interests which is supposed to result in an improved understanding of each other's interests. It is assumed that this leads to more integrative agreements [6]. Hence, negotiators who are provided with a negotiation strategy subsequently understand their opponent's priorities which enables them to reduce their fixed-pie perceptions and

² Since bridging turned out to be difficult to implement in an experimental context, it was not included as a negotiation strategy in the present study, and it is therefore not discussed in more detail in this paper.

obtain an integrative agreement. Research on information availability and information processing in negotiations has shown that fixed-pie perceptions can indeed be decreased by an increase in information exchange and information processing [3, 4, 5, 13]. Apparently, negotiators often fail to exchange and accurately process information about interests and preferences which consequently results in a fixed-pie perception and a decreased likelihood of obtaining an agreement. Since little effort has been put into empirically validating the effectiveness of the above described negotiation strategies, it is unknown whether negotiators benefit from receiving a negotiation strategy both in an online and offline environment. Therefore, the above described negotiation techniques have been implemented in an online negotiation environment in order to test their usefulness in terms of a reduction in fixed-pie perceptions and an increase in the likelihood of obtaining an agreement. The set-up of the two experiments that have been conducted, the most important results as well as the consequences and practical implications of these findings are discussed in the following sections.

2. Experiments

Two experiments, in which participants had to negotiate several issues in an online environment, were conducted in order to explore whether providing negotiators with a negotiation strategy contributes to a decrease in fixed-pie perceptions and an increase in the likelihood of obtaining an agreement.

2.1 Experiment 1

The first experiment was conducted to test whether people revise their fixed-pie perceptions when they receive one of the following negotiation strategies: (1) expanding the pie, (2) logrolling, (3) non-specific compensation, (4) cost cutting, or (5) knowing one's BATNA. A control group was included in order to measure whether negotiators who receive a negotiation strategy revise their fixed-pie perceptions to a greater extent than negotiators who do not receive any instructions. The main hypotheses were that (1) negotiators revise their fixed-pie perception during the course of a negotiation, and that (2) negotiators who receive a negotiation strategy are more likely to revise their fixed-pie perceptions than negotiators who do not receive a negotiation strategy. It was furthermore tested whether people reach more agreements when they receive a negotiation strategy.

The experiment took place in a room that was equipped with computers. 84 students of Tilburg University participated in the first experiment. They were randomly assigned to one of the conditions (control, expanding the pie, logrolling, non-specific compensation, cost cutting, knowing one's BATNA) and were told that they should imagine they wanted to purchase a computer and had to negotiate the price, warranty and delivery time of the computer with the seller (see table 1). The negotiation task that was used in the present experiment was similar to negotiation tasks used in prior research [2, 3, 5]. The negotiation took place via a computer. The participants' opponent, i.e. the seller of the computer, was not an actual person but his actions were dictated by a computer. Participants were told that they should use their payoff schedule in order to obtain an outcome that is most favourable to them in terms of points on the three issues to be negotiated. As can be seen in the payoff schedule presented in table 1, the best deal for the buyer is 9-9-9, for a total outcome of 1000

points, while the least favourable outcome is 1-1-1, for a total outcome of 0 points. Participants were only provided with their own payoff schedule and did not know the preferences of the other party. Participants were not allowed to communicate during the completion of the negotiation task and were informed that the negotiation would continue for seven rounds after which it would be terminated regardless of whether or not they had obtained an agreement. They were told that if they failed to reach an agreement with the other party, they would obtain no points. Additionally, subjects were informed that one iPod was allotted amongst all participants and two additional ones amongst those who reached the highest amount of points. Not obtaining an agreement would therefore decrease their chances of winning an iPod. This incentive was believed to assure that participants take the negotiation task seriously, try to maximise their points and try to reach an agreement. Participants were informed that the seller (i.e. the computer program) makes the first offer and that they had to either accept it or place a new offer. The negotiation continued until the buyer made an offer that equalled or exceeded the seller's offer or until the seventh negotiation round had been completed.

Table 1. Negotiator's payoff schedule for computer negotiation task (adopted from Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004).

Level	Price of computer		Warranty period		Delivery time	
	Price	Payoff	Warranty	Payoff	Time	Payoff
1	1500	0	1 month	0	9 weeks	0
2	1450	65	2 months	40	8 weeks	20
3	1400	130	3 months	80	7 weeks	40
4	1350	195	4 months	120	6 weeks	60
5	1300	260	5 months	160	5 weeks	80
6	1250	325	6 months	200	4 weeks	100
7	1200	390	7 months	240	3 weeks	120
8	1150	455	8 months	280	2 weeks	140
9	1100	520	9 months	320	1 week	160

The different negotiation strategies were operationalised as follows; in the “expanding the pie” condition, a fourth issue was added in order to create more possible solutions. Participants assigned to the “logrolling” condition were provided with information about the seller's preferences during the course of the negotiation. In the “non-specific compensation” condition, negotiators were provided with distinct gadgets of varying value to both the buyer and the seller. Subjects assigned to the “cost cutting” condition were told that the seller would deliver and assist in the installation of the computer if the buyer accepts the long delivery time. In the “BATNA” condition, negotiators were told that not obtaining an agreement would have the consequence that the buyer cannot buy the computer at the special offer price but instead will have to return the next day which would result in an increase in price. These pieces of information were presented throughout the course of the negotiation in order to make sure that participants understand and use it. The efficiency of the distinct negotiation techniques was measured by assessing participants' fixed-pie perceptions before and after the negotiation as well as by their ability to reach an agreement. Joint outcomes were measured by summing the points of the buyer and the seller on all three issues. If

participants failed to reach an agreement, this automatically resulted in a score of 0 points.

Table 2. Negotiator's (buyer) and opponent's (seller) payoff schedule for computer negotiation task (adopted from Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004).

Level	Price of computer		Warranty period		Delivery time		<i>Printer</i> ³	
	Price	Payoff	Warranty	Payoff	Time	Payoff	Type	Payoff
Buyer								
1	1500	0	1 month	0	9 weeks	0	Type A	0
2	1450	65	2 months	40	8 weeks	20	Type B	15
3	1400	130	3 months	80	7 weeks	40	Type C	30
4	1350	195	4 months	120	6 weeks	60	Type D	45
5	1300	260	5 months	160	5 weeks	80	Type E	60
6	1250	325	6 months	200	4 weeks	100	Type F	75
7	1200	390	7 months	240	3 weeks	120	Type G	90
8	1150	455	8 months	280	2 weeks	140	Type H	105
9	1100	520	9 months	320	1 week	160	Type I	120
Seller								
1	1500	160	1 month	320	9 weeks	520	Type A	120
2	1450	140	2 months	280	8 weeks	455	Type B	105
3	1400	120	3 months	240	7 weeks	390	Type C	90
4	1350	100	4 months	200	6 weeks	325	Type D	75
5	1300	80	5 months	160	5 weeks	260	Type E	60
6	1250	60	6 months	120	4 weeks	195	Type F	45
7	1200	40	7 months	80	3 weeks	130	Type G	30
8	1150	20	8 months	40	2 weeks	65	Type H	15
9	1100	0	9 months	0	1 week	0	Type I	0

2.1.1 Results

Of the 84 participants, 27 (32.1%) had a fixed-pie perception before the negotiation as opposed to 57 (67.9%) who perceived integrative potential before the negotiation. The number of participants who had a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation decreased to 14 (16.7%), while the number of participants who perceived integrative potential after the negotiation increased to 70 (83.3%). More precisely, of the 84 participants, 19 (22.6%) had improved from having a fixed-pie perception before the negotiation to perceiving integrative potential after the negotiation, 6 (7.1%) had no fixed-pie perception before and had a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation, and the remaining 59 (70.2%) had not changed their perception. This finding indicates that during the negotiation people revised their fixed-pie perception and correctly perceived integrative potential. The results of the first experiment furthermore show that negotiators who received a negotiation strategy were not more likely to revise their fixed-pie perception than negotiators who did not receive a negotiation strategy.

53 (63.1%) subjects reached an agreement while the remaining 31 (36.9%) subjects failed to reach an agreement. In the majority of the cases where an agreement

³ Note that the fourth issue (printer) is only provided to participants assigned to the "expanding the pie" condition.

was obtained (60.4%), it was obtained in the last, i.e. seventh round. Participants who obtained an agreement were found to make higher concessions in the last round than in the preceding rounds which may indicate that knowing that the negotiation would be interrupted after the seventh round regardless of whether or not they had obtained an agreement had an influence on their negotiation behaviour. This is an interesting finding, since participants knew beforehand that the negotiation would not exceed seven rounds and that they could increase their chances of winning an iPod if they obtained an agreement. The finding that the majority of the participants who obtained an agreement did so in the last round strongly suggests that participants were highly motivated to obtain an agreement in the last round in order to increase their chances of winning an iPod rather than because of an increased perception of integrative potential. In a follow-up experiment, participants should therefore not be informed about the number of rounds in order to exclude this effect on their behaviour. Nevertheless, this finding leads to the inference that time pressure might induce more cooperative negotiation behaviour.

The results furthermore demonstrate that whether or not a negotiator received a negotiation strategy and if so which negotiation strategy he was provided with did not increase the likelihood of obtaining an agreement. Furthermore, participants who did not have a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation were not more likely to obtain an agreement than those who still had a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation. This finding suggests that obtaining an agreement does not depend on whether or not a person perceives integrative potential in this particular context. This finding is not in line with previous research findings and it might at least in part be due to both a small number of participants and some of the negotiation strategies not being very distinctive.

Taken together, the results demonstrate that negotiators more often perceived integrative potential after the negotiation, and are hence able to revise their fixed-pie perceptions in the course of a negotiation. Apparently, negotiators had improved their understanding of the seller's preferences after the negotiation. However, this was the result of the negotiation itself rather than the negotiation strategies. Moreover, the effect of negotiation strategy on fixed-pie perceptions and the likelihood of obtaining an agreement seems to be less strong than hypothesised. Since some of the findings were not in accordance with previous research findings, a second experiment with a larger sample and several changes in the experimental set-up was conducted.

2.2 Experiment 2

The second experiment was designed to test whether people revise their fixed-pie perceptions when they receive one of the following negotiation strategies: (1) adding resources, (2) logrolling, or (3) knowing one's BATNA. Based on the research findings of the first experiment, it was hypothesised that negotiators revise their fixed-pie perception during the course of a negotiation. Despite the results of the first experiment, it was again tested whether negotiators who receive a negotiation strategy were more likely to revise their fixed-pie perceptions than negotiators who did not receive a negotiation strategy. As in the first experiment, a control group was included in order to measure whether negotiators who receive a negotiation instruction revise their fixed-pie perceptions to a greater extent than negotiators who do not receive any instructions, the underlying assumption being that a decrease in fixed-pie perception results in an increase in the likelihood of obtaining an agreement.

The negotiation strategies used in the second experiment were operationalised as follows; in the “adding resources” condition, negotiators received incentives that were added to the initial issues. This condition equals the “non-specific compensation” condition in the first experiment. The “expanding the pie”, the “non-specific compensation” and the “cost cutting” strategies are very similar to each other and it was therefore decided to group them together resulting in the “adding resources” condition. The “logrolling” condition of the second experiment was operationalised in the same way as in the first experiment, i.e. by providing subjects with information about the other party’s interests. The “BATNA” condition of the second experiment differs from the “BATNA” condition that had been used in the first study. Participants assigned to the “BATNA” condition were told that the negotiation would have seven rounds after which it would be terminated. Their BATNA was therefore that not obtaining an agreement would result in no points which would mean that they would not take part in the lottery for an iPod. The BATNA used in the second experiment is therefore a real and not an imagined outcome. Given the findings of the first study it is assumed that the first two negotiation strategies influence the likelihood of obtaining an agreement by reducing people’s fixed-pie perception whereas the BATNA strategy influences the likelihood of obtaining an agreement as a result of time pressure, i.e. an external motivation to obtain a valuable outcome. Moreover, knowing one’s BATNA was believed to lead to more agreements than either no or one of the other strategies. This is in line with the findings of the first experiment as well as previous research findings on the influence of time pressure on negotiation behaviour [17].

In the second experiment, the exact same procedure was used as in the first experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions. The negotiation task was the same as the one used in the first experiment and was similar to negotiation tasks used in prior research [2, 3, 5]. Again, subjects had to negotiate the price, warranty and delivery time of a computer. Participants were told that they have the role of the person who wants to purchase the computer. The seller’s actions were again dictated by a computer program using the same strategy as the one used in the first experiment. The payoff schedule used in this experiment is the same as the one that had been used in the first experiment (see table 1). It shows participants which outcomes are most favourable to them and does not provide any information about the preference structure of the other party. Participants were informed that the seller (i.e. the computer program) makes the first offer and that they will have to either accept it or place a new offer. The negotiation continued until the buyer made an offer that equalled or exceeded the seller’s offer or until the seventh negotiation round had been completed. Before the negotiation, subjects were informed that a price would be awarded to the individual who reaches the highest amount of points in the negotiation task and that subjects who failed to reach an agreement would not take part in the lottery. Unlike in the first experiment, participants were not informed about the number of negotiation rounds. Only participants in the “BATNA” condition received this information.

The effectiveness of the distinct negotiation techniques was measured by assessing participants’ fixed-pie perceptions before and after the negotiation, as well as by their ability to reach an agreement. Since the measure for fixed-pie perceptions used in the first experiment was found to be less accurate than assumed, two distinct measures were used to assess participants’ fixed-pie perceptions in the second experiment. In addition to participants’ fixed-pie perceptions before and after the negotiation, the

number of participants who obtained an agreement was measured. Joint outcomes were again measured by summing the points to the buyer and to the seller on all three issues.

2.2.1 Results

295 law students of Tilburg University participated in the study in exchange for course credit. 203 (68.8%) had a fixed-pie perception before the negotiation as measured with the new fixed-pie measure. This number is considerably higher than the number of participants who had a fixed-pie perception in the first experiment and is moreover similar to findings of other studies concerning the proportion of people who enter a negotiation with a fixed-pie perception [2, 4] which strongly suggests that this is a more accurate measure of people's fixed-pie perceptions in this context. Only 75 (25.4%) participants had a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation. Like in the first experiment, this finding indicates that during the negotiation people revised their fixed-pie perception and correctly perceived integrative potential. There was again no difference across the conditions in terms of perceiving integrative potential after the negotiation. This finding is in line with the results of the first experiment suggesting that negotiators who receive a negotiation strategy are not more likely to revise their fixed-pie perception than negotiators who do not receive a negotiation strategy.

109 (36.9%) subjects reached an agreement while the remaining 186 (63.1%) subjects failed to reach an agreement. In 49.5% of the cases where an agreement was obtained it was obtained in the last, i.e. seventh round. This is lower than the proportion of negotiators who obtained an agreement in the last round in the first experiment. Furthermore, the proportion of participants who obtained an agreement in the second experiment is considerably lower than in the first experiment (63.1% vs. 36.9%). This is believed to be the result of the fact that in the second experiment, negotiators were not informed about the number of negotiation rounds. The results of the second experiment therefore suggest that knowing the number of negotiation rounds, i.e. being exposed to time pressure, had a positive effect on the likelihood of obtaining an agreement. This finding is in accordance with the integration-before-differentiation hypothesis stating that negotiators' behaviour often becomes more cooperative if they fear that they might fail to obtain an agreement [8]. Being aware of the fact that the time to obtain an agreement is limited seems to have increased negotiators' awareness that obtaining an agreement is more favourable than failing to, which in turn seems to have led to a change in negotiation behaviour from more distributive to more problem-solving behaviour.

Subjects who received a negotiation strategy obtained an agreement more often than subjects who were not provided with a negotiation technique. Hence, receiving a negotiation technique improves negotiations in terms of leading to more agreements. In the first experiment this effect was not found which is most likely due to both a small number of participants and the finding that some of the negotiation strategies were not very distinctive. As expected, negotiators who knew their BATNA more often achieved an agreement than negotiators who received either no or one of the other two negotiation strategies. As previously mentioned, it seems that time pressure improves negotiations by increasing the likelihood of achieving an agreement. Interestingly, there was again no significant relation between whether or not someone obtained an agreement and fixed-pie perception after the negotiation. This finding is consistent with the results of the first experiment and suggests that obtaining an agreement does not necessarily depend on whether or not a person perceives integrative potential. In order

to further explore the relation between fixed-pie perception and agreement, the differences between the experimental groups were analysed in more detail. When considering all participants assigned to the experimental conditions, there was no significant difference in fixed-pie perceptions after the negotiation across the three groups. Hence, all the three negotiation techniques had an equal effect on the reduction of fixed-pie perceptions. In contrast, the effect differed for the three strategies when only participants who obtained an agreement were considered. Of those negotiators who obtained an agreement, more participants in the “BATNA” condition still had a fixed-pie perception after the negotiation than participants in the “adding resources” and the “logrolling” conditions.

Taken together, the results show that there is some overlap between the findings of the first and the second experiment. In accordance with the first experiment, one of the most important results of the second experiment refers to the fact that participants reduced their fixed-pie perceptions over the course of the negotiation. In contrast to what had been expected, this effect was again found to be due to the negotiation itself rather than the negotiation techniques. The effectiveness of the negotiation techniques in terms of reducing negotiators’ fixed-pie perception therefore seems to be limited. Since fixed-pie perceptions decreased across all conditions, it seems that the negotiation itself had at least some effect on negotiators’ understanding of their opponent’s interests. A possible explanation for this finding is that while both the negotiation itself and the strategies might have contributed to some awareness of the opponent’s interests, the strategies might not have motivated negotiators to process this information more systematically. As previously mentioned, more thorough information processing is a prerequisite for integrative negotiation [4, 5, 8]. Nevertheless, the results of the second study demonstrate that negotiation techniques are effective in leading to more agreements. The finding that negotiators who received a strategy were more likely to obtain an agreement shows that they have some potential in making negotiators aware of the fact that obtaining an agreement is typically more favourable than failing to reach an agreement. Apparently, a thorough understanding of the opponent’s preferences is not necessary in order to achieve an agreement. The findings of the second experiment therefore suggest that the effectiveness of negotiation strategies lies in their potential of motivating negotiators to realize that obtaining an agreement is desirable rather than in motivating them to engage in more information exchange and processing.

3. Discussion and Conclusion

An exploration of the effectiveness of integrative negotiation techniques that have been proposed in the literature, on fixed-pie perceptions and the likelihood of achieving an agreement has largely been ignored. The present paper summarizes the most important findings of two experiments that studied the implementation of negotiation techniques that are supposed to contribute to more integrative agreements to online negotiations in order to explore their usefulness. The findings demonstrate that while negotiators are able to revise their fixed-pie perceptions over the course of a negotiation, whether or not they are provided with a negotiation strategy had no effect on perceiving integrative potential. It may therefore be concluded that in contrast to what has been proposed, these strategies do not sufficiently contribute to an improvement in information exchange and especially more effortful and systematic processing of information about

interests. Nevertheless, the findings demonstrate that the strategies had an effect on the likelihood of obtaining an agreement. Moreover, it seems that a decrease in fixed-pie perceptions is not necessary in order to enable negotiators to obtain an agreement. The potential of the negotiation techniques therefore seems to lie in an increase in negotiators' awareness of the importance and desirability of obtaining an agreement rather than in implying a better understanding of the opponent's interests. Furthermore, the findings of the present study support previous research findings on the importance of time pressure on negotiation behaviour in terms of leading to more agreements. Clearly, more research on the effects of various negotiation techniques on negotiation behaviour seems beneficial. In addition, a more detailed exploration of negotiation behaviour seems valuable in order to gain more insights into aspects that affect the likelihood of obtaining an agreement without necessarily increasing the negotiator's understanding of the opponent's interests. One of the aspects that deserves more attention refers to providing negotiators with their BATNA and exposing them to other forms of time pressure.

With regard to implications for online negotiations, the findings of the present studies imply that increasing negotiators' awareness of the desirability of achieving an agreement can enhance their tendency to engage in more problem-solving behaviour. Apparently, this can be achieved by different means, e.g. by providing negotiators with their BATNA. Clearly, ODR practice would benefit from more research on the potential benefits of time pressure, in terms of nearness to a deadline, on negotiation behaviour in an online environment. While providing negotiators with incentives independent from the resources that have to be divided as well as providing them with information about the opponent's preferences led to more agreements in online negotiations, providing them with their BATNA was most effective. From a practical point of view, the findings of the present studies have important implications that may lead to more agreements in online negotiations.

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