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16th SAGT 2023: Egham, UK
- Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 16th International Symposium, SAGT 2023, Egham, UK, September 4-7, 2023, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 14238, Springer 2023, ISBN 978-3-031-43253-8
Abstract of Invited Talks
- George Christodoulou:
A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture. x - Michal Feldman:
Ambiguous Contracts. xi - Alexander Teytelboym:
Duality in Market Design. xii
Computational Aspects and Efficiency in Games
- Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Marcin Dziubinski:
Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on Networks. 3-21 - Katharina Eickhoff, Lennart Kauther, Britta Peis:
Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a Path. 22-39 - Vittorio Bilò, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Marios Mavronicolas:
Computational Complexity of Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Multi-player Games. 40-57 - Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias:
Arbitrary Profit Sharing in Federated Learning Utility Games. 58-70 - Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis:
The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing Reviews. 71-89 - Shaul Rosner, Tami Tamir:
Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation Games. 90-108
Computational Social Choice
- Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Lars Seifert:
Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games. 111-126 - Andrew Fraser, Brian Lavallee, Blair D. Sullivan:
Parameterized Complexity of Gerrymandering. 127-141 - Haris Aziz, Sujit Gujar, Manisha Padala, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen:
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting. 142-160 - Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Lukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk:
Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and Experiments. 161-178 - Cyrus Cousins, Justin Payan, Yair Zick:
Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities. 179-197 - Lata Narayanan, Yasaman Sabbagh:
Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in Networks. 198-217
Fair Division
- Sirin Botan, Angus Ritossa, Mashbat Suzuki, Toby Walsh:
Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Under Cost Utilities. 221-238 - April Niu, Agnes Totschnig, Adrian Vetta:
Fair Algorithm Design: Fair and Efficacious Machine Scheduling. 239-256 - Yusuke Kobayashi, Ryoga Mahara, Souta Sakamoto:
EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approach. 257-270 - Umang Bhaskar, Neeldhara Misra, Aditi Sethia, Rohit Vaish:
The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few Agent Types. 271-289 - Paul W. Goldberg, Kasper Høgh, Alexandros Hollender:
The Frontier of Intractability for EFX with Two Agents. 290-307
Matching and Mechanism Design
- Haris Aziz, Gergely Csáji, Ágnes Cseh:
Computational Complexity of k-Stable Matchings. 311-328 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Nidhi Rathi:
Optimizing over Serial Dictatorships. 329-346 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Shivika Narang:
Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and Efficiently. 347-364 - Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris, Rongsen Zhang:
Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations. 365-382 - Ali Khodabakhsh, Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Jimmy Horn:
Threshold Mechanisms for Dynamic Procurement with Abandonment. 383-400 - Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir:
Strategy-Proof Budgeting via a VCG-Like Mechanism. 401-418
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