Publications of the Institute of Cognitive Science (PICS), 2024
I analyse the paradigm shift in cognitive sciences towards a pragmatist approach, known as post-c... more I analyse the paradigm shift in cognitive sciences towards a pragmatist approach, known as post-cognitivism, which recognises that cognition depends not only on the brain, but also on the dispositions of the body and the environment. This approach emerges from the convergence between pragmatist, computationalist and evolutionary analytical currents, and more dialectical and hermeneutic continental currents. Although apparently divergent, I point out that both currents share the concept of habitus as a routine and optimising dynamic. In dialogue with various authors such as M. Heras-Escribano, K. Friston, E. Di Paolo or J. Bruineberg, I show how their "habit-centred epistemology" leads to other assumptions and another normativity for the cognitive sciences, which reveals that they understand cognition as exclusively focused on the search for adaptation, equilibrium, "homeostasis" or prediction of the environment, in short, they start from a principle similar to that which governs the balance between supply and demand. I make some objections to this view. Furthermore, I propose to explore a marginal conception of habitus in the history of these sciences, inspired by Deleuze's work. This approach conceptualises habitus avoiding a mechanical understanding of it, as something expansive, generating diversity and deepening and breaking with the “habit-goal dualism”. Thus, cognitive sciences are envisioned as aiming to understand cognition beyond its predictive function.
This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definit... more This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, we will first connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, we will outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach; in particular, our definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go as we will emphasize that it also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily ...
This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most
adequate defini... more This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most
adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper,
T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism
to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of
nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, first I
connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before
their progressive distancing. Finally, I outline a formulation of scientific
progress inferred from the structural realism approach. In particular, my
definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go. As
I will emphasize, this definition also provides an answer to the aforementioned
original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress
differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and
accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a
speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this
fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce.
Publications of the Institute of Cognitive Science (PICS), 2024
I analyse the paradigm shift in cognitive sciences towards a pragmatist approach, known as post-c... more I analyse the paradigm shift in cognitive sciences towards a pragmatist approach, known as post-cognitivism, which recognises that cognition depends not only on the brain, but also on the dispositions of the body and the environment. This approach emerges from the convergence between pragmatist, computationalist and evolutionary analytical currents, and more dialectical and hermeneutic continental currents. Although apparently divergent, I point out that both currents share the concept of habitus as a routine and optimising dynamic. In dialogue with various authors such as M. Heras-Escribano, K. Friston, E. Di Paolo or J. Bruineberg, I show how their "habit-centred epistemology" leads to other assumptions and another normativity for the cognitive sciences, which reveals that they understand cognition as exclusively focused on the search for adaptation, equilibrium, "homeostasis" or prediction of the environment, in short, they start from a principle similar to that which governs the balance between supply and demand. I make some objections to this view. Furthermore, I propose to explore a marginal conception of habitus in the history of these sciences, inspired by Deleuze's work. This approach conceptualises habitus avoiding a mechanical understanding of it, as something expansive, generating diversity and deepening and breaking with the “habit-goal dualism”. Thus, cognitive sciences are envisioned as aiming to understand cognition beyond its predictive function.
This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definit... more This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, we will first connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, we will outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach; in particular, our definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go as we will emphasize that it also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily ...
This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most
adequate defini... more This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most
adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper,
T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism
to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of
nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, first I
connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before
their progressive distancing. Finally, I outline a formulation of scientific
progress inferred from the structural realism approach. In particular, my
definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go. As
I will emphasize, this definition also provides an answer to the aforementioned
original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress
differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and
accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a
speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this
fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce.
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Papers by A. B. Pablos
adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper,
T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism
to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of
nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, first I
connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before
their progressive distancing. Finally, I outline a formulation of scientific
progress inferred from the structural realism approach. In particular, my
definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go. As
I will emphasize, this definition also provides an answer to the aforementioned
original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress
differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and
accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a
speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this
fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce.
adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper,
T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism
to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of
nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, first I
connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before
their progressive distancing. Finally, I outline a formulation of scientific
progress inferred from the structural realism approach. In particular, my
definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go. As
I will emphasize, this definition also provides an answer to the aforementioned
original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress
differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and
accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a
speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this
fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce.