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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 54
Volume 54, Number 1, January 2006
- Christopher M. Anderson, Louis Putterman:
Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. 1-24 - Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad:
The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note. 25-30 - Indranil Chakraborty:
Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry. 31-46 - Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak:
Approval voting with endogenous candidates. 47-76 - Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko, Andriy Zapechelnyuk:
Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games. 77-94 - Jim Engle-Warnick, Robert L. Slonim:
Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games. 95-114 - Marek Kaminski:
Parametric rationing methods. 115-133 - John Morgan, Henrik Orzen, Martin Sefton:
An experimental study of price dispersion. 134-158 - Charles H. Mullin, David H. Reiley:
Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining. 159-182 - Tibor Neugebauer, Reinhard Selten:
Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets. 183-204 - Jos A. M. Potters, Hans Reijnierse, Amit Biswas:
The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks. 205-225 - Abraham L. Wickelgren:
The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies. 226-240
Volume 54, Number 2, February 2006
- Christopher P. Chambers:
Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity. 241-260 - Martin Dindos, Claudio Mezzetti:
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games. 261-292 - Armin Falk, Urs Fischbacher:
A theory of reciprocity. 293-315 - Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Soenje Reiche:
Dynamic yardstick mechanisms. 316-335 - Douglas Gale, Hamid Sabourian:
Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games. 336-352 - Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Jurjen Kamphorst:
Network formation with heterogeneous players. 353-372 - Francesc Llerena, Carles Rafels:
The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games. 373-379 - Maria Montero:
Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games. 380-397 - Sangkyu Rhee:
Allocation problems among sharing groups. 398-418
- Jesús Mario Bilbao, N. Jiménez, Jorge Jesús López Vázquez:
A note on a value with incomplete communication. 419-429 - Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi:
Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. 430-440
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