1. Inflation Targeting in the United Kingdom: Is there evidence for Asymmetric Preferences?. (2020). Srinivasan, Naveen ; Kayal, Parthajit.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:mad:wpaper:2020-196.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. El esquema de objetivos de inflación: Evidencia para América Latina (1999-2015). (2017). Barros-Campello, Esther ; Pateiro-Lopez, Carlos ; Salcines-Cristal, Venancio J ; Pateiro-Rodriguez, Carlos.
   In: Estudios de Economia.
   RePEc:udc:esteco:v:44:y:2017:i:2:p:97-124.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. El esquema de objetivos de inflación: Evidencia para América Latina (1999-2015). (2017). Barros-Campello, Esther ; Pateiro-Lopez, Carlos ; Salcines-Cristal, Venancio J ; Pateiro-Rodriguez, Carlos.
   In: Estudios de Economia.
   RePEc:udc:esteco:v:44:y:2017:i:2:p:223-250.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences. (2011). Puy, M. Socorro ; Martínez-Mora, Francisco ; Martinez-Mora, Francisco .
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2011-03.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Asymmetric central banks preference and inflation rate in Jordan. (2009). Sweidan, Osama.
   In: Studies in Economics and Finance.
   RePEc:eme:sefpps:v:26:y:2009:i:4:p:232-245.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Asymmetry in Monetary Policy: An Asymmetric Objective Function and a New-Keynesian Model. (2007). Nagar, Weitzman.
   In: Bank of Israel Working Papers.
   RePEc:boi:wpaper:2007.02.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Estimating Central Banks preferences from a time-varying empirical reaction function. (2006). Assenmacher, Katrin.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:50:y:2006:i:8:p:1951-1974.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Bias in Federal Reserve Inflation Forecasts: Is the Federal Reserve Irrational or Just Cautious?. (2005). Capistrán, Carlos ; Capistrn-Carmona, Carlos.
   In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2005.
   RePEc:sce:scecf5:127.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences. (2004). Surico, Paolo.
   In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2004.
   RePEc:sce:scecf4:108.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences. (2003). Surico, Paolo.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0210002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. The macroeconomic Loss Function: a Critical Note. (2003). Mayer, Thomas.
    In: Applied Economics Letters.
    RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:10:y:2003:i:6:p:347-349.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model. (2002). Castelnuovo, Efrem.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0211006.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make? - commentary. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2002:i:jul:p:37-46:n:v.84no.4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. The Inflation Forecast and the Loss Function. (2002). Svensson, Lars.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3365.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Inflation Expectations and Learning about Monetary Policy. (2002). Moran, Kevin ; Hendry, Scott ; Andolfatto, David.
    In: Staff Working Papers.
    RePEc:bca:bocawp:02-30.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. A Prudent Central Banker. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-07.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Bai, J. and Ng. 5. (1998), A Test for Conditional Symmetry in Time Series Models, Boston College, Mi'meo.

2. Barro, R. and Gordon, D. (1983), A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, Journal of Political Economy, 91: 589-6 10.

3. Beetsma, R. and Jensen, H. (1998), Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30: 384:403.

4. Bernanke, B. S. and Mishkin, F. 5. (1997), Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11: 97-116.

5. Bernanke, B. S., Laubach, T., Mishkin, F. S., and Posen, A. 5. (1999), Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

6. Blinder, A. 5. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, The MIT Press: Cambridge.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

7. Campbell, J. Y. and Perron, P. (1991), Pitfalls and Opportunities: What Macroeconomists Should Know About Unit Roots, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 6: 141-200.

8. Christoffersen, P. F. and Diebold, F. X. (1997), Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss, Econometric Theory, 13: 808-817.

9. Clarida, R. and Gertler, M. (1997), How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy, in Reducing Inflation, edited by D. Romer. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

10. Clarida, R., Gall, J., and Gertler, M. (1999), The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 1661-1707.

11. Cukierman, A. (2000), The Inflation Bias Result Revisited , Tel-Aviv University, Mi'meo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

12. Eijffinger, S. C. W., Hoeberichts, M., and Schaling, E. (2000), Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Uncertainty and Mystique, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 32: 218-235.

13. Engle, R. F. (1982), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation, Econometrica, 50: 987-1007.

14. Epstein, L. and Zin, 5. (1989), Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework, Econometrica 57: 937969.

15. Fischer, 5. (1994), Modern Central Banking, in The Nature of Central Banking, edited by F. Capie, C. Goodhart, S. Fischer, and N. Schnadt. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
16. Friedman, M. (1968), The Role of Monetary Policy, American Economic Review, 58: 1-17.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

17. Gerlach, 5. (1999), Who Targets Inflation Explicitly?, European Economie Review 43: 1257-1277.

18. Goldfajn, I. and Vald
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

19. Granger, C. W. J. and Pesaran, M. H. (1996), A Decision Theoretic Approach to Forecast Evaluation, University of Cambridge, DAE Working Paper No. 9618.

20. Green, J. H. (1996), Inflation Targeting: Theory and Implications, IMF Staff Papers, 43: 779-795.

21. Gul, F. (1991), A Theory of Disappointment Aversion, Econometrica 59: 667-686.

22. Hamilton, J. D. (1983), Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II, Journal of Political Economy, 91: 228-248.

23. Hamilton, J. D. (1994), Time Series Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
24. Harvey, A. C. (1981), Time Series Models, Philip Allan Publishers Limited: Oxford.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

25. Ireland, P. N. (1999), Does the Time-Consistency Problem Explain the Behavior of Inflation in the United States?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 44: 279-292.

26. Judd, K. L. (1998), Numerical Methods in Economics, MIT Press: Cambridge.

27. King, M. (1996), How Should Central Banks Reduce Inflation: Conceptual Issues in Achieving Price Stability, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

28. Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. (1977), Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy, 85: 473-490.

29. Lafrance, R. (1997), An Overview of the Monetary Frameworks of Four InflationTargeting Countries, Bank of Canada, Mi'meo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

30. Lockwood, B. and Philippopoulos, A. (1994), Insider Power, Unemployment Dynamics and Multiple Inflation Equilibria, Economica, 61: 59-77.

31. Lucas, R. E. (1972), Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, Journal of Economic Theory, 4: 103-124

32. Lucas, R. E. (1973), Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs, American Economic Review, 63: 326-334.

33. McCallum, B. T. (1995), Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 85: 201-211.

34. McCallum, B. T. (1997), Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39: 99-112.

35. Muscatelli, V. A. (1999), Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers, Economica, 66: 241-254.

36. Nobay, R. A. and Peel, D. A. (1998), Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences, London School of Economics, Mi'meo.

37. Nobay, R. A. and Peel, D. A. (2000), Optimal Monetary Policy with a Nonlinear Phillips Curve, Economics Letters, 67: 159-164.

38. Orphanides, A. and Wilcox, D. W. (1996), The Opportunistic Approach to Disinflation, Federal Reserve Board, Mi'meo.

39. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy, in Handbook of Macroeconomics, edited by J. Taylor and M. Woodford. North-Holland: Amsterdam.

40. Pesaran, M. H. and Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (1999), Analysis of Exchange Rate Target Zones Using a Limited-Dependent Rational-Expectations Model with Jumps, Journal of Business and Economics Statistics, 17: 50-66.

41. Rogoff, K. (1985), The Optimal Degree of Commitment to a Monetary Target, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100: 1169-1190.

42. Romer, D. (1996), Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill: New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

43. Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2000), The Inflation Bias when the Central Banker Targets the Natural Rate of Unemployment, University of Montreal, Mi'meo.

44. Shimer, R. (1998), Why is the U.S. UnemploymentRate so Much Lower?, NBER Macroeconomics Annual: 33-49.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

45. Staiger, D., Stock, J. H., and Watson, M. W. (1997), The NAIRU, Unemployment and Monetary Policy, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11

46. Svensson, L. E. 0. (1997), Optimal Inflation Targets, Conservative Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts, American Economic Review, 87: 98-114.

47. Svensson, L. E. 0. (1999), Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule, Journal of Monetary Economics, 43: 607-654.

48. Tetlow, R. J. (1999), Inflation Targeting and Target Instability, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mi'meo.

49. Tootell, G. M. B. (1994), Restructuring, the NAIRU, and the Phillips Curve, New England Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, September/October: 31-44..

50. Varian, H. (1974), A Bayesian Approach to Real Estate Assessment, in Studies in Bayesian Economics in Honour of L. J. Savage, edited by S. E. Feinberg and A Zellner. Noth-Holland: Amsterdam.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

51. Walsh, C. (1995), Optimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers, American Economic Review, 85: 150-167.

52. Walsh, C. (1998), Monetary Theory and Policy, The MIT Press: Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
53. Weiner, S. E. (1993), The Natural Rate and Inflationary Preasures, Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 79: 5-9.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

54. White, H. (1982), Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models, Econo`metrica, 50: 1-25.

55. Zellner, A. (1992), Bayesian Estimation and Prediction Using Asymmetric Loss Functions, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 81: 446-451.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

1. How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?. (2007). Woodford, Michael.
   In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001419.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. La crédibilité de la banque centrale face aux défis de la monnaie électronique. (2007). HAMDI, Helmi ; Bougi, Gilbert .
   In: CAE Working Papers.
   RePEc:cgm:wpaper:56.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Endogenous Stabilization in Open Democracies. (2006). Kiefer, David.
   In: Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah.
   RePEc:uta:papers:2006_01.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Algunos criterios para evaluar una meta de inflación de largo plazo. (2006). López, Martha ; Lopez, Martha .
   In: Borradores de Economia.
   RePEc:bdr:borrec:386.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. The Cause of the Great Inflation: Interactions between the Government and the Monetary Policymakers. (2005). Harashima, Taiji.
   In: Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0510026.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Latin American Central Bank Reform: Progress and Challenges. (2005). Jácome, Luis ; Carstens, Agustin ; Luis I. Jacome H., .
   In: Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0509022.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Monetary and Fiscal Interactions without Commitment and the Value of Monetary Conservatism. (2005). Billi, Roberto ; Adam, Klaus.
   In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2005.
   RePEc:sce:scecf5:62.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Monetary Concequences of Alternative Fiscal Policy Rules. (2005). Railavo, Jukka .
   In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2005.
   RePEc:sce:scecf5:145.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer. (2005). Comin, Diego ; Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol.
   In: Departmental Working Papers.
   RePEc:rut:rutres:200501.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Inflation Targeting in India: Issues and Prospects. (2005). Jha, Raghbendra.
    In: ASARC Working Papers.
    RePEc:pas:asarcc:2005-04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Trade union density and inflation performance: evidence from OECD panel data. (2005). Nunziata, Luca ; Bowdler, Christopher.
    In: Marco Fanno Working Papers.
    RePEc:pad:wpaper:0009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11792.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Testing out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer. (2005). Comin, Diego ; Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11110.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
    In: The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Great expectations and the end of the depression. (2005). Eggertsson, Gauti.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:234.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Establishing credibility: evolving perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:231.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Does the time inconsistency problem make flexible exchange rates look worse than you think?. (2005). Bodenstein, Martin ; Armenter, Roc.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:230.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Can U.S. monetary policy fall (again) into an expectation trap?. (2005). Bodenstein, Martin ; Armenter, Roc.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:229.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Changes in the Federal Reserves inflation target: causes and consequences. (2005). Ireland, Peter.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:05-13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0557.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. INFLATION TARGET ZONES AS A COMMITMENT MECHANISM. (2005). Schwartzman, Felipe.
    In: Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2005:038.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Monetary Policy under Imperfect Commitment : Reconciling Theory with Evidence. (2004). Kara, Hakan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:tcb:wpaper:0415.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Lost Decade in Translation: Did the US Learn from Japans Post-Bubble Mistakes?. (2004). Kuttner, Kenneth ; Harrigan, James.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10938.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Fiscal policy and inflation volatility. (2004). Backe, Peter.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2004317.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Perspektiven und Grenzen der Verwendung geldpolitischer Regeln. (2004). Fendel, Ralf.
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:169-192.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters. (2003). Lippi, Francesco.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Speculative Attacks. (2003). Cukierman, Alex ; Goldstein, Itay ; Spiegel, Yossef .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3714.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Recession Aversion, Output and the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon Model. (2003). Gerlach, Stefan.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3687.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Independência e autonomia do Banco Central: mais sobre o debate [Central Bank independence and autonomy: more on this debate]. (2003). Jayme Jr, Frederico ; Crocco, Marco.
    In: Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG.
    RePEc:cdp:texdis:td199.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Openness, Inflation, and the Phillips Curve: A Puzzle.. (2002). Temple, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:34:y:2002:i:2:p:450-68.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Recent developments in monetary policy analysis: the roles of theory and evidence. (2002). McCallum, Bennett.
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2002:i:win:p:67-96.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Optimal Commitment Policy Under Noisy Information. (2002). aoki, kosuke.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3370.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees. (2002). Sibert, Anne ; Mihov, Ilian.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3278.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the EMU – A Survey of the Issues. (2001). .
    In: Empirica.
    RePEc:kap:empiri:v:28:y:2001:i:4:p:325-351.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences. (2001). Sibert, Anne.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3113.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Labour Market Reform and Monetary Policy in EMU: Do Asymmetries Matter?. (2001). Viegi, Nicola ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2979.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy. (2001). Viegi, Nicola ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2671.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bde:wpaper:0106.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Beyond The Design Of Monetary Policy Alone: Fiscal Commitment, Macro Coordination, And Structural Adjustment. (2000). Begg, David.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2637.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. (2000). Geraats, Petra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2582.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. One Size Must Fit All. National Divergences in a Monetary Union. (2000). Hefeker, Carsten ; Gros, Daniel.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_326.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations. (1999). Sibert, Anne.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2328.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments. (1999). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Demertzis, Maria.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2219.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2195.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Money demand and seignorage - maximizing inflation. (1992). Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus ; Mauro, Paolo ; Easterly, William.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1049.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Lessons from the heterodox stabilization programs. (1991). Kiguel, Miguel A. ; Liviatan, Nissan.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:671.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Money, inflation, and deficit in Egypt. (1990). Dinh, Hinh T. ; Giugale, Marcelo .
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:553.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Some implications of policy games for high inflation economies. (1990). Kiguel, Miguel A. ; Liviatan, Nissan.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:379.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. The old and the new in heterodox stabilization programs : lessons from the 1960s and the 1980s. (1989). Kiguel, Miguel A. ; Liviatan, Nissan.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:323.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

51. Inflationary rigidities and stabilization policies. (1988). Kiguel, Miguel A. ; Liviatan, Nissan.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

52. Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank. (). Missale, Alessandro ; Falcetti, Elisabetta.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:169.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

53. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

Report date: 2025-02-19 06:43:48 || Missing content? Let us know