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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 67
Volume 67, Number 1, September 2009
- David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 1 - Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. 2-21 - Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Congestion games with malicious players. 22-35 - Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
Trading networks with price-setting agents. 36-50 - Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. 51-68 - Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. 69-98 - Ron Lavi
, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. 99-124 - Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Beyond Moulin mechanisms. 125-155 - Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources. 156-173 - Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson:
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism. 174-190
- Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita:
Elections with platform and valence competition. 191-216 - Stefano Barbieri, Andrea Mattozzi:
Membership in citizen groups. 217-232 - Charles Bellemare, Bruce Shearer:
Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment. 233-244 - Peter Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro:
Competitive environments and protective behavior. 245-252 - Anabela Botelho, Glenn W. Harrison, Lígia M. Costa Pinto, E. Elisabet Rutström:
Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods. 253-265 - Péter Csóka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, László Á. Kóczy:
Stable allocations of risk. 266-276 - Yuk-fai Fong, Jay Surti:
The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments. 277-291 - Miltiadis Makris:
Private provision of discrete public goods. 292-299 - Michael Mandler:
Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade. 300-314 - Gábor Virág:
Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit. 315-330
- Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Tami Tauman:
On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets. 331-333
Volume 67, Number 2, November 2009
- Fabrizio Adriani, Luca G. Deidda:
Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities. 335-350 - Yaron Azrieli:
Categorizing others in a large game. 351-362 - Paulo Barelli:
Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria. 363-375 - James Bergin, Dan Bernhardt:
Cooperation through imitation. 376-388 - Venkataraman Bhaskar:
Games played in a contracting environment. 389-398 - Dirk Engelmann, Urs Fischbacher:
Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. 399-407 - Larry G. Epstein, Kyoungwon Seo:
Subjective states: A more robust model. 408-427 - Josep Freixas, William S. Zwicker:
Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval. 428-444 - Jacob K. Goeree, Arno Riedl, Aljaz Ule:
In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents. 445-466 - Volker Hahn:
Reciprocity and voting. 467-480 - Daniel Halbheer, Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette, Armin Schmutzler:
Self-reinforcing market dominance. 481-502 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro Chaves Rêgo:
Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness. 503-525 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch:
Farsightedly stable networks. 526-541 - Florian Herold, Christoph Kuzmics:
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. 542-551 - Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko:
Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status. 552-568 - Roger Lagunoff:
Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions. 569-583 - Wooyoung Lim, Alexander Matros:
Contests with a stochastic number of players. 584-597 - Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels:
A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game. 598-610 - Robert Powell:
Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": Allocating defensive resources prior to attack. 611-615 - E. Elisabet Rutström, Nathaniel T. Wilcox:
Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test. 616-632 - Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter:
On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability. 633-644 - Nicholas Shunda:
Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences. 645-664 - Anton Suvorov, Jeroen van de Ven:
Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism. 665-681 - Tristan Tomala:
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. 682-694 - Christian Trudeau:
Cost sharing with multiple technologies. 695-707 - Elias Tsakas, Mark Voorneveld:
The target projection dynamic. 708-719 - Alexander Wolitzky:
Fully sincere voting. 720-735
- Alexander Guembel, Silvia Rossetto:
Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding. 736-744 - John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima:
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. 745-749 - Igal Milchtaich:
Weighted congestion games with separable preferences. 750-757
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