When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga ... more When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to establish, and then turn to explain why it fails. The first main problem is that, contrary to his contemporary defenders, there is no good way to use it to reach a conclusion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of c... more The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of consciousness has not adequately distinguished between the following two claims:
(Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M.
(The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M.
While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory:
(The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.
The evil demon in the lab: skepticism, introspection, and introspection of introspection, 2020
In part one, I clarify the crucial notion of "introspection", and give novel cases for the cohere... more In part one, I clarify the crucial notion of "introspection", and give novel cases for the coherence of scenarios of local and global deception about how we access our own minds, drawing on empirical work. In part two, I evaluate a series of skeptical arguments based on such scenarios of error, and in each case explain why the skeptical argument fails. The first main upshot is that we should not overestimate what it takes to introspect: introspection need not be accurate, or non-inferential, or exclusive of perception, or even exclusive of confabulation. The second main upshot is that, while skeptical challenges by figures such as Carruthers, Doris, and Schwitzgebel are rich and empirically informed, these skeptical challenges founder on how they are epistemologically under-informed.
Suppose that, having concluded that there’s an external world, Moore forges on, and reasons along... more Suppose that, having concluded that there’s an external world, Moore forges on, and reasons along the following lines:
This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world ... more This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world of our own minds. I start by arguing that the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology has been widely misconstrued---we need to reconfigure the debate in order to see how it can arise about our access to the internal world. I then argue for the coherence of scenarios of radical deception about our own minds, and I use them to defend a properly formulated internalist view about our access to our minds. The overarching lesson is that general epistemology and the specialized epistemology of introspection need to talk---each has much to learn from each other.
In cases of cognitive penetration, the way you see the world is shaped by your prior expectations... more In cases of cognitive penetration, the way you see the world is shaped by your prior expectations or other cognitive states. But what is cognitive penetration exactly? What are the consequences for epistemology if it sometimes happens? What are the consequences for epistemology if it never happens?
This paper surveys answers to these questions and argues that cognitive penetration has implications for epistemology whether it ever happens or not.
This Stanford Encyclopedia entry surveys interactions between the epistemology of perception and ... more This Stanford Encyclopedia entry surveys interactions between the epistemology of perception and the philosophy of mind.
When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga ... more When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to establish, and then turn to explain why it fails. The first main problem is that, contrary to his contemporary defenders, there is no good way to use it to reach a conclusion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of c... more The massive debate in philosophy and psychology and neuroscience about higher-order theories of consciousness has not adequately distinguished between the following two claims:
(Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M.
(The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M.
While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory:
(The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.
The evil demon in the lab: skepticism, introspection, and introspection of introspection, 2020
In part one, I clarify the crucial notion of "introspection", and give novel cases for the cohere... more In part one, I clarify the crucial notion of "introspection", and give novel cases for the coherence of scenarios of local and global deception about how we access our own minds, drawing on empirical work. In part two, I evaluate a series of skeptical arguments based on such scenarios of error, and in each case explain why the skeptical argument fails. The first main upshot is that we should not overestimate what it takes to introspect: introspection need not be accurate, or non-inferential, or exclusive of perception, or even exclusive of confabulation. The second main upshot is that, while skeptical challenges by figures such as Carruthers, Doris, and Schwitzgebel are rich and empirically informed, these skeptical challenges founder on how they are epistemologically under-informed.
Suppose that, having concluded that there’s an external world, Moore forges on, and reasons along... more Suppose that, having concluded that there’s an external world, Moore forges on, and reasons along the following lines:
This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world ... more This paper examines how new evil demon problems could arise for our access to the internal world of our own minds. I start by arguing that the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology has been widely misconstrued---we need to reconfigure the debate in order to see how it can arise about our access to the internal world. I then argue for the coherence of scenarios of radical deception about our own minds, and I use them to defend a properly formulated internalist view about our access to our minds. The overarching lesson is that general epistemology and the specialized epistemology of introspection need to talk---each has much to learn from each other.
In cases of cognitive penetration, the way you see the world is shaped by your prior expectations... more In cases of cognitive penetration, the way you see the world is shaped by your prior expectations or other cognitive states. But what is cognitive penetration exactly? What are the consequences for epistemology if it sometimes happens? What are the consequences for epistemology if it never happens?
This paper surveys answers to these questions and argues that cognitive penetration has implications for epistemology whether it ever happens or not.
This Stanford Encyclopedia entry surveys interactions between the epistemology of perception and ... more This Stanford Encyclopedia entry surveys interactions between the epistemology of perception and the philosophy of mind.
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Papers by Nico Silins
(Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M.
(The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M.
While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory:
(The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.
This paper surveys answers to these questions and argues that cognitive penetration has implications for epistemology whether it ever happens or not.
(Necessary Awareness): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M.
(The Higher-Order Theory): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then M is conscious because S is aware of M.
While I will assume that the first claim is true, I will argue that we should reject higher-order theories of consciousness. We should turn them on their head to go with the following theory:
(The Ascending Road): For any conscious mental state M and subject S, if S is in M, then S is aware of M because M is conscious.
This paper surveys answers to these questions and argues that cognitive penetration has implications for epistemology whether it ever happens or not.