ABSTRACT In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic... more ABSTRACT In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. I show that in Book 4 this method is a key moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits, tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of method is never separated from the experience of questioning the dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.
Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization, and use this as evidenc... more Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization, and use this as evidence to show that Plato left the dialogue incomplete or that old age had decreased the philosophical quality of his writing. However, the Laws can be shown to be answering a lucid question according to a discernable logical structure, and the specific proposals set forth can be understood as corresponding to this structure. The Laws constitutes part of an actual political founding. As such, the dialogue treats the acts of lawgiving, and not the nature of laws themselves. The Athenian stranger, evidently a philosopher, presents an account of lawgiving that is alternative to the traditional understanding of lawgiving as transmitted by divinely inspired poetry (624b, 747e).
In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. ... more In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. I show that in Book 4 this method is a key moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits, tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of method is never separated from the experience of questioning the dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.
Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization , and use this as eviden... more Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization , and use this as evidence to show that Plato left the dialogue incomplete or that old age had decreased the philosophical quality of his writing. However, the Laws can be shown to be answering a lucid question according to a discernable logical structure, and the specific proposals set forth can be understood as corresponding to this structure. The Laws constitutes part of an actual political founding. As such, the dialogue treats the acts of lawgiving, and not the nature of laws themselves. The Athenian stranger, evidently a philosopher, presents an account of lawgiving that is alternative to the traditional understanding of lawgiving as transmitted by divinely inspired poetry (624b, 747e).
ABSTRACT In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic... more ABSTRACT In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. I show that in Book 4 this method is a key moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits, tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of method is never separated from the experience of questioning the dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.
Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization, and use this as evidenc... more Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization, and use this as evidence to show that Plato left the dialogue incomplete or that old age had decreased the philosophical quality of his writing. However, the Laws can be shown to be answering a lucid question according to a discernable logical structure, and the specific proposals set forth can be understood as corresponding to this structure. The Laws constitutes part of an actual political founding. As such, the dialogue treats the acts of lawgiving, and not the nature of laws themselves. The Athenian stranger, evidently a philosopher, presents an account of lawgiving that is alternative to the traditional understanding of lawgiving as transmitted by divinely inspired poetry (624b, 747e).
In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. ... more In this article I discuss Plato’s use of method in the Republic in light of the Socratic method. I show that in Book 4 this method is a key moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits, tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of method is never separated from the experience of questioning the dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.
Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization , and use this as eviden... more Some commentators argue that the Laws does not have a clear organization , and use this as evidence to show that Plato left the dialogue incomplete or that old age had decreased the philosophical quality of his writing. However, the Laws can be shown to be answering a lucid question according to a discernable logical structure, and the specific proposals set forth can be understood as corresponding to this structure. The Laws constitutes part of an actual political founding. As such, the dialogue treats the acts of lawgiving, and not the nature of laws themselves. The Athenian stranger, evidently a philosopher, presents an account of lawgiving that is alternative to the traditional understanding of lawgiving as transmitted by divinely inspired poetry (624b, 747e).
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Papers by Beth L'Arrivee
moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits,
tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant
regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of
method is never separated from the experience of questioning the
dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul
and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the
Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.
moment in the conversion from a political way of life (where habits,
tastes and beliefs are conditionally deduced from the dominant
regime) to the philosophic way of life, in that Socrates’s account of
method is never separated from the experience of questioning the
dialogue incites. The Socratic account of method differs from our modern conception of method in that it is never presented abstractly or with finality. It is learned by experiencing its application to the constitution of one’s own soul. Socrates’s use of questioning and agreement (i.e., elenchus) prepares the soul to apply the method in a way that reveals the contradictions between the city and the soul
and the questions these contradictions raise. I conclude that questioning and method taken together constitute a decisive but often overlooked moment in the philosophic conversion presented in the
Republic, and suggest that contemporary political theory would benefit from a return to the method that implicates the questioner herself in the search for knowledge of justice.