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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 82
Volume 82, November 2013
- Fuhito Kojima
:
Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand. 1-14 - Pinghan Liang:
Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary. 15-30 - Dinah Rosenberg, Antoine Salomon, Nicolas Vieille:
On games of strategic experimentation. 31-51 - Andreas D. Pape, Kenneth J. Kurtz:
Evaluating case-based decision theory: Predicting empirical patterns of human classification learning. 52-65 - Ozan Candogan, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parrilo:
Dynamics in near-potential games. 66-90 - Julian Wright:
Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets. 91-102 - Rogério Mazali, José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto:
Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols. 103-131 - Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Ziv Hellman, Eyal Winter:
Spectrum value for coalitional games. 132-142 - Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli:
Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility. 143-156 - William Thomson:
A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims. 157-168 - Matteo Triossi:
Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? 169-191 - Konrad Mierendorff:
The Dynamic Vickrey Auction. 192-204 - Michal Bresky:
Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. 205-217 - Ruben Juarez:
Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences. 218-239 - Sam Aflaki:
The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons. 240-253 - Anthony Creane, Chiu Yu Ko, Hideo Konishi:
Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals. 254-268 - Youxin Hu, John H. Kagel, Xiaoshu Xu, Lixin Ye:
Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities. 269-291 - Felix J. Bierbrauer, Craig Brett, John A. Weymark:
Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility. 292-311 - Peter McGee:
Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values. 312-326 - Laurent Mathevet, Ina Taneva:
Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations. 327-349 - Cédric Wasser:
Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values. 350-368 - Efthymios Athanasiou:
A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good. 369-387 - Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter:
Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates. 388-402 - Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Neslihan Uler:
Understanding the reference effect. 403-423 - Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman:
Mechanism design with a restricted action space. 424-443 - Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille:
Strategic information exchange. 444-467 - Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems. 468-489 - Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen:
Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces. 490-502 - Sarah Auster:
Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard. 503-521 - Romans Pancs:
Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition. 522-543 - Yun Dai, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Han T. J. Smit, Wouter De Maeseneire:
Similar bidders in takeover contests. 544-561 - Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Pareto optimality in coalition formation. 562-581 - Daniele Condorelli:
Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources. 582-591 - Urs Fischbacher, Verena Utikal:
On the acceptance of apologies. 592-608 - Jian Yang, Xiangtong Qi:
The nonatomic supermodular game. 609-620 - Manuel Förster, Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska:
Anonymous social influence. 621-635 - Nicolas Klein:
Strategic learning in teams. 636-657 - Wieland Müller, Fangfang Tan:
Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon. 658-674 - Brian Hill:
Confidence and decision. 675-692 - Paula Jaramillo, Çagatay Kayi, Flip Klijn:
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare. 693-701 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Katrina Ligett:
Information-sharing in social networks. 702-716
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