1. BEHAVIORAL MONETARY POLICYMAKING: ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGY. (2019). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
   In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
   RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19105.

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2. The politics of central bank independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
   In: DNB Working Papers.
   RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:539.

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3. Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism of Central Banks: A Dynamic Approach. (2016). Berlemann, Michael ; Hielscher, Kai .
   In: Annals of Economics and Finance.
   RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2016:v:17:i:1:berlemann.

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4. Central Bank Independence : a speech at the 2015 Herbert Stein Memorial Lecture National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., November 4, 2015.. (2015). Fischer, Stanley.
   In: Speech.
   RePEc:fip:fedgsq:873.

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5. .

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6. The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach. (2014). Kim, Sehjeong ; Jaeck, Louis.
   In: International Advances in Economic Research.
   RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:20:y:2014:i:1:p:73-86:10.1007/s11294-013-9449-5.

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7. The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s. (2014). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
   In: International Review of Economics & Finance.
   RePEc:eee:reveco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:217-227.

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8. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2013). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Landstrom, Mats ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
   In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
   RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:41:y:2013:i:4:p:427-438.

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9. Are Central Bank Independence Reforms Necessary for Achieving Low and Stable Inflation?. (2013). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Landstrom, Mats ; Rudholm, Niklas.
   In: HUI Working Papers.
   RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0095.

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10. Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries. (2013). Berlemann, Michael ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:60:y:2013:i:3:p:267-290.

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11. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements – Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
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12. Introduction [to Handbook of Post-Keynesian Economics: Oxford University Press: USA].. (2012). Kriesler, Peter ; Harcourt, Geoff(rey).
    In: Discussion Papers.
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13. The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?. (2012). Petrevski, Goran ; Bogoev, Jane ; Sergi, Bruno S..
    In: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.
    RePEc:mes:postke:v:34:y:2012:i:4:p:611-652.

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14. Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence. (2012). Hueng, C..
    In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
    RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:111-126.

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15. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hlj:hljwrp:34-2012.

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16. Social trust and central-bank independence. (2012). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen .
    In: HUI Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0066.

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17. The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence. (2012). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:286-301.

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18. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1225.

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19. A Time-varying Indicator of Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism. (2011). Berlemann, Michael ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2011_112.

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20. The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence. (2011). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3396.

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21. Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler. (2011). Schiereck, Dirk ; Mietzner, Mark .
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:92-100.

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22. Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries. (2010). Berlemann, Michael ; Hilscher, Kai .
    In: HWWI Research Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:2-21.

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23. Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism. (2009). Berlemann, Michael ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2009_089.

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24. Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting.The Case of Romania. (2009). DUMITER, Florin Cornel .
    In: Romanian Economic Journal.
    RePEc:rej:journl:v:12:y:2009:i:33:p:23-60.

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25. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2009). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
    In: Ratio Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0143.

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26. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2008). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
    In: Umeå Economic Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:umnees:0733.

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27. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2008). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
    In: HUI Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0013.

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28. Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set. (2007). Sturm, Jan-Egbert ; Dreher, Axel ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: KOF Working papers.
    RePEc:kof:wpskof:07-167.

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29. Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s. (2007). schneider, friedrich ; Freytag, Andreas.
    In: Jena Economic Research Papers.
    RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-002.

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30. Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set. (2007). Sturm, Jan-Egbert ; Dreher, Axel ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2045.

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31. Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s. (2007). schneider, friedrich ; Freytag, Andreas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2001.

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32. Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece. (2006). Panagiotidis, Theodore ; TRIAMPELLA, Afroditi.
    In: REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL ROSARIO.
    RePEc:col:000151:002112.

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33. Central Bank Independence and Inflation: The case of Greece. (2005). Panagiotidis, Theodore ; Triampella, Afrodit.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2005_7.

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34. The Role of Politics and Institutions in LDC Currency Devaluations. (2004). Shortland, Anja.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lec:leecon:04/30.

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35. Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries. (2003). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; de Luna, Xavier.
    In: Umeå Economic Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:umnees:0589.

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36. ‘Independence’ and the founding of the Federal Reserve. (2003). Forder, James.
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:3:p:297-310.

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37. Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Beblavý, Miroslav ; BADRAN, rema ; Beblavy, Miroslav.
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:1:p:61-68.

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38. Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?. (2003). Sterne, Gabriel ; Stasavage, David ; Chortareas, Georgios.
    In: Manchester School.
    RePEc:bla:manchs:v:71:y:2003:i:5:p:521-540.

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39. Interests and Independence: The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy. (2002). Forder, James.
    In: International Review of Applied Economics.
    RePEc:taf:irapec:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:51-69.

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40. Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence. (2001). Bibow, Joerg.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0108004.

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41. Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination. (2001). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd ; BADRAN, rema.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0103006.

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42. Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations. (2001). Freytag, Andreas.
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:2001:22.

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43. Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations. (2001). Freytag, Andreas.
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:2001:22.

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44. Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?. (2001). Sturm, Jan-Egbert ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: CCSO Working Papers.
    RePEc:gro:rugccs:200101.

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45. Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?. (2001). Sturm, Jan-Egbert ; de Haan, Jakob ; BADRAN, rema.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_511.

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46. Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks. (2000). Forder, James.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
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47. Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator. (2000). de Haan, Jakob ; Kooi, Willem J..
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:24:y:2000:i:4:p:643-664.

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48. Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification. (1999). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob ; Amtenbrink, F. ; S. C. W. EIJFFINGER, .
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1999:23.

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49. Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification. (1999). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob ; Amtenbrink, F. ; S. C. W. EIJFFINGER, .
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
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50. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. (1999). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gla:glaewp:9814.

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51. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. (1999). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_190.

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52. The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources. (1998). Forder, James.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:53-71.

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53. A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank. (1997). de Haan, Jakob ; Berger, Helge.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_131.

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