Books by Christopher M Bell
The failed naval offensive to force a passage through the Straits of the Dardanelles in 1915 drov... more The failed naval offensive to force a passage through the Straits of the Dardanelles in 1915 drove Winston Churchill from office in disgrace and nearly destroyed his political career. For over a century, the Dardanelles campaign has been mired in myth and controversy. For some, it was a brilliant concept that might have dramatically shortened the First World War and saved millions of lives. For others, it was fundamentally misconceived and doomed to fail. Churchill is either the hero of the story, or the villain.
Drawing on a wide range of original documents, Christopher M. Bell shows that both perspectives are flawed. Bell provides a detailed and authoritative account of the campaigns origins and execution, explaining why the naval attack was launched, why it failed, and how it was transformed into an even more disastrous campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula. He untangles Churchill's complicated relationship with Britain's admirals, politicians, and senior civil servants, and uncovers the machinations behind the bitter press campaign in 1915 to drive him from power.
The book goes on to explore the origins of the myths surrounding the ill-fated campaign. It provides the first full account of Churchill's tireless efforts in the decades after 1915 to refute his legion of critics and convince the public that the Dardanelles campaign had nearly succeeded. Largely by his own exertions, Churchill ensured that the legacy of the Dardanelles would not stop him becoming Prime Minister in 1940.
Introduction: Sea Power in the Age of Churchill W inston Churchill enjoyed a longer and closer re... more Introduction: Sea Power in the Age of Churchill W inston Churchill enjoyed a longer and closer relationship with the Royal Navy than any British politician of the twentieth century. In 1911, at the relatively young age of thirty-six, Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, the political head of the British navy. He threw himself into the task of preparing the service for war, and presided over its fortunes until May 1915, when a political crisis, partly of his own making, drove him from offi ce in disgrace. His reputation as a strategist and war leader was badly damaged by his prominent role in the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign, although his political career soon revived. Churchill's part in the Dardanelles was eventually overshadowed in the public mind by his warnings about Adolf Hitler and high-profi le fi ght for rearmament during the 1930s. Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty again on 3 September 1939, the day Britain declared war on Nazi Germany, but he remained at this post less than a year, during which time he presided over a second failed campaign, this time in Norway. This new disaster evoked memories of the Dardanelles and sparked another political crisis, but rather than being cast back into the political wilderness, as some observers hoped, Churchill emerged as prime minister. Acting as his own Minister of Defence, he shaped British grand strategy and oversaw all three fi ghting services for the duration of the Second World War.
is is the first study to show how the Royal Navy’s ideas about the meaning and application of sea... more is is the first study to show how the Royal Navy’s ideas about the meaning and application of seapower shaped its policies in the interwar period. Drawing on a wide range of unpublished sources, the author challenges the accepted view that the intellectual shortcomings of Britain’s naval leaders resulted in poor strategic planning and an inability to meet the challenges of the Second World War.
This book provides the first comprehensive survey of the navy’s strategies for dealing with possible wars with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and even the United States. It argues that the “Singapore Strategy” has been widely misunderstood, that there was in fact more than one strategy developed for war with Japan, that the navy’s war plans placed greater emphasis on maritime economic pressure than decisive sea battles, and that the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the interwar navy has been greatly exaggerated.
The author also reveals how the “One Power Standard” did not fundamentally affect the outcome of the navy’s ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, how the service’s interest in “showing the flag” abroad was linked to its concerns over the health of the naval armaments industry at home, and how the navy reluctantly employed propaganda between the wars to revive its popularity with the British public.
The book argues that naval leaders possessed a more sophisticated and flexible understanding of the strengths and limitations of sea power than previous studies have recognized, and that Britain’s strategic position during the 1930s would have been stronger if their advice had been followed. The author concludes that the navy’s efforts to shape British grand strategy were largely unsuccessful, however, because civilian decision-makers often had different views about the role of sea power in the modern world.
Few navies have been immune from mutiny in the twentieth century, but the question of how and why... more Few navies have been immune from mutiny in the twentieth century, but the question of how and why naval discipline sometimes breaks down has received little scholarly attention. This book brings together a set of readable and up-to-date essays examining mutinies in the navies of Russia (the Potemkin mutiny, 1905), Brazil (1910), Austria-Hungary (1918), Germany (1918), France (1919), Australia (1919), Chile (1931), Great Britain (the Invergordon mutiny, 1931), the United States (the Port Chicago mutiny, 1944), India (1946), China (1949), and Canada (1949).
The nature of these incidents varied widely, but all represented a deliberate assault on naval or political authority. The objectives of the mutineers ranged from limited reforms of a purely naval nature to overtly political goals and, in rare cases, to outright revolution. The first twelve chapters in this book address the causes of a particular mutiny, its long-and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. Taking advantage of new research and new methodologies, the contributors provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader.
The volume concludes with an essay by the editors shedding important new light on the dynamics at work in the outbreak, development, and resolution of modern naval mutinies. It shows that mutinies in democratic, western states usually differed fundamentally from those in authoritarian regimes or less-developed societies. In the former, incidents were usually short-lived and non-violent. They tended to spread easily from ship to ship, but the mutineers' demands remained moderate and limited. In the latter, mutinies were less frequent, but were more often characterized by violence, escalating demands, and revolutionary intent.
Looking forward, the authors' conclude that the days when sailors might rebel against their immediate superiors to seize control of a warship are probably long gone. But as long as western states rely on broad and imprecise definitions, incidents will continue to occur that meet all of the legal criteria for mutiny, even if there is a reluctance to use the term. The potential for major naval mutinies probably remains, however, in non-democratic states like China and throughout the underdeveloped world.
At the Crossroads Between Peace and War provides fresh perspectives on the international strategi... more At the Crossroads Between Peace and War provides fresh perspectives on the international strategic environment between the two world wars. At London in 1930, an important arms control agreement was concluded by the United States, Great Britain and Japan to control the international competition in naval armaments. In particular, agreement was reached about how many heavy cruisers the major naval powers could possess. On the surface, the London Conference was a success – the great powers cooperated to control their rivalries in armaments. But France and Italy refused to participate in the treaty, and within a few years growing antagonisms among the great powers manifested itself in the complete breakdown of the interwar arms control regime negotiated at London. In this volume, a team of leading international scholars shows how the London Conference represents a turning point in the history of the interwar period. An examination of yesterday’s competition among the great powers to fight at sea offers sobering lessons for national security professionals concerned with the current-day naval, cyber, and aerospace competition in Asia.
Papers by Christopher M Bell
The Allied failure to close the mid-Atlantic " air gap " before May 1943 is widely attributed to ... more The Allied failure to close the mid-Atlantic " air gap " before May 1943 is widely attributed to the prioritization of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany over the allocation of long range aircraft to trade defense. This article demonstrates that delays in acquiring Very Long Range aircraft for the " air gap " were the result of bureaucratic muddle rather than deliberate obstruction by the Air Ministry, Bomber Command, or Winston Churchill. It shows that the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command possessed enough aircraft to have provided air cover for convoys in the mid-Atlantic much sooner than it did. The Admiralty and Coastal Command were both slow to identify the need for land-based air cover in the mid-Atlantic because the threat did not develop until mid-1942, and because they initially assumed that the problem would be solved with escort carriers.
Revisionist historians have argued that in July 1914 Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winst... more Revisionist historians have argued that in July 1914 Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was preparing to implement a “Naval Revolution” based on radical ideas they attribute to Admiral Sir John Fisher. This article examines Fisher’s influence on Churchill in 1911-1914. By subjecting the revisionist argument to rigorous scrutiny, it demonstrates that Churchill did not embrace either ‘flotilla defence’ or the ‘battle-cruiser concept’, the two central components of Fisher’s supposed radical agenda. On the eve of war, Churchill’s immediate goals were neither revolutionary nor inspired by Fisher. The weakness of the revisionists’ argument undermines their broad interpretation of naval policy during the Fisher era.
The imperial dimensions of British naval policy in the years leading up to the First World War ha... more The imperial dimensions of British naval policy in the years leading up to the First World War have been overshadowed by Anglo-Germany naval rivalry, and for good reason. Germany's powerful High Seas Fleet posed a direct threat to the heart of the empire, and British naval preparations were naturally focussed on the North Sea rather than more distant waters. Most studies of British naval policy during this period, following the lead of Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, omit imperial concerns altogether, ignoring not just preparations for the defence of British interests outside European waters, but also the development of autonomous navies by Britain's self-governing Dominions. 1 Scholarship on the new Dominion navies, which might be expected to fill this gap, has been dominated instead by national and regional concerns. 2 Recent interest in the Admiralty's approach to imperial defence has been largely confined to a small school of revisionist historians whose conclusions are warped by their controversial views on the broad outlines of British naval policy in 1904-1914. According to the revisionists, British naval leaders were not so preoccupied with Germany and the naval balance in the North Sea that they neglected the threat to trade and imperial interests in distant waters, particularly that posed by the French and Russian navies. To meet this danger at a manageable cost, Admiral Sir John ('Jacky') Fisher, Britain's First Sea Lord from 1904-1910, allegedly developed secret plans to transform the navy's force structure.
War in History, Jul 2013
This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the July 2011 article ‘Sir John Fisher’s N... more This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the July 2011 article ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’, which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a ‘naval revolution’ based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert’s criticisms are unfounded, and provides additional evidence to support an alternative interpretation of British naval policy in the period 1912-14. Important changes were undoubtedly under way on the eve of the First World War, but the revisionists exaggerate Fisher’s influence and over-simplify an inherently complex decision-making process. The Admiralty’s plan to substitute torpedo craft for some of the battleships in its 1914 programme was intended to bolster a conservative strategy, and the changes under consideration were essentially evolutionary in nature.
War in History, 2011
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on ... more This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a “naval revolution” based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher’s concept of “flotilla defence” in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to protect Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean, a secondary theatre, but he still believed that Britain must maintain a preponderance of strength over Germany in capital ships in the North Sea. Churchill’s strategic views were generally conservative. He hoped that new designs or new technologies would one day allow submarines to supplant battleships, and he actively supported measures that might help to make this possible. But there is no evidence that he and his naval advisers were ready to gamble on a radical departure in force structure or naval strategy on the eve of the First World War.
Journal of Military History, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 523 56., 2010
Between 1919 and 1932, successive British governments instructed the armed services to frame thei... more Between 1919 and 1932, successive British governments instructed the armed services to frame their policies on the assumption that they would not face a major conflict for a period of ten years. The 'ten year rule', as this guideline later became known, was long regarded by scholars as the basis of Treasury control over British service policies throughout this entire period. This view was corrected in the mid-1980s by John Ferris, who demonstrated that the significance of the ten year rule had been exaggerated and misunderstood. Through his examination of British strategic foreign policy during the years 1919-1926, Ferris revealed the fallacies of the then-orthodox view: the Treasury did not enjoy virtually unlimited power to cut service estimates during these years; the ten year rule had little impact on service policies prior to 1924; and it did not begin to take on the characteristics typically ascribed to it until 1924-1926. The subsequent history of the ten year rule has been less 1 controversial. During the years 1925-1932, it operated largely as historians had always thought it 2 did: as a means for the Treasury to strengthen its control over defence expenditure.
Journal of British Studies, vol. 48, no. 3 (July 2009), 695-716. , Jul 2009
The new social order that many hoped would emerge from the First World War failed to materialize ... more The new social order that many hoped would emerge from the First World War failed to materialize in interwar Britain. The nation's political, professional, and commercial elites continued to be recruited predominantly from families that could afford expensive public school educations for their sons. 1 The national education system was maintained in a manner calculated to buttress the existing social structure rather than to foster upward mobility. State-funded education allowed, even encouraged, a modest number of working-class children to move from elementary to secondary schools, thus enabling them to rise into the lower rungs of the middle class, but access to the nation's elite public schools, and thence the professional and higher middle classes, was virtually closed to the working-and lower-middle classes. 2 Critics of the educational system were increasingly vocal throughout the interwar period, but the succession of Conservative and Conservative-dominated governments, supported by like-minded officials at the Board of Education, successfully defended the autonomy of the nation's public schools and
The Unwilling and the Reluctant: Perspectives on Military Disobedience in the Canadian Forces, 2006
Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective, ed. Christopher M. Bell and Bruce Elleman, 2003
For two days in the autumn of 1931, the Royal Navy's Atlantic Fleet, anchored in the Cromarty Fir... more For two days in the autumn of 1931, the Royal Navy's Atlantic Fleet, anchored in the Cromarty Firth near Invergordon, was in a state of open mutiny. Four of the fleet's capital ships were unable to leave harbour for exercises on the morning of 15 September. On some ships men actively interfered with preparations for sailing; on others, ratings simply refused to fall in for duty. Most regarded this action as little more than a 'down tools' industrial strike. It was hoped that by refusing duty, the government would be compelled to ameliorate the pay cuts about to be imposed on the lower deck.
Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars, 2003
in Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, ed. Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, Westport, CN: Praeger, 2005, pp. 139-55. , 2005
In the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, the Royal Navy devote... more In the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, the Royal Navy devoted more energy and resources to preparing for war with Japan than it did for war with either Germany or Italy. Yet when hostilities finally broke out in the Pacific in December 1941, Britain's naval resources were fully committed to operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The result was a series of humiliating naval defeats in the Far East. The navy's critics have often linked faulty intelligence assessments to defects in the Admiralty's strategic appreciations during the 1930s, and to the operational failures of 1941-42. Thus, it is alleged that the to discover the characteristics of Japanese warships and to estimate the quality of the Japanese navy crippled British naval planning against Japan and ultimately led to the destruction of the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse off the Malayan coast in December 1941.
English Historical Review, vol. 116, issue 467 (June 2001), 604-34., Jun 2001
On the evening of 8 December 1941, two British capital shipsthe newly-completed battleship HMS Pr... more On the evening of 8 December 1941, two British capital shipsthe newly-completed battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the First World War-era battlecruiser HMS Repulseset out from the naval base at Singapore to disrupt Japanese landings in Malaya and Thailand. Under the command of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, the two ships and four destroyers which accompanied them were code-named Force Z. The decision to seek out enemy forces was a calculated gamble. As the Royal Air Force could not provide continuous air cover for these ships as they traversed the South China Sea, Phillips had to count on speed and surprise for protection. The gamble did not pay off.
Journal of Strategic Studies, Sep 1997
Book Reviews by Christopher M Bell
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Books by Christopher M Bell
Drawing on a wide range of original documents, Christopher M. Bell shows that both perspectives are flawed. Bell provides a detailed and authoritative account of the campaigns origins and execution, explaining why the naval attack was launched, why it failed, and how it was transformed into an even more disastrous campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula. He untangles Churchill's complicated relationship with Britain's admirals, politicians, and senior civil servants, and uncovers the machinations behind the bitter press campaign in 1915 to drive him from power.
The book goes on to explore the origins of the myths surrounding the ill-fated campaign. It provides the first full account of Churchill's tireless efforts in the decades after 1915 to refute his legion of critics and convince the public that the Dardanelles campaign had nearly succeeded. Largely by his own exertions, Churchill ensured that the legacy of the Dardanelles would not stop him becoming Prime Minister in 1940.
This book provides the first comprehensive survey of the navy’s strategies for dealing with possible wars with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and even the United States. It argues that the “Singapore Strategy” has been widely misunderstood, that there was in fact more than one strategy developed for war with Japan, that the navy’s war plans placed greater emphasis on maritime economic pressure than decisive sea battles, and that the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the interwar navy has been greatly exaggerated.
The author also reveals how the “One Power Standard” did not fundamentally affect the outcome of the navy’s ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, how the service’s interest in “showing the flag” abroad was linked to its concerns over the health of the naval armaments industry at home, and how the navy reluctantly employed propaganda between the wars to revive its popularity with the British public.
The book argues that naval leaders possessed a more sophisticated and flexible understanding of the strengths and limitations of sea power than previous studies have recognized, and that Britain’s strategic position during the 1930s would have been stronger if their advice had been followed. The author concludes that the navy’s efforts to shape British grand strategy were largely unsuccessful, however, because civilian decision-makers often had different views about the role of sea power in the modern world.
The nature of these incidents varied widely, but all represented a deliberate assault on naval or political authority. The objectives of the mutineers ranged from limited reforms of a purely naval nature to overtly political goals and, in rare cases, to outright revolution. The first twelve chapters in this book address the causes of a particular mutiny, its long-and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. Taking advantage of new research and new methodologies, the contributors provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader.
The volume concludes with an essay by the editors shedding important new light on the dynamics at work in the outbreak, development, and resolution of modern naval mutinies. It shows that mutinies in democratic, western states usually differed fundamentally from those in authoritarian regimes or less-developed societies. In the former, incidents were usually short-lived and non-violent. They tended to spread easily from ship to ship, but the mutineers' demands remained moderate and limited. In the latter, mutinies were less frequent, but were more often characterized by violence, escalating demands, and revolutionary intent.
Looking forward, the authors' conclude that the days when sailors might rebel against their immediate superiors to seize control of a warship are probably long gone. But as long as western states rely on broad and imprecise definitions, incidents will continue to occur that meet all of the legal criteria for mutiny, even if there is a reluctance to use the term. The potential for major naval mutinies probably remains, however, in non-democratic states like China and throughout the underdeveloped world.
Papers by Christopher M Bell
Book Reviews by Christopher M Bell
Drawing on a wide range of original documents, Christopher M. Bell shows that both perspectives are flawed. Bell provides a detailed and authoritative account of the campaigns origins and execution, explaining why the naval attack was launched, why it failed, and how it was transformed into an even more disastrous campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula. He untangles Churchill's complicated relationship with Britain's admirals, politicians, and senior civil servants, and uncovers the machinations behind the bitter press campaign in 1915 to drive him from power.
The book goes on to explore the origins of the myths surrounding the ill-fated campaign. It provides the first full account of Churchill's tireless efforts in the decades after 1915 to refute his legion of critics and convince the public that the Dardanelles campaign had nearly succeeded. Largely by his own exertions, Churchill ensured that the legacy of the Dardanelles would not stop him becoming Prime Minister in 1940.
This book provides the first comprehensive survey of the navy’s strategies for dealing with possible wars with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, and even the United States. It argues that the “Singapore Strategy” has been widely misunderstood, that there was in fact more than one strategy developed for war with Japan, that the navy’s war plans placed greater emphasis on maritime economic pressure than decisive sea battles, and that the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on the interwar navy has been greatly exaggerated.
The author also reveals how the “One Power Standard” did not fundamentally affect the outcome of the navy’s ongoing struggle with the Treasury for funds, how the service’s interest in “showing the flag” abroad was linked to its concerns over the health of the naval armaments industry at home, and how the navy reluctantly employed propaganda between the wars to revive its popularity with the British public.
The book argues that naval leaders possessed a more sophisticated and flexible understanding of the strengths and limitations of sea power than previous studies have recognized, and that Britain’s strategic position during the 1930s would have been stronger if their advice had been followed. The author concludes that the navy’s efforts to shape British grand strategy were largely unsuccessful, however, because civilian decision-makers often had different views about the role of sea power in the modern world.
The nature of these incidents varied widely, but all represented a deliberate assault on naval or political authority. The objectives of the mutineers ranged from limited reforms of a purely naval nature to overtly political goals and, in rare cases, to outright revolution. The first twelve chapters in this book address the causes of a particular mutiny, its long-and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. Taking advantage of new research and new methodologies, the contributors provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader.
The volume concludes with an essay by the editors shedding important new light on the dynamics at work in the outbreak, development, and resolution of modern naval mutinies. It shows that mutinies in democratic, western states usually differed fundamentally from those in authoritarian regimes or less-developed societies. In the former, incidents were usually short-lived and non-violent. They tended to spread easily from ship to ship, but the mutineers' demands remained moderate and limited. In the latter, mutinies were less frequent, but were more often characterized by violence, escalating demands, and revolutionary intent.
Looking forward, the authors' conclude that the days when sailors might rebel against their immediate superiors to seize control of a warship are probably long gone. But as long as western states rely on broad and imprecise definitions, incidents will continue to occur that meet all of the legal criteria for mutiny, even if there is a reluctance to use the term. The potential for major naval mutinies probably remains, however, in non-democratic states like China and throughout the underdeveloped world.